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Abstract
The Renovation Program - ðổi Mới in Vietnam since 1986 have posed a
puzzling policy question: why have some policy areas experienced radical changes
while others have experienced only limited and incremental changes? This policy
puzzle provided the focus for this dissertation in which a model of major policy
change was developed to provide a new way of explaining the policy reforms in
Vietnam over the past two decades. The model was developed based on three bodies
of literature: (1) the most well-developed theories and models of policy change
process created in the U.S and their application to the non-U.S. policy contexts; (2)
the Policy-elite model as an alternative to explain the policy reforms in developing
countries; (3) critical and unique regime characteristics of Vietnam that play an
important role in shaping the policy contexts for the policy processes and outcomes in
Vietnam.
Taken together, these bodies of literature provided the basic concepts and
suggested potential causal mechanism of major policy change for a conceptual
framework to build a major policy change model for Vietnam. The proposed policy
model identifies four policy factors (stressor, leadership predisposition, change in
policy image and consensus on the political priority) that need to occur at different
stages of the policy process in Vietnam to make radical change happen. Owning to the
unique regime characteristics of Vietnam, the model differs from other policy process
theories and models in the way that it strongly emphasizes the role of the Communist
Party and the predisposition to reform embraced by the policy elites in the process of
major policy change. It also reflects the collective and consensus-based policy making
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style of the Vietnamese Communist Party and government in the transitional period of
the country.
The explanatory capacity of the proposed policy model was validated by four
policy case studies in higher education, international trade liberalization, state
economic sector, and legal reform in foreign investment in Vietnam. The empirical
evidence drawn from the case studies has affirmed the usefulness and relevance of the
policy factors and the causal flow embedded in the proposed model. Concretely, the
two cases with radical policy changes witnessed the presence of all four policy factors
and the processes of change followed the causal arguments of the model. Whereas, in
the two cases without radical changes, the legacy of a Socialist state in Vietnam has
impeded the significant changes in the policy image of the policy elites in respective
policy domains. As the result, no innovative policy change alternative has been
advanced to the agendas of the Vietnamese government, which in turn prohibited
radical policy changes in the areas of higher education and state-owned enterprise
over the past two decades.
In the last chapter, the cross-case comparison has found that in all four cases,
there have been strong stressors and the leaders of the Vietnamese Communist Party
and government have felt great pressure to reform. The Party has shown the
predisposition to reform in various guiding resolutions in the four policy sectors. Yet,
in the cases of higher education policy on institutional autonomy and state-owned
enterprise management policy, the lack of significant change in the policy image of
the leaders has been the main reason for the absence of innovative policy change. In
contrast, in the cases of international trade liberalization and legal reform in setting
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the level playing field for enterprises of all economic sectors, all the policy factors
have occurred to produce radical policy changes in these two areas.
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Chapter I: ðổi Mới - The Source of the Research Questions
This first chapter will provide an introduction to the dissertation. In the first
section, I am going to review the major socio-economic achievements and challenges
during the Renovation Program – ðổi Mới in Vietnam. This section provides the
reader a general background of the socio-economic situation of Vietnam over the past
two decades. The second section will introduce the policy change processes and
outcomes in some policy areas in Vietnam. This review leads to a puzzling policy
question: why have some policy areas experienced radical changes while others have
experienced modest and only incremental changes? This puzzling question suggests
the research questions for this dissertation. The last section presents how the
dissertation is structured and the main contents of each chapter.
1. Achievements and challenges in ðổi Mới
In 1986, the Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam
adopted a Renovation Program, called ðổi Mới even though the country still retains a
single-party and centralized political system with the “unquestionable” leadership of
the Vietnamese Communist Party. ðổi Mới is characterized by a shift from a “centralplanning” to a “Socialist-oriented” market economy allowing for the private economic
sector development, international economic integration and a number of legal reforms
in various policy areas.
The Renovation Program have brought about remarkable achievements for
Vietnam in terms of GDP growth, macroeconomic stabilization, export expansion,
foreign direct investment (FDI) attraction, and poverty reduction (Vo & Nguyen ,
2009). From 1986 to 2006, the average economic growth rate of Vietnam was 7.1%
making it as one of the fastest growing economies in the world (Vu, 2009). Vietnam’s
1

GDP reached $124 billion in 2011, making its GDP per capita US$1,400 compared to
US$146 in 1990 and US$630 in 2005 (World Bank, 2011; Chu & Dickie, 2006). As
the result of ðổi Mới, the living standard of a large population was improved.
According to the poverty standard set by the Vietnamese government for the period
from 2006-2010, in 2010, the country only has 10.7 % of poor households, compared
to 18.1% in 2004 and 58% in 1993 (General Statistic Office of Vietnam, 2010; Chu &
Dickie, 2006).
As an emerging middle-income country, Vietnam is confronted with critical
challenges. The Resolution of the XI Vietnamese Communist Party’s National
Congress (NPC) in early 2011 emphasized the need to improve the quality of the
country’s socio-economic development and environmental protection while
maintaining the rapid economic growth (Vietnamese Party Resolution, 2011). During
the past two decades of development, the contribution of capital to the economic
growth has been very high compared to other countries in the region. For instance, in
the periods 1990-2000, capital, labor and total factor productivity contributions to the
economic growth in Vietnam were 34 %, 22%, and 44% respectively while in the
period 2000-2008, the proportion was 53%, 19%, and 26% (National Assembly of
Vietnam, 2012). This proportion for China in the period from 2000-2008 was 42%,
6%, and 52%, respectively.
For the past four years, Vietnam has had one of the highest inflation rates in
Asia, averaging nearly 16 percent a year between 2008 and 2011. The committed
foreign direct investment fell significantly from 72 billion USD in 2008 to 14 billion
in 2011. Affected by the World Economic Crisis, since 2008, Vietnam’s economic
growth has continuously slowed down. The average GDP growth of the period 20062

2010 was only 7.0% compared to the target of 7.5-8.0% (National Assembly of
Vietnam, 2012). The growth rate declined under 6% in 2009 and 2011, the lowest
level since 2000. According to Fitch Ratings, the rate of bad loans in the commercial
banking system has reached the level of 13% by 2011 (National Assembly of
Vietnam, 2012). Government debt also reached the highest level ever at 57% of the
GDP in 2011 (The Vietnam Consultative Group Meeting, 2011).
The decline of the economy since Vietnam became a middle-income country is
a warning that Vietnam needs to avoid the “middle-income” trap if it wants to become
an industrialized country by 2020. A recent report from McKinsey Global Institute
(2012) pointed out that Vietnam will need to boost its overall labor productivity
growth by more than 50 percent, from 4.1 percent annually to 6.4 percent in order for
its economy to meet the government’s target of 7 to 8 percent annual growth by 2020.
To reach this target, the report emphasizes education and governance reforms as the
key solutions. The Consultative Group Meeting at the end of 2011 urged the
Vietnamese government to take radical reforms in state economic sector and in public
spending in response to economic recession and low performance of state-owned
enterprise sector. Most recently in July 2012, an independent report produced by the
Economic Committee of the National Assembly of Vietnam with the technical support
from UNDP pointed to an economic overhaul to improve the “quality” of the
economic growth in the context of the ongoing economic crisis.
In response to the pressures for reform during ðổi Mới, the Vietnamese
Communist Party and government have continuously faced a paradox. Indeed, the
economic reforms press the state to delegate its powers to the market place and
respect international rules. In the meantime, the Party and Government need to
3

centralize its authority to maintain its leading role over the society. Economic reforms
require commensurate political changes such as changes in higher education, stateowned enterprise, land use policies, or the protection of human rights. Changes in
these areas, however, potentially could put the political stability of the country at risk
as well as jeopardize centralized control by the regime.
In this transitional period, according to Scott Fritzen (2002), there have been
two trends that support state centralization as well as decentralization. The
centralization trends are supported by the maintenance of political ideology and
government will to ensure a unitary state; dominated executive power over the
legislature; state control over civil society and the private sector; and centralized
coordination to deal with ideological, global, inter-sectorial and intergovernmental
difficulties. Trends that support decentralization include the growth of the private
economic sector, the spread of Internet and communication among the populace, and
rapid urbanization. In addition to these factors, international integration especially the
accession to international economic entities such as WTO, AFTA, or APEC adds more
pressures to the trend of decentralization. These pro and cons factors of
decentralization have interacted with each other to produce radical policy changes in
some policy areas, while prohibiting innovation in other areas.
2. Policy change outcomes in some key areas
Over the past two decades since the early of 1990s, the Vietnamese
Communist Party and government have made radical policy changes especially
changes in creating a level playing field for enterprises of all economic sectors and in
liberalizing international trade and investment. Indeed, in 2005 after many times of
incremental adjustments, the Enterprise Law and Investment Law were approved to
4

remove all the legal discrimination between state-owned and private enterprises and
between domestic and foreign enterprises in Vietnam. The two laws have provided an
integrative legal framework for the establishment and operation of enterprises in all
economic sectors regardless of ownership. The Investment Law of 2005 unified
separate laws in the field of investment including Law on Foreign Investment of 1996
(revised in 2000), the Domestic Investment Promotion Law of 1998. The Enterprise
Law of 2005 replaced the Enterprise Law of 1999 and the Law on State-owned
Enterprises of 2003.
In the area of international trade and investment, Vietnam have signed a
number of trade agreements with key partners and adopted radical legal reforms to
create favorable conditions for foreign direct investment and international trade.
Beginning with the trade agreement with the European Union (EU) in 1992, Vietnam
joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Free
Trade Area (AFTA) in 1995 and committed to fulfill the agreements under AFTA by
2006. In 1998, it became a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation
(APEC), and in 2000, signed the critical Bilateral Trade Agreement with the United
States. In November 2006, Vietnam made a major decision to join the World Trade
Organization after 11 years of negotiation, marking the completion of the institutional
integration into the world economy.
To attract foreign direct investment, the first cornerstone of the legal
framework was the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Law promulgated in December
1987. At that time, the law was relatively progressive that welcomed FDI in all
economic sectors, permitted 100 percent foreign ownership, provided generous tax
and duty exemptions in various areas, and guaranteed unrestricted repatriation of
5

capital (Chu & Dickie, 2006). The law was consciously revised in 1990 and 1992 and
then replaced by the new Foreign Direct Investment Law of 1996. In response to
fierce competitions from countries in the region after the Asian Financial Crisis in
1997, the Vietnamese government adopted many regulatory changes in harmonizing
the business environment from 1998-2001 including one-price policy applied to all
economic sectors and revised the Foreign Direct Investment Law of 1996 in 2000 to
create more favorable conditions for FDI. In 2005, pressed by commitments made
under international agreements, in particular the Vietnam-US Bilateral coming into
effect from 2002, the full implementation of AFTA agreements and the conditions to
access WTO by 2005, Vietnam adopted the unified Investment Law provide equal
treatment to foreign-owned enterprises in accordance with the rule of nondiscrimination under WTO (Muller, 2005). The law removes a number of constraints
on foreign-owned enterprises such as the constraints on importing goods related to
their business lines (Pham H. T., 2011).
In contrast to the radical policy changes in the above areas, there are other
policy areas that have produced the opposite results. State-owned enterprise
management policy is one such area where there has been no innovative change. Over
the past two decades, Vietnam has equitized thousands of small and inefficient stateowned enterprises (SOEs). Yet, the pace and scope of this process is much slower than
the case of China (Vu, 2009). In addition, from 1994, the government decided to
consolidate the state economic sector by establishing a number of large state
corporations, called the General Corporations. In the same direction, from 2005 to
2010, 12 state economic groups were created by merging the state enterprises in the
same business areas into several “mother” companies. By 2009, the share of state6

owned enterprises (SOEs) in capital, fixed assets, bank credit, and the employment in
the enterprise sector was still as high as 39, 45, 27, and 19 percent, respectively (The
Vietnam Consultative Group Meeting, 2011). This process tends to make the outsiders
to think that the Vietnamese government wants to emulate the experience of Japan’s
Keiretsus and the Republic of Korea’s Chaebols (Beresford, 2008). That is, the
government proactively subsidizes and invests in strategic economic sectors and
enterprises to promote the international competitiveness of the domestic economy. But
this is just one side of a coin. Another important reason for the state to consider stateowned enterprises as the cornerstone of the economy is the embrace of the legacy of a
Socialist state. State-owned enterprises are expected to help the state monitor and
direct the industrialization process of the country and maintain a social welfare
delivery system. With this in mind, the government has provided state economic
sectors, especially the general corporations and economic groups with various
privileges and favorable treatments regardless economic rationale.
Nonetheless, over the past three years, few issues have evoked more
passionate debate and public concern in Vietnam than the issue of state ownership in
the market economy and the recent scandals related to some state general corporations
and economic groups. A series of revelations regarding the poor performance of SOEs
and the mismanagement by their leaders and executives were uncovered. According to
a report from the Ministry of Finance (Vneconomy, 2012), the total accumulative loss
of the state corporations and economic groups by the end of 2011 was 26,100 billion
VND (approximately 1.25 billion USD). By September 2011, the total debt amount of
state-owned economic enterprises is 415,347 billion VND (around 20 billion USD),
occupying up to 16.9% of the total debt of the banking system. Another problem with
7

the state-owned enterprises especially the general corporations and economic groups
is their large-scale investments in non-core business activities. Instead of focusing on
their core missions and on promoting their international competitiveness, many stateowned enterprises used the preferential loans from the government and state banks to
invest in the stock markets, real estates and joint-stock banks for short-term gains.
In the face of pressures and critics of weak oversight and transparency,
expansion of non-core business activities, financial mismanagement, and concealing
information in the state economic sector, the Vietnamese Communist Party (CPV) and
government still stands firm on its policy in this area although incremental changes
have been made. The leaders do not necessarily see a contradiction between the
existence of a large-scale state economic sector and a dynamic market-oriented
economy (The Vietnam Consultative Group Meeting, 2011). In the most important
official documents, the CPV and its government continue to consider public
enterprises to be the cornerstone of the national economy (Resolution of the XI Party
National Congress, 2011). Restructuring the state economic sector has been proposed
and implemented but not to diminish the role of this sector. Rather, it is to consolidate
the strengths and influences of state-owned enterprises to help government retain
control in key economic areas. The ultimate goal is for the Party and government to
control the state-owned enterprises as state macroeconomic monitoring instruments
and social welfare service delivery system.
Similar to the state economic sector, the Vietnamese Party and government
have been reluctant to make radical change in the policy on institutional autonomy for
higher education institutions. Despite of rhetorical statements and incremental policy
changes over the past years, no specific regulatory framework has been introduced to
8

provide substantive institutional autonomy for universities and colleges. In 2005, the
Prime Minister called for a “fundamental and comprehensive” renovation in the
higher education system in order to achieve dramatic changes in quality, efficiency,
and structure that meet the national demand for modernization, industrialization and
international integration (Prime Minister’s Resolution No. 14, 2005). However, there
has been a big gap between intention and the actual and concrete commitments and
policies. Key areas related to administrative autonomy and academic freedom are
rigorously regulated by the Ministry of Education and Training (MOET) and 12 other
line ministries (Hayden & Lam, 2007).
In June 2012, after a prolonged deliberation and revision, the National
Assembly approved the Higher Education Law, which was expected to increase the
institutional autonomy of the higher education institutions as a way to address the
problems and weaknesses of the higher education system. However, a reading of the
new law shows that substantial institutional rights are still conditional and awaiting
for the concrete guidelines to be promulgated as the decrees and directives. The law,
together with the previous legal documents, has demonstrated the regime’s
commitment to providing more autonomy for institutions. Yet, this commitment is in
very abstract form and there has been no substantive regulatory framework to realize
such institutional autonomy due to the strong commitment of the regime to the
Socialist legacy. As a result, the government continues to maintain a highly
centralized higher education system even in the face of increasing pressures from
institutions, the private sectors and the public.
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3. Research questions and the structure of the dissertation
From the above reviewed policy phenomenon, a major question arises: Why
did radical change seemingly occur more quickly and more completely with
something like the introduction of a free market economy or trade liberalization but
change has occurred so slowly and incompletely in some areas such as in higher
education and state-owned enterprise management? This is the central question I hope
to answer in this dissertation. In the process of collecting information to answer this
central question, I will also be able to address subsidiary questions and issues. These
include: what are the causal factors and mechanisms of major policy change in
Vietnam? What are the preconditions that must be in place in order for major policy
change to occur in the areas of higher education and state-owned enterprise? How do
policy elites in Vietnam function compared to the policy elites in the comparative
government literature? What is the relative weight of technical feasibility and political
acceptability in determining major policy change in Vietnam? And what is the weight
of the role of government and the role of the political party in making radical policy
change?
Despite a surge of interest in studying the democratization process and policy
changes in Vietnam, there continues to be a lack of research that explores the unique
political characteristics of the country as they affect public policy reform. To my
knowledge, no researcher has employed policy theories or models to explain policy
phenomenon in Vietnam. Most of the policy studies in Vietnam have focused on
descriptive inquiries in specific policy areas instead of trying to develop a more
systematic descriptive model that might be used to explain and predict policy
outcomes in the future. To close this gap in the literature, this dissertation has
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developed an explanatory model of major policy change in Vietnam by drawing from
three bodies of knowledge and information. The model was then validated by policy
case studies in order to identify its relevance and usefulness in policy change analysis
in the case of Vietnam. Thus, the next chapters are structured as following.
In the second chapter, I survey the literature to get the ingredients for a
theoretical framework that can be advanced to create a policy model explaining major
policy change in Vietnam. The first body of literature examines some of the most
well-developed theories and models of major policy change in the contemporary
policy process literature in the U.S context. The main objective is to find potential
policy factors and causal mechanisms that might explain major policy change. Next, I
examine how the reviewed policy change process theories and models work in the
non-U.S. policy settings. This is to identify some causal factors of major policy
change that might come into play and which are not centrally important in the
American-centered policy change theories that I have reviewed. In this chapter, I am
also examining the Policy-elite Model that was created by Grindle and Thomas (1991)
based on the evidence of policy reforms in 12 developing countries to get additional
substances for the theoretical framework of the to-be-built policy model for Vietnam.
The third part of the literature review will look at the important and unique regime
characteristics of Vietnam that play an important role in shaping the policy context for
the policy change process and its outcomes.
Taken together, the three bodies of literature provide me with the basic
concepts and suggest a causal mechanism that I have used to build and then to
validate a model of major policy change for Vietnam. In Chapter III of my
dissertation, I employ the policy change concepts and causal arguments that I have
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drawn from the literature review in Chapter II to develop a major policy change
model for Vietnam. This policy model borrows important concepts and causal
assumptions of the reviewed theories and models created in the U.S literature but it is
based on the regime characteristics of Vietnam. The model emphasizes the role of
policy elites and their predisposition to reform in the process of major policy change.
It also reflects the collective and consensus-based policy making style of the
Vietnamese Communist Party and government in the transitional period of the
country.
In chapter IV, I present the research methods that I use to validate the policy
model developed in Chapter III. To validate the model, I will employ case study
approach in which I select two policy change initiatives that produced major changes
and two policy cases that resulted in limited or incremental changes. Specifically, I
explain why I am using comparative and qualitative research methods in this study by
introducing the use the theory-confirming and theory-infirming approach and processtracking methods in the case studies. I will also explain how I have collected, coded,
and analyzed the information to validate the propositions of the proposed model of
major policy change for Vietnam.
Chapter V will be dedicated to the master case of higher education policy on
autonomy for higher education institutions in which no radical policy change has been
seen during the past two decades. This is the case that I have invested the most time
and effort in process tracking than the others. Chapter VI, VII and VIII will continue
with three junior policy reform cases in the areas of international trade liberalization,
state-owned enterprise management, and legal changes to create favorable conditions
for foreign-invested enterprises. Among these cases, the two cases related to the
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decision to join World Trade Organization 2006 and the adoption of Investment Law
in 2005 involved major change. The third case will be case of state-own enterprise
management policy that has witnessed no radical change even when the government
faces of fierce criticisms from the public.
Chapter IX will present the discussion on the evidence and data collected from
the four case studies. The main objective is to identify the explanatory capacities of
the proposed policy model in the analysis of policy processes and outcomes across the
cases. I will compare and contrast between the two cases that resulted in radical
changes and the other two with only limited or incremental changes. The discussion
focuses on linking the evidence of the policy processes and outcomes in the cases
with the causal factors and arguments embedded in the policy model developed in
Chapter III. In this last chapter, I also identify the implications on the policy process
of Vietnam and the contribution of the dissertation to the literature of policy process
and the studies of policy reform in Vietnam. Finally, some limitations of the research
are identified and the future research is proposed.
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Chapter II: Literature Review

The main purpose of this chapter is to identify key policy change factors and
plausible causal mechanism of change that might be important for developing a major
policy change model for Vietnam. In the first part of the chapter, I examine the
theories and models that have been developed from the U.S. political contexts and
applied to explain the policy processes and outcomes in the U.S policy subsystems.
This section helps produce a table of important policy factors and their relevance in
explaining major policy changes identified by different policy process theorists in the
U.S. In the second section, I review some selected policy studies that have applied the
policy process theories to non-American policy contexts in European and Asian
countries. The main objective of section two is to uncover the policy factors that are
critical for major policy change in the non-U.S. contexts but are not emphasized in the
theories and models created and applied in the U.S. The third section will examine the
Policy-elite model that was created by Grindle and Thomas (1991) from the evidence
of policy reforms in 12 developing countries. This is an alternative perspective and
explanation to the public policy process and reforms in developing countries based on
their corresponding regime characteristics. The last section reviews the regime’s
specific characteristics of Vietnam that are important for a better understanding of the
causal factors and mechanisms associated with major policy change in Vietnam.
Taken together, these bodies of literature provide me with the basic concepts and
suggest causal mechanism of major policy change that I use to build and validate a
model of major policy change for Vietnam in the next chapters.
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1. Theories and models of the policy process in the U.S context
Perhaps the most dominant view of policy change in the United States is that
change occurs incrementally because institutional arrangements surrounding a policy
domain are characterized by stability and continuity. Scholars in the field of policy
process studies have used different concepts to describe this phenomenon such as
“Policy Monopoly” (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993), “Policy Subsystem” (Sabatier,
1988), “Policy Network” (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Blanco et al., 2011), or “Policy
Regime” (Wilson, 2000). In an influential article, Lindblom (1959) argued that policy
makers often act in a reactive and conservative way, and that the political constraints
and risk avoidance inhibit them from pushing for policy innovation. Consequently,
policy tends to change slowly and incrementally. In another explanation for policy
equilibrium, Baumgartner & Jones (1993) pointed out that the specialized and parallel
formal structure of government gives the policy actors the monopoly privileges and
powers to resist unfavorable policy change to the status quo. Nonetheless, over the
past two decades, a large and expanding body of literature has questioned this
perspective by providing compelling theoretical arguments together with empirical
evidence for dramatic policy changes (Lowry, 2008).
This body of policy change literature can be organized around the following
policy process theories and models:
1.

Punctuated-equilibrium (Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones, 1993),

2.

Advocacy coalition (Paul Sabatier, 1988, 1993),

3.

Multiple-stream (John Kingdon, 1984, 1995),

4.

The models of Policy-regime (Carter Wilson, 2000) and Focusing-

event (Thomas Birkland, 2006).
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Indeed, although all of the above theories acknowledge policy stability and
resistance to change as a reality in any policy subsystem, they argue for the
plausibility of major policy changes in given conditions and points of time. Each of
them employs various policy concepts, and articulates different causal flows to
explain how and why major policy changes are transformed into government agenda
and then succeed in getting adopted. I will discuss each of the above theories and
models with the goal of answering the following three main questions:
a. What does the theory or model tell us about the policy context and the
nature of policy change?
b. What are the key causal factors/variables used by the theorists to
explain major policy change? What is the mechanism of policy change
articulated in the theory/model?
c. What implications can we draw from the theory to develop a
conceptual framework for the model of major policy change in
Vietnam?
Before examining these theories and models of policy process, it is important
to define some of the generic concepts used in the policy process literature.
Key concepts in the theories of policy process
The following five critical concepts are important to this study and provide a
common language for students of the public policy process. While there are
sometimes differences in definition, my summary will focus on what policy process
scholars all seem to share in common.
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Public policy
“Public policy”, in the most simplified form, is defined as what the
government chooses to do or not to do (Birkland, 2001). It can be referred to the
intentional course of action followed by government institutions or officials for
resolving an issue of public concern (Theodoulou and Kofinis, 2004; Anderson,
2010). More comprehensively, public policy is defined as “a reflection of how people
in political society define a good life, and how they try to achieve it through their
political institutions” (Morgan, Green, Shinn, & Robinson, 2008, pp. 317). One
important point is that a public policy is not a particular public action, project or
program; instead, it is a combination of strategies, guidelines, and actions supported
by public resources to change a social condition affecting a given population. In this
dissertation the word “policy” is used as shorthand for public policy.
Although scholars in the field of policy study have emphasized different
aspects of the definition of public policy, Theodoulou and Kofinis (2004) have
provided a set of characteristics that help illuminate the concept of public policy: (1)
Includes both policy action and inaction; (2) Involves an array of formal and informal
players within and outside the arenas of government; (3) Includes a variety of types of
public policy actions; (4) Is focused on achieving an intentional course of action
within a specific or sometimes vague goals as its objectives; (5) Is an action that leads
to intentional and unintentional consequences; and (6) Follows a definable, yet fluid
evolutional course of stages, represented by a pre-decision, decision and post-decision
phase of the policy making process.
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Policy process
It is useful to visualize the policy process as a series of interdependent
activities arrayed through time including: agenda setting, policy formulation, policy
adoption, policy implementation, policy assessment, and policy adaption (Deleon,
1999; Fritzen & Muniraa, 2007). Sabatier (1999) defined the process of public policy
making as the mechanism in which: (1) problems get conceptualized and brought to
government for solution; (2) governmental institutions formulate alternatives and
select policy solutions; and (3) those solutions get implemented, evaluated and
revised. This “stage heuristic” approach, however, does not view the policy making
process as a complex social process which involves politics, psychology, and culture
(Dunn, 2008). Schlager (2006) seeks to correct this deficiency by arguing that policy
process focuses on unfolding of policy over time and on all of the attending
structures, context’s constraints and dynamics of the process as well as the actual
decisions and events that occur. This definition of policy process takes into account
the dynamics of the contexts surrounding a policy domain and thus departs from the
conventional structural notion of “iron triangle” where public policy is normally
formulated and dominated in a closed system, with predictable policy outcomes
(Sabatier, 1988). In this dissertation, I refer to both stage and dynamic approach to
policy process.
Theory of the policy process
Once we have identified the essential characteristics associated with the
concepts of public policy and public policy process, what additional elements are
necessary to create a theory of the policy process? Elinor Ostrom (1999) has
introduced a widely accepted definition of theory of policy process. In a broad sense,
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she argues that a policy process theory places values on some of the variables
identified as important in a policy framework, then posits the relationships among
variables, and finally makes predictions about the likely policy outcomes (cited in
Sabatier, 1999). Compared to a policy framework, a theory of the policy process is
more specific in defining each of the policy variables (or factors or concepts), their
respective value in relationship to the other variables, and the way in which all of the
variables work together to produce policy outcomes. Theories of policy process are
important to a public policy researcher for two reasons. First, theories enable the
researcher to explain the same policy phenomenon in different ways by selecting and
focusing on different kinds of variables (concepts) extracted from different theories.
For example, the Advocacy-coalition theory employs three main variables: policy
subsystem, belief system, and external perturbation to explain major policy change
while the Punctuated-equilibrium theory uses policy image, policy venue/forum, and
political mobilization as the key concepts to explain.
A second reason is that policy process theories using the same framework with
identical key variables can be differentiated by the way in which each theory places
different value on each of the variables. This enables the researcher to assume
different relationships among these variables and create diverse hypothesis explaining
the same policy phenomenon. For instance, within the Policy Choice Framework
created by Grindle and Thomas (1991), by relying on one or another state-centered or
society-centered approaches, the policy-elite theory places importance on the values,
perceptions, behavior, and institutional position of the individual policy elites while
pluralist theory emphasizes the role of values, perceptions, behavior and historical and
international contexts of social classes or interest groups as the more important factors
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explaining policy choice and change. In sum, the theories of policy process are useful
for policy studies because they help bring in difference lenses to understand and
explain policy phenomenon.
Model of policy process
A model is expected to include selected concepts and relationships, which are
used to represent a real system (Forrester, 1971 cited in Dunn, 2008). Social models
are built to describe, explain, or predict elements and the relationships among the
elements of a specific social phenomenon. Models are more specific than theories and
are limited in their scope of explanation. Policy models “help distinguish essential
from nonessential features of a problem situation, highlight the relationships among
important policy factors or variables, and assist in explaining and predicting the
consequences of policy choices” (Dunn, 2008, p.86). A model of a policy process in
certain policy system may be a simplified representation of such process in an attempt
to generalize the relationships among the policy factors, which in turn can help
explain and predict policy outcomes. In this dissertation, I am using this concept of
policy model.
Policy change
Different scholars define and categorize the concept of policy change in
different ways. Roberts and Nancy (1996) in their study on policy entrepreneurship
identified two main types of policy change. “First-order” change represents modest
adjustments to an existing policy system. In this case, there is no significant change in
the overall structure and process of the policy system. Researchers have assigned
many names to “first-order” policy change: branch change, evolutionary change,
single-loop learning, continuous change, incremental change, and momentum change
20

(Roberts and Nancy, 1996, pp. 1-2). In contrast, the second-order change refers to
basic change in the system itself instead of a modification of one of its parts. This type
of change is characterized by a discontinuity of the old system and a shift to a new
one, and thus represents a qualitative rather than quantitative transformation in the
way the system works. Again, it has many names: root change, revolutionary change,
transformational and paradigm change, radical change, major change, innovative
change. This categorization, however, is too broad and cannot differentiate the
subtypes of policy change within each of the policy change types. For instance, in
some policy processes, a policy outcome may not be a first-order change but also not
a second-order change. When this occurs, the policy outcome might be considered to
be non-linear succession (Hogwood and Peters, 1982)
Bennett and Howlett (1992) classified different types of change within the
government and argued that the change differences resulted from different kinds of
learning (see table 1). This definition is helpful in differentiating between policy
change and other types of changes such as organizational and program changes. It,
however, does not specify different types or dimensions of policy change.
Table 1: Types of policy-oriented learning model
Type of change
Organizational change

Type of learning
Government learning

Who learns
State officials

Program change
Paradigm/policy change
Bennett and Howlett, 1992

Lesson-drawing
Social learning

Policy network
Policy community

Learns what
Process-related
learning
Instruments
Ideas

Brian Hogwood and Guy Peters (1982) are among the policy scholars who pay
much attention to the categorization of policy change. Accordingly, they categorized
four ideal types of policy change, including policy maintenance, policy succession,
policy termination, and policy innovation (see table 3 in chapter IV). Policy
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maintenance is defined as the continuation of an existing policy, program, or
organization with the same task definition. It is a situation that retains the status quo
and keeps the policy subsystem intact. Policy succession is defined as a change in
which a new policy is closely related in some way to the policy underlying the old
program, but may have significantly different policy objectives, program
characteristics and/or organizational form.
According to (Hogwood and Peters, 1982), policy innovation differs from
policy succession in several important respects. First, policy innovation must
overcome the greater barrier of legitimacy for a new policy than policy succession.
Second, it involves higher levels of conflict between the new and old policy within
the policy subsystem. Finally, it must develop new organizational structures for
implementation. One important point related to Hogwood and Peters’ categorization
of policy change makes it appropriate for a broader application. That is, it identifies
the “innovation-succession spectrum”, which includes various kinds of policy change
lying in between policy succession and policy innovation. The concept of policy
innovation defined by Hogwood and Peters (1982) is similar to the concept of
“second-order” or radical policy change articulated by Roberts and Nancy (1996) and
the concept of policy succession, to some extent, resembles the definition of “firstorder” policy change. To develop the model of major policy change in this research, I
am intensively employing the categorizations of policy change created by Hogwood
and Peters as well as by Roberts and Nancy. The words “radical”, “major” and
“innovative” changes are used interchangeably.
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The Punctuated-equilibrium theory (PE)
Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones (1993) introduced the “punctuatedequilibrium” theory in an effort to encompass and explain both policy stasis and
policy punctuation. The term “punctuated-equilibrium” attempts to describe public
policy-making as a process characterized by long periods of stability interrupted by a
large-scale policy change. The key elements of the theory focus on the foundational
characteristics of the political institutions and bounded rational decision-making. In
particular, the theorists argue that the political system, like humans, cannot
simultaneously consider all the governance issues and problems (True, Jones, &
Baumgarner, 1999). Thus, the government needs to be divided by policy subsystems
such as education, defense, trade, economic, etc. This governmental practice allows
the political system to engage in parallel processing, but also creates what the authors
called “policy monopoly”.
A policy monopoly “has a definable institutional structure responsible for
policy making in an issue area and its responsibility is supported by some powerful
ideas or images” (True et al., 1999, pp. 100). A policy monopoly is comprised of a
small group of decision makers who dominate all discourse and policy making related
to individual policy issues (Crow, 2009). By controlling the content of policy
discussions, a policy monopoly can control the problem definition. Usually, supported
by the dominant policy ideas and favorable power structure, the policy monopoly
successfully dampens the initiatives for change. As a result, the established policies
supported by the policy monopoly are advanced and maintained for a long period of
time. Thus, policy is likely to change slowly, and incrementally, which is a common
phenomenon in American politics.
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Nonetheless, the authors of the punctuated-equilibrium theory point out that
those policy monopolies are not invulnerable forever (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009).
To explain how policy monopolies lose control, paving the way for major policy
change, the authors employed the concepts of “policy image” and “policy venue”.
Policy image is what the policy makers define as the problems and the respective
solutions. Policy images are a mixture of empirical information and emotive appeals
(True et al., 1999). When an image is supportive of the policy and widely accepted, it
is usually associated with a successful policy monopoly. However, at given points of
time, interest conflict and oppositional mobilization can occur. These factors create a
favorable condition for the emergence of a new policy image, new policy actors, and
new policy forums in the policy system.
Notably, the multiple-venue structure in the American political system
provides opportunities for policy entrepreneurs to advance the new policy images “out
of the box” (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). That is, the presence of various
institutional policy venues can be used to sell an alternative policy image to challenge
the established one (Walgrave and Varone, 2008). A major policy change is likely to
happen when the new image becomes part of the agenda of the macro-political system
of the legislature or the chief executive. Usually, the policy image is controlled by the
policy monopoly at the policy subsystem at the state level. Major policy changes take
place when the policy image escapes from the closed subsystem/policy monopoly at
the state level, and advances into the national government’s agenda (True et al., 1999).
The concept of venue expansion was defined as the circumstance, in which the
proponents of an alternative policy image identify friendly policy forum to have their
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voices heard. Here, the role of media and press is critical to attract broad attention to
the new policy images and venues.
The PE theory has several implications for the development of the conceptual
framework for the model of major policy change in Vietnam. First, the concept of
policy monopoly helps explain how the single-party system in Vietnam can use its
resources, ideology and information to dampen departure from the status quo, creating
only incremental and slow policy changes in certain policy areas. The closed political
system and weak independent social organizations reinforce the monopoly of the
policy actors inside the public agencies, which in turn affects the momentum of the
policy change in Vietnam.
Second, the concepts of bounded rationality and institutional constraints can
be used in understanding the behaviors of the policy elites and public officials in the
Vietnamese Party and government when they calculate the benefits and risks attached
to a major policy change. Together, these concepts help us understand the role of
predisposition to policy reform of the policy elites in dealing with different concerns
and priorities at given points of time. In the transitional period of time, in the face of
both internal and external pressures and priorities, the policy elites in Vietnam may
need to anchor their decisions on a set of principles and priorities as the guidelines for
their policy-making to avoid unintentional consequences. This can help to explain the
“gradualism” and “experimental” approach embraced by the Vietnamese regime in the
policy reform process during ðổi Mới. Third, the concept of policy image is
important to describe how the Vietnamese policy makers perceive policy problems,
anticipate consequences of change and evaluate alternative policies. In a state-led
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policy system like Vietnam, change in the policy images of policy leaders within the
regime must occur in advance of any major policy change.
The Advocacy-coalition framework (ACF)
Paul Sabatier (1988 & 1993) developed the Advocacy-coalition
framework/theory explaining policy change based on the employment of the
following key concepts: policy subsystem, advocacy coalition, policy core belief,
policy learning, and external perturbation. This model is perhaps the most popular and
useful for understanding policy change in modern industrial and open societies like
the U.S. This is because it emphasizes a pluralist and democratic political process and
practice of decision-making in western democracies. In particular, the theory argues
that the best way to understand the policy process and policy change is to look at a
policy subsystem rather than at specific institutions or an “iron triangle”. A policy
subsystem is more formally and politically organized than a policy network.
Accordingly, a subsystem usually has a dominant coalition and one or more minority
coalitions operating under different beliefs. Coalitions, in turn, comprise actors from a
variety of public and private organizations who are actively concerned with a policy
issue (e.g., air pollution control or nuclear power) and who regularly seek to influence
public policy outcomes that are congruent with their policy beliefs (Sabatier, 1988).
The Advocacy-coalition theory considers shared beliefs among participants as
the glue in the creation and maintenance of the advocacy coalitions. The policy belief
is a set of value priorities and causal assumptions about how to realize them. A policy
belief system of a policy coalition is organized into a hierarchical structure with deep
core beliefs, policy core beliefs, and secondary beliefs (Sabatier, 1988). At the highest
level are the deep core beliefs that includes basic ontological and normative beliefs
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such as individual freedom or social equality and that the deep core beliefs are very
difficult to change. At the lower level are the policy core beliefs, which represent the
perceptions concerning value priorities, the seriousness of the policy problems, the
principle causes of the problems, and the strategies to realize the core values within
the subsystem.
The third level of belief is the secondary aspects of policy which include the
expectation of budgetary allocation, the design of specific institutions, or the selection
of specific policy instruments in a given policy issue. This secondary belief is easier
to change than the policy core beliefs. Among the beliefs, the ACF considers the
policy core beliefs as the fundamental glue holding members of a coalition together,
not the deep core beliefs or the secondary beliefs (Sabatier, 1999). Within the policy
subsystem, different coalitions interact with each other, trying to advance their
preferences into policy outcomes, reflecting their policy core beliefs. Notably, this
theory identifies the coalition member’s “beliefs” as the most important impetus for
policy actors who advocate major policy change, rather than economic or political
interests.
Sabatier (1988) argued that there are two paths leading to changes in the belief
system, which in turn stimulate coalitions, to act for policy changes. In the first place,
belief system changes can occur as the result of policy-oriented learning. Policyoriented learning can result from: (1) experiences or deliberative studies that can bring
out increased knowledge of origins and parameters of the problem, and the factors
affecting them; (2) internal feedback loops; and (3) the changing perceptions based on
the impacts of alternative policies. This policy-oriented learning often alters
secondary aspects of a coalition’s belief system, but not the deep core or policy core
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beliefs. Therefore, the policy outcomes in this case are characterized by the attainment
(or revision) of policy objectives, not a policy paradigm shift.
The second path leading to changing coalition beliefs originate from the
influences of exogenous perturbation factors that may include: (1) major socioeconomic changes such as economic crisis, or the rise of social movement; (2)
changes in the systemic governing coalition such as the result of a national election;
(3) the impact of policy changes in other subsystem (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999,
pp. 120). These external factors of the subsystem make policy change more likely to
happen, and are often the prerequisites to a major policy change. They can
dramatically alter the composition and the resources of various coalitions within the
subsystem. However, policy change does not occur automatically. The external shocks
need to be coupled with the actions of “policy brokers” to provide a catalyst
environment for successful major policy change. Accordingly, conflicting strategies
from various coalitions are normally mediated by a group of brokers. The policy
brokers help the policy coalitions to seek some reasonable compromise that will
reduce intense conflict to reach the common ground, allowing for policy change.
To summarize, the basic argument of ACF is that while policy-oriented
learning is an important aspect of policy change and can often alter secondary aspects
of a coalition's belief system, changes in the core aspects of a policy are usually the
results of perturbations in non-cognitive factors external to the subsystem such as
macro-economic conditions or the rise of a new systemic governing coalition. Thus,
for major policy to occur there must be a form of perturbation to the subsystem, which
is coupled with the active role of policy brokers in order to realize the opportunity
window for major policy change.
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The Advocacy-coalition theory has both strengths and weaknesses in
explaining major policy change in Vietnam. In the first place, it offers some useful
concepts for the development of the conceptual framework for a model of major
policy change for Vietnam. For instance, similar to the concept of policy monopoly,
the concept of policy subsystem helps explain policy stability and the resistance to
policy innovation in Vietnam. Powerful bureaucratic groups in the policy subsystems
may act against any proposal or initiative of changes to protect their privileges and
beliefs.
Second, the categorization of policy beliefs is useful to order the priorities and
values embraced by the policy elites in the Vietnamese Communist Party and
government when they consider proposals for policy changes. The deep core belief
concept is close to the concept of “political principle” set forth by the Party and
government in Vietnam and the concept of policy core belief is close to the concept of
political tactics in Vietnam. Third, the concept of policy-oriented learning captures the
technical learning of policy instruments and implementation methods that is relevant
to explain non-radical changes as the result of policy-oriented learning in various
policy domains in Vietnam.
The ACF, however, has limitations in explaining policy phenomenon in
Vietnam. First, like the Punctuated-equilibrium theory, it assumes a pluralist and
democratic political system and policy-making process common to western and
developed countries. The theory emphasizes the role of policy advocacy coalitions
and policy brokers in the process of policy change. This is not the case of Vietnam
where the policy process and reforms are characterized by the principle of
“democratic-centralism” and a state-led approach. Often in Vietnam, even though the
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social inputs and international pressures can affect the behaviors of the government
and its officials, the policy process takes place within the Party and State circles with
limited participation of private and social actors.
Second, the theory emphasizes the role of policy beliefs while overlooking the
role of politics and formal power in decision-making. The concept of belief tends to
rely on technical rationales more than on political and ideological rationales. This is
also not the case of Vietnam where the political principles, priorities and values still
dominate the process and outcomes of policy agenda setting, formulation and
adoption, especially those policies dealing with sensitive issues, for example, the
policy on higher education management. Third, the Advocacy-coalition theory
emphasizes the role of policy brokers who may be outside the governmental agencies.
This, again, does not reflect the political realities of Vietnam where the civil society is
still weak and the participation of non-public actors in the policy process is still
limited (Kerkvliet, 2001; Hayton, 2010; and Painter, 2003). Even though, there are
connections between public officials and the private and social actors, the preferences
and desires of outsiders are still limited and conditional.
Multiple-streams theory (MS)
John Kingdon (1995) built the Multiple-streams theory of the policy process
(MS) based on the approach of the “Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice”
by Cohen, March, and Olson (1972). This theory attempts to explain why some policy
proposals become prominent and successfully assimilated into the government’s
official agenda while others are neglected. Kingdon sees policy change arising from
the combination of right timing and skillful manipulation as policy entrepreneurs
match policy solutions to policy problems, exploit opportunities, and promote change
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(Wilson, 2000). The author identifies three streams (concepts) that exist independently
within a policy system: problem, policy, and politics. Each of the streams is
considered as largely separate from the others with its own dynamics and rules (Travis
& Zahariadis, 2002).
The “problem stream” comprises all of the evidence and analysis that
document the nature of a policy issue or conditions surrounding a policy domain. The
indicators of the conditions can be the magnitude of the problems, or a dramatic event
or crisis or the feedback from the existing policies. More important, the problem
stream demonstrates how the public officials and policy actors interpret the conditions
by applying their values and beliefs (Travis & Zahariadis, 2002). Thus, not every
condition becomes policy problems that require governmental intervention through
policy change.
The “policy stream” comprises proposals, strategies, and initiatives to tackle
the problems, which exist in a “primeval soup” (Kingdon, 1995). Solutions for given
policy issues may come from various policy actors including legislative members,
bureaucrats, academics, or researchers who are concerned about and involved in a
policy domain. At any point in time, there are always some kinds of solutions floating
around within the policy system. Some ideas may survive until adopted, some may be
combined into new proposals, and other may disappear (Travis & Zahariadis, 2002).
According to the MS theory, two basic criteria for a policy alternative/solution that
should be followed by a policy entrepreneurship are ‘‘technical feasibility’’, and
‘‘value acceptability’’ (See Zhu, 2008). Technical feasibility refers to the demand for
details and technicalities of a policy proposal while value acceptability refers to the
need for eliminating inconsistencies and political resistance.
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The last stream in Kingdon’s theory is the “politics stream” that may consist of
party politics, pressures from interest groups, national moods, ideologies or
administrative and legislative turnover. Specifically, changes in interest group
pressure, swings in the national mood, and the results of elections that bring new
administrations to power are some of the most important factors that define the
political stream in the United States. The political stream is the most critical avenue
toward placing a policy initiative on the official government agenda (Lieberman,
2002). The political stream may also be defined as a venue in which key policy actors
can propose, debate, or resist specific policy issues and initiatives (Stout & Stevens,
2000).
The MS model does not see policymaking as a linear or stage-like process.
Instead, each of the streams exists continuously and independently and may become
coupled only when a window opens. Thus, the most important argument of the MS
model is that issues rise on to the agenda when the three streams joined together at a
critical moment in time. This moment is called the "window of opportunity" when the
combination of three streams can advance given policy change initiatives. Such
windows are opened by compelling problems or by events in the political stream
(Travis & Zahariadis, 2002). They open the opportunities for “advocate of proposals
to push their pet solutions or to push attention to their special problems” (Kingdon,
1995, pp. 165).
However, even when an issue is perceived as a problem in all three streams,
there is one factor that Kingdon (1995) proposed as the medium through which the
policy issue can reach the agenda. That is the role of “policy entrepreneur” which is
pivotal in the process of agenda setting. Accordingly, “policy entrepreneurs” are
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defined as those who are willing to devote their time, energy, reputation, and money
to make policy changes. An entrepreneur can recognize the problem, attaches an
appropriate policy proposal to it, and floats the policy proposal in various forums to
bring it to the attention of the elected officials that have the true power to place it on
the agenda. Proactive policy entrepreneurs may seek windows of opportunity that
create a favorable political climate for the policy being proposed. More specifically,
the policy entrepreneurs may promote policy change through: displaying social acuity,
defining problems, building teams, or leading by example (Mintrom & Norman,
2009).
To summarize, the MS theory of the policy process places great importance
both on the evolutionary perspective of the government system as well as on the role
of the policy entrepreneur for a policy change initiative to be advanced into the
official governmental agenda. A policy issue is successfully advanced into the agenda
when the three streams - problem, policy and politics - converge together during a
window of opportunity. This convergence then must be coupled with the activism of
policy entrepreneurs who can seize upon the arising opportunities and advance a
policy change initiative to the government agenda. Thus, the theory emphasizes the
both cognitive and non-cognitive factors in explaining the policy outcomes. The
theory helps answer a popular question: why some policy problems are never
addressed by any form of public policy while others succeed in reaching the agenda
for policy adoption? Accordingly, agenda setting is the key hurdle for a policy
initiative to become a public policy.
The Multiple-streams theory has several implications for the development of
the conceptual framework for a policy change model for Vietnam. First, the concepts
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of different streams (problem, policy and politics) are very helpful to clearly identify
different components of the context surrounding of a given policy domain. The
politics stream is especially useful in calling attention to the role of party politics,
which can strongly influence the policy process in Vietnam. Second, like the
Advocacy-coalition and Punctuated-equilibrium theories, the Multiple-stream theory
emphasizes the roles of policy entrepreneurs in pushing a major policy change that
may not be relevant to state-led and consensus-based political systems like Vietnam.
Third, although the MS theory is extended by recent work to cover the stage of policy
adoption, it only focuses on the initial stage of agenda settings. It does not have a
capacity to explain the dynamics of the policy process after the policy issues are
advanced into the governmental agenda. Thus, it is limited in explaining the whole
process in which policy outcomes are shaped and adopted.
The Policy-regime model (PR) and Focusing-event model (FE)
In this part, two policy models will be presented: policy-regime and focusingevent models. These two models share a common approach that emphasizes the role
of “stressor” or “focusing-event” as the trigger for a major policy change. They
connect the exogenous factors outside the policy subsystem and internal process
within the government that can affect the outcome of the policy process.
Policy-regime model
Carter Wilson (2000) made an effort to synthesize different policy theories
into a “policy regime” model useful in explaining both policy stability and change.
The author employed the concept of “policy regime” as the subject for studying the
policy process and for explaining the plausible mechanism of major policy change
with an emphasis on the connection between exogenous factors and the political
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process inside the government. Accordingly, the process of policy regime change - the
substantial change to a policy regime - occurs with changes in the policy paradigm,
alterations in patterns of power and shifts in organizational arrangements. After the
old policy regime is replaced, the new one with a new policy paradigm, new patterns
of power and new organizational arrangements will operate to maintain long periods
of stability.
According to Wilson, similar to the concept of international regime, policy
regimes are organized around specific policy areas such as environmental protection,
civil rights, education, etc. There are four key dimensions of each policy regime. The
first dimension is the power arrangement that consists of at least one or more
powerful interest groups supporting and maintaining the policy regime. There may be
various patterns of power arrangements that can include interest groups, professional
associations, and state actors. Here, author shares the same perspective with Sabatier
(1988) in terms of a pluralist policy subsystem in the U.S political process that
consists of various policy actors and venues.
The second dimension of a policy regime is the policy paradigm, which shapes
the way problems are defined and understood, the types of solutions offered, and the
kinds of policies proposed. A paradigm serves as a lens that filters information and
focuses attention. It embodies particular assumptions about the policy problem,
including: its cause, its seriousness, its pervasiveness, those mostly affected, those
responsible for creating it or ameliorating it, and the appropriate governmental
response (Wilson, 2000). The concept of policy paradigm is broad enough that can be
related to other policy concepts used by other scholars such as policy image
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(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), policy core belief (Sabatier, 1988, 1993), and the
streams of problem and policy (Kingdon, 1995).
The third dimension is the government organization responsible for policymaking and policy implementation in a given area. The policy-making arrangements
can include leaders of congressional committees, public agencies, institutions,
professional associations and organized interests involved in developing and
maintaining the policy (Wilson, 2000). These arrangements may vary from closed
iron triangles to more open issue networks. The implementation structure emphasizes
the implementing agencies, which in some cases may involve agencies of all
government levels from local to state and federal ones.
Finally, the fourth dimension is the policy itself. The policy embodies the
goals of the policy regime as well as the rules and routines that are responsible for
formulating, legitimizing and implementing the existing policy paradigm (Wilson,
2000). This definition of policy resembles the way Morgan et al, (2008) defined
public policy as a combination of both political goals and bureaucratic processes.
Similar to the other theories of the policy process, the policy regime model
clearly assumes that every aspect of the policy regime (power, paradigm,
organization, and policy itself) contributes to long-term policy stability (Wilson,
2000). To explain the initiation of policy regime change, Wilson (2000) emphasizes
the role of exogenous variables with the concept of “stressors” that may include
catastrophic events, economic crises, demographic changes, shifts in modes of
production, etc. Sometimes stressors produce enough strain to stimulate a rethinking
of existing policy arrangements and a consideration of alternatives. They provoke
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questions about the legitimacy of current policy arrangements. They create
possibilities and opportunities for radical change.
According to the author, policy regime change tends to occur in stages,
although the following stages do not necessarily occur in the same sequence and
sometimes occur simultaneously:
1.

Stressors/enablers generate stress on organizational arrangements,
underscore anomalies in the prevailing policy paradigm, or raise the
visibility of new problems.

2.

Paradigm shift occurs when events or situations arise that are
inconsistent with the dominant policy paradigm, or that can be
explained more persuasively by an alternative policy paradigm.

3.

A legitimacy crisis occurs when political leaders manage to establish
popular doubt in the validity of the stories, images, and authority upon
which the established policy regime is based.

4.

Power shift occurs when there is a defection of a faction of the
dominant policy coalition, rapid mobilization of grassroot
organizations, the dissolution of old coalitions and the formation of
new ones, or the emergence of new coalitions and new sources of
power.

5.

Finally, policy regime change involves changes in the policy goals and
the organization of policy implementation including change in policy
target, policy paradigm, power arrangement, and implementation
structure.
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The Policy-regime model has some implications to the conceptual framework
for the development of the model of major policy change in Vietnam. First, the model
articulates clearly and logically the mechanism of major policy change with welldefined policy concepts such as stressor, policy paradigm, policy regime, and policy
regime change. When regimes become stressed, alternative policy paradigms may
arise, legitimacy crises occur, and shifts in power and new implementation
organizations come into being. However, this synthesis is, as admitted by the author,
too general and needs to be specified when applying it to explain given policy
phenomena. Second, the concept of stressor, along with the concepts of “external
perturbation” and “politics streams” in the Advocacy-coalition and Multiple-stream
theory respectively, is helpful for identifying the starting point or the catalyst of a
major policy change in Vietnam There is, however, a question of whether or not all of
the stressors influencing the government will automatically induce major policy
change. To seek the answer to this question, it is important to review the “focusingevent” model of policy change created by Thomas Birkland (2006).
Focusing-event model
Thomas Birkland (2006) proposed a model of major policy change through
four case studies of public policy change surrounding sudden events in the United
States: the September 11 terrorist attacks and the Hurricane Katrina. In his model, the
author used the notion of focusing-event, which is similar to the concept of “stressor”
used in the regime-policy model. At the heart of this focusing-event model is the
notion of policy-oriented learning after a focusing-event. Accordingly, Birkland
(2006) defined the policy-oriented learning as the process by which “participants use
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information and knowledge to develop, test, and refine their beliefs; the beliefs that
motivate political action as well as the beliefs that find their way into policies”.
The focusing-event model of policy change generates six propositions
regarding the policy process. The first proposition is that most if not all participants in
policy domains want to address or solve the problems revealed by a focusing event,
but the proposed solutions are likely to vary with the interests and motivations of the
interested parties. Participants in a given domain are goal oriented and they each act
in order to achieve their goals even in a sudden event. The second proposition is that a
few events will gain the most attention. The distribution of damage and deaths in
disasters and accidents is not statistically normal. Rather, a large number of relatively
small events garner little attention and a few big events garner a great deal. Thus, the
magnitude of the damage and the socio-economic impacts of the event determine the
influence of the event on the policy change process afterward.
The third proposition argues that group mobilization is linked in time to a
particular focusing event. In particular, the activities of groups or the representatives
of such groups will become more evident in new accounts of the issue. The fourth
proposition posits that group mobilization will be accompanied by an increase in
discussion of policy ideas. This discussion will include the ideas about the causes of
the problem and potential solutions. The fifth proposition is related to the relationship
between idea and policy change. In particular, change is more likely when ideas
become more prominent after events than when they do not. The last proposition
argues that it is possible for learning to decay over time. While policy change may
result from an event, the time that intervenes between one focusing event and another
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and the demands placed on policy makers in that intervening period may cause
participants in the policy process to “forget” the lessons they learned.
The generic logical flow of this focusing-event model is as following. When a
focusing event happens, the first step is for the event to gain attention. If it fails to
gain much attention, it is unlikely to result in much group and policymaker
mobilization. The concept of group defined by the author is different from the concept
of coalition in Sabatier’s advocacy-coalition theory. The groups are relative small,
consisting of professional experts, and advocates who are mostly likely to be
energized by the event. If there is discernible group mobilization after a focusing
event, we should expect to see a discussion of ideas in various forums. In these
forums, participants present an exchange of opinions, beliefs, and theories about why
the event happened and whether existing policy can address the problems revealed by
the event. If the existing policy is shown to have failed, the discussion will include
alternative policies that seek to remedy the failure and prevent recurrence.
It is at this stage that we may see considerable evidence of learning. If there is
policy change without such discussion and deliberation about the origin of problem,
the relevance of existing policy, and the appropriate solutions for the problems
revealed after the disasters or crises, it is possible that mimicking or superstitious
learning is at work. The author defines this kind of policy change as robot-like
because there is little or no discussion and deliberation about the origin of problem,
the relevance of existing policy, and the appropriate solutions for the problems. If, by
contrast, we can draw a link between ideas, the events, and increased attention to
ideas and the new policies, then we have strong evidence of instrumental policy
learning and possibly also evidence of social policy learning and political learning.
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In short, a focusing event may influence the policy stream by drawing
attention to ideas that were generally unformulated before the event and may create
the opportunity for a new look at policies previously considered politically
unnecessary. Like the policy-regime theory, a focusing event may change policy
makers’ understanding of how and why the problem comes about. However, the
author is cautious about attributing policy change to any one cause and that focusing
events do not automatically bring in policy change. In some cases, the window of
opportunity may close before policy change can occur. However, one can say that
focusing events make policy change more likely. Also, Birkland (2006) argued that
policy change is the function of ideas, but through his study, new ideas were not
developed in response to an event. Instead, focusing events tend to reinvigorate
attention to preexisting ideas. This view is similar to the view of policy image in the
Punctuated-equilibrium theory and the notion of policy stream in the Multiple-streams
theory.
There are some important implications of this policy model for the
development of the model of major policy change in Vietnam. First, following other
theories, the model recognizes that focusing events are necessary to gain the attention
of the government and its policy makers. However, the model clearly points to the fact
that events may fail to gain much attention, and thus fail to result in change. In this
regard, the magnitude of the damage of a given event is correlated to the magnitude of
attention to the event. Second, the model focuses on the concept of policy-oriented
learning which helps draw a link between idea, information, event, and the motivation
to develop new policies. The author differentiates policy-oriented learning from what
he calls “mimicking or superstitious learning”. That is the case where policy change
41

occurs without discussion and deliberation about the policy problems revealed after
the disasters and the relevant solutions. In such cases, there is no policy-oriented
learning.
The third important implication of the focusing-event model is the argument
that a focusing event may change policy makers “understanding of how and why the
problem comes about”. But along with regime-policy model (Wilson, 2000), Birkland
argued that focusing events do not automatically bring about policy change. In some
cases, the window of opportunity may close before policy change can occur. It is the
role of the policy champions or leaders to identify such opportunities for major policy
change. Thus, for a major policy change to occur there must be both “non-cognitive”
and “cognitive” factors. The cognitive factors may include the predisposition to
reform of leaders, or groups of actors in the policy subsystem.
Summary of the policy process theories and models in the U.S context
Table 2 in the next page summarizes the factors identified by the reviewed
theories and models that can influence the process of major policy change in the U.S
context. These factors can be grouped as the following segments of policy concepts:
1. Stressor – focusing event – external shock – perturbation – national mood
2. Policy monopoly – policy subsystem – policy regime
3. Pluralist and democratic political system (including open and free press)
4. Advocacy group or coalition
5. Policy image – policy paradigm – policy core belief – policy stream –
policy-oriented learning
6. Policy entrepreneur – policy advocate – policy broker – Policy leader
7. Interest conflict and mobilization
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Table 2: Policy theories/models and factors associated with major policy change
Theory
Policy factor
Exogenous
factor/stressor
Dismantled
policy
monopoly
Pluralist
political
system
Advocacy
groups
Policy
entrepreneur
Interest
conflict and
mobilization
Change in
policy
image/belief/
paradigm

Multiplestream

Policy
Regime

Advocacy
coalition

Punctuatedequilibrium

Focusing
event models

Medium

High

High

High

High

Not applicable

High

High

High

Not applicable

High

High

High

High

High

Not applicable

High

High

High

High

High

High

High

High

High

Not applicable

Medium

Not applicable

High

Not applicable

Not applicable

High

High

High

High

Notes: High: must be present for major policy change
Medium: to some extent is necessary for major policy change
Not applicable: is not mentioned by or related to the theory

The theories and models of the policy process and policy change reviewed in
this section can be useful for the development of a conceptual framework for a major
policy change model in Vietnam. Some of the policy concepts and causal arguments
may be applicable across countries and policy systems. They, however, may have
limitations because they were created for and applied to the U.S policy contexts. For
that reason, it is important to examine the application of these theories and models in
the non-U.S. policy settings to see how they work.
2. The applicability of policy process theories in non-U.S. policy contexts
Over the past decade, an increasing number of policy studies have applied the
theories of the policy process created in the U.S to help explain policy phenomenon in
European, Asian, and African countries (Olsson, 2009; Nohrstedt, 2009; Walgrave and
Varone, 2008; Parsons and Fidler, 2005; Ridde, 2009; Zhu, 2008, etc.). This part of
43

the literature review will present some selected critics of the theories of the policy
process reviewed in the previous section when they are applied in non-U.S. policy
systems. I will focus my review on Advocacy-coalition, Punctuated-equilibrium, and
Multiple-streams theories because they are the only ones that have been empirically
tested by researchers in non-U.S. contexts. The criticisms of the theories play an
important role in identifying the relative importance of the causal factors contributing
to major changes in the policy contexts other than the U.S, thus suggesting their
applicability to Vietnam.
Critics of Advocacy-coalition framework (ACF)
Jan Olsson (2009) has employed the Advocacy-coalition framework (ACF) to
explore and explain the policy process related to land use and natural resources in
Sweden. Olsson found the basic propositions of the ACF important for understanding
how policy subsystems work in his case study on Sweden. In particular, the author
employed the concept of policy subsystem and advocacy coalition of the ACF to
examine policy change in his cases. These concepts of the ACF challenge the notion
of “stage heuristic” and “rational decision maker” policy process approaches. Olsson
argued that that a policy process theory needs to recognize the complexity of the
policy structure with both formal and informal actors and coalitions.
The author also likes the fact that the AFC model focuses on subsystems,
which is necessary because policy processes tend to vary between different policy
areas. The unique characteristics of a policy area may need a specific contextual
understanding that can accurately explain its process and outcomes. Finally, Olsson
agreed with the ACF about the importance it places on values and beliefs as inputs in
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the policy process. Because policy subsystems tend to have relatively stable patterns
of actors and values it can persist for many years.
The author, however, pointed to some limitations of the ACF in his case
studies and proposed some revisions. First, Olsson posited that the model needed to
incorporate the concept of “inside activists” in explaining policy change. These inside
activists differ from the policy brokers or advocacy coalitions in ACF in some
important ways. In particular, an inside activist may be an activist in civic society;
hold a formal position in the public sector; and act strategically from this position by
using municipality resources. The inside activist has knowledge, capacity and a
formal role, taking responsibility for local problems and issues. Thus, inside activists
are confined to those working within the government with institutional powers while
the policy brokers and advocacy coalitions in the ACF are open to actors from private
and non-profit sectors sharing policy core beliefs.
Second, instead of strictly relying on the notion of advocacy coalitions, Olsson
emphasizes the role of value networks. The value network concept and the advocacy
coalition concept complement each other. An advocacy coalition is political in the
sense that it is formed in order to try to influence public policy making, while the
existence of the value network is not dependent on a policy subsystem. The value
network exists because a number of actors in the society share some common values
in a policy issue. If these values are threatened, or if an opportunity to enhance them
appears, the network may be mobilized politically, for instance by developing an
advocacy coalition. Thus, a persisting value network may develop into a coalition
rather quickly, implying much more coalition dynamics than is supposed by the ACF.
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Third, the researcher points to the problematic nature of the ACF concept of
“policy broker”. Olsson argues that this concept may even prevent analysts from
understanding the importance of the professional network and the key role that inside
activists play. The author refutes the key assumption of ACF that a policy broker is
supposed to play a kind of politically neutral role, helping a “better policy” to triumph
over inferior ideas, or assisting with the resolution of conflict through a learning
process that ends in a synthesis. Instead, Olsson emphasizes the factor of power rather
than implicit and shared normative values in explaining the policy process and policy
change. This argument is supported by the results of his case studies, which points to
the fact that the concept of power is neglected by the ACF.
In another piece of research on Swedish nuclear energy policy, the researcher
argued that due to the political characteristics of Sweden, political judgments had
overshadowed policy-oriented beliefs as the primary motive for policy change
(Nohrstedt D. , 2009). That means policy actors acted on the basis of their political
interests rather than on neutral policy beliefs as argued by the ACF. Thus, to explain
policy change in the Swedish context with the active participation of political parties,
the ACF needs to take into account the political interests and learning as important
causal variables of policy change.
In short, the above researchers together emphasize the need to take into
account different causal factors that are overlooked in the ACF model. These factors
include the role of key policy actors within the government and political parties and
the critical role of power and politics in determining the outcomes of the policy
process. These factors contrast to the normative policy core belief that is central to the
ACF model. In the political systems with highly centralized political party roles, in
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contrast to the decentralized role of political parties in the U.S, the values and power
of the ruling regimes can dominate policy-oriented learning and beliefs and thus direct
the final outcomes of the policy process.
Critics of Punctuated-equilibrium theory (PE)
Stefaan Walgrave and Frederic Varone (2008) used the Punctuated-equilibrium
(PE) to explain the critical change in the legal system in Belgium after the Dutroux
Crisis in 1998. The research found that shifts in policy images and policy venues are
necessary but not sufficient in order for radical policy change to occur. In another
word, new policy venues and images do not automatically produce change. In polities
dominated by political parties such as Belgium, the political party must be taken into
account when explaining radical policy change. A focusing event may attract and
increase the attention of media press and the general public. Policy problems and
alternative solutions may be clearly identified. Yet, without the political support of the
key party actors, major policy change may not be advanced into the government
agenda and be adopted. The dominating political parties must become vested in the
issue before major policy change can really be adopted.
Walgrave and Varone’s case study in Belgium challenges the causal
assumptions of the PE theory that the emergence of alternative policy images, coupled
with new policy venues and media attention, will produce increasing policy
mobilization leading to major policy change. The researchers argued that in order to
increase the exploratory power of PE theory in a party-led system like Belgium, the
will of the political parties needs to be incorporated as the key causal factor in
producing major change.
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In a case study of the internationalization process of higher education in the
United Kingdom and Germany, Christine Parsons and Brian Fidler (2005) used the
Punctuated-equilibrium theory to explain the pace and scope of higher education
reform in these countries. The researcher argued that the external triggers such as
financial crisis and governance reform are important for policy change in their cases.
However, external crisis must be viewed as serious enough to merit a contingency
response (Parsons and Fidler, 2005). Core values and beliefs must be called into
question before other elements of the deep structure can be radically changed. In this
process, policy champions play an important role. The combination of internal
pressures for change advocated by policy champions together with external pressures
helps achieve a greater effect on policy change. But external stressors and proactive
policy champions are only the necessary conditions for major policy change. A
perceived crisis is the most likely catalyst for such change to happen (Parsons and
Fidler, 2005).
Critics of Multiple-streams theory (MS)
Xufeng Zhu (2008) has employed the Multiple-streams (MS) theory to explain
a radical change in China’s policy on ‘‘Detention and Repatriation”. Instead of
applying all the concepts and assumptions of the MS theory, Zhu has built the
‘‘technical infeasibility” model arguing its contextual relevancy to China’s political
culture. John Kingdon (1995) argued that “technical feasibility” and “political
acceptability” are necessary and sufficient conditions for a policy change proposal to
be accepted. Zhu, however, argues that China’s party-oriented political system,
dominated by strong political and ideological influences enables a major policy
change to occur that may not be technically feasible but is politically acceptable.
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Zhu concluded that the doctrine of the political party becomes the most
important and dominant element in the politics stream in a country likes China. In
addition, because of the workings of the Chinese party-oriented and centralized
political and personnel system, officials are less likely to initiate an agenda of policy
change that deviates from the Party’s strategies and political mainstreams. In a
relative closed and state-led policy system, only external forces or perturbations
powerful enough to bring wide public attention can challenge the legitimacy of
existing policies. In that case, the Chinese authorities may pay attention to the issues
at hand and take into account policy change initiatives. If the challenge is not to the
core political framework, the authorities may only initiate a policy that is of a lesser
political risk or legitimate threat, not a radical change.
The author concluded that Kingdon’s policy change model may be useful in
China, but with modifications. At the same time, in the course of testing Kingdon’s
model, the author raised questions about the fundamental differences between Chinese
and Western systems. These underlying differences are important in an attempt to use
Western policy models or ideas for transplantation to China. The arguments and
assumptions of Zhu’s research are especially influential on the efforts in this
dissertation to develop and validate a unique policy model to explain the policy
change process and outcomes in Vietnam.
Conclusion on the application of the U.S theories in non-U.S. contexts
The studies reviewed in this section indicate the utility and usefulness of the
theories of the policy process created in the U.S in explaining policy change in other
political systems in European or Asian countries. The researchers have employed key
concepts of the theories summarized in Table 1 to explain major policy change in their
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case studies. However, the findings of these researchers suggest that the theories of
the policy process created in the U.S need to be revised to enable them to have
explanatory power in other countries.
In particular, other explanatory factors overlooked by these theories need to be
added or the relative importance of varying causal factors needs to be reexamined
according to different policy contexts. For instance, the policy process theories in the
U.S tend to emphasize the role of policy entrepreneurs and group mobilization as the
key causal factors of major policy change, while the findings of the case studies
indicate the critical role of policy elites and activists inside the governments. Another
main difference is that policy theorists in the U.S are more concerned with advocacy
groups and professional associations that bring in their seemingly neutral and
technical beliefs and learning to policy deliberation, while non-U.S. studies
emphasize the importance and the central role of political judgments or party
predisposition in bringing about major policy change.
The critics of the theories of policy processes created in the U.S when
applying to other policy contexts suggest two important points regarding the
development of a policy change model for Vietnam. For instance, it is useful and
appropriate to employ some of the key and common concepts used by the widely
known policy process theories and models for the development of a new policy model
for Vietnam. There are some concepts that seem to apply across different political
systems such as policy subsystem/monopoly, policy image/belief, stressors/focusing
events, political acceptability, etc. Despite the transnational characteristics of the
policy process, researches have suggested the importance of building in the unique
features of a given regime’s policy context to explain policy change process. For this
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reason, the next section will discuss the policy-elite choice model as an alternative
explanation of policy change in developing countries. The objective is to provide the
basis for abstracting the unique elements in developing countries that need to be
incorporated into a model of major policy change in Vietnam.
3. Policy-elite model: an alternative explanation of policy reform in
developing countries
In this section, I will summarize the “policy-elite” model, which has proven
especially important in explaining policy choice and policy change in developing
countries. Indeed, Grindle and Thomas (1991) provided a way to close the gap in the
policy study literature in general and the policy change theory in particular by
advancing the policy-elite model and a series of case studies to explain policy reforms
in 12 different developing countries. The model takes the middle view between the
society-centered and state-centered approaches to policy choice. The authors argue
that specific policy choices are significantly shaped by policy elites who bring in a
variety of perceptions, commitments, and resources. But, on the other hand, policy
elites are influenced by the external social conditions of the developing countries.
Hence, the elite model of policy choice begins with two sets of variables. One set
focuses on the background characteristics of policy elites, while the other emphasizes
the institutional constraints as well as opportunities created by the broader
environmental context of developing countries (Grindle & Thomas, 1991).
The characteristics of the policy elites related to their policy preferences are
considered an internal set of variables that include personal attributes, ideological
predispositions, professional expertise, and experiences on similar policy situations,
position and power resources, and political and institutional commitments. The
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second set of factors emphasizes the external environment surrounding a policy
system in developing countries, including societal pressures and interests, historical
and international contexts, and the bureaucratic capacity.
The key assumption of this theory is that the policy process in developing
countries is characterized by a high level of state autonomy, fear of economic and
political vulnerability, and a weak civil society (Grindle and Thomas, 1991). These
important institutional characteristics emphasize the critical role of policy elites in
developing countries where elites can proactively define policy problems, formulate
appropriate solutions and adopt policy choice through their own perceptions and
evaluations. This, in turn, affects how policy and institutional change is initiated,
decided and implemented in developing countries. Notably, through the evidence
collected in the their case studies, Grindle and Thomas (1991) argued that it is not that
the policy elites in developing countries just abuse their powers or are strongly
influenced by interest groups. Instead, they are able to make their owned choices
based on their own calculation to adopt appropriate policy for their countries.
This model sheds lights on the explanation of policy choices made by the
Vietnamese elites in the Vietnamese Communist Party and government in two critical
ways. First, it describes accurately the policy contexts in developing countries in
which the policy elites and managers have much more autonomy in the policy process
compared to their counterparts in developed and industrialized countries. Policy
makers in developing and transitional countries emerge as the central actors in the
politics of policy reform because developing countries actually have the conditions of
uncertainty of information, poverty, pervasive state influence in the economy, and
centralization of decision making (Grindle and Thomas, 1991). The concept of
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“ideological predisposition” used by the authors is especially relevant for
understanding the policy process and policy choice in Vietnam. In Vietnam, it implies
the ideological commitment to a Socialist state, which the regime uses to build its
legitimacy. Thus, this commitment explains the attitudes to, and perceptions of policy
problems of the policy elites, which in turn determine how they select issues to act on.
External stressors may occur and stimulate policy change but policy elites must take
into account their ideological commitments and core values of the regime before any
major policy change is advanced.
A second value of the policy elite model for the Vietnamese setting is that it
helps capture the importance of a closed and centralized political and policy process
led by the Communist Party. The model emphasizes internal deliberation and
interaction among policy elites within the government and the ruling regime rather
than policy coalitions, interest groups or networks, as is the case with pluralist
political systems. These inside policy elites are not necessarily isolated from interest
groups, international organizations or pressures from the public, but often the
environment and reality of underdevelopment and the presence of an unorganized
society or passive civil society tend to increase the weight of their power and
preferences (Grindle and Thomas, 1991). Even though state powers may be eroded in
the globalization process, government elites in developing and centralized countries
still possess a high level of autonomy in their policy decisions.
The elite model, however, is limited in explaining the policy process and
policy change in several ways. First, the model lists a number of both internal and
external factors that can affect the decisions and choices of policy elites in developing
country. But the model is not useful in identifying and ordering the importance of
53

multiple causal factors associated with major policy change. Thus, it does not meet
the standard of a good model that can differentiate critical factors from those that are
non-critical (Dunn, 2008). The second limitation of the model is its lack of capacity to
explain how these multiple factors interact with each other to induce policy changes.
It is also unable to specify different paths of change with the presence of different
causal factors that can produce different kinds of policy outcomes.
To summarize, the studies on the application of U.S policy process theories to
non-U.S. policy system along with the policy-elite model have suggested the need to
revise the existing U.S theories and models of the policy process for accurate
explanation of policy phenomenon based on different policy context of Vietnam. This
is not especially surprising when one recognizes that the policy contexts are the
product of “the intellectual, historical, social and practical conditions in which the
subsystem is embedded, consisting of both structural conditions, such as mostly
socio-economic factors, and institutionalized rules, norms, ideas and mutual
expectations” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, cited in Olsson, 2009). For this reason, it is important
to understand the unique regime characteristics of Vietnam and their implications for
a better understanding of the policy context in Vietnam.
4. Vietnam regime characteristics: implications for policy context
This section will review the main regime characteristics as the determinants
for the policy context in Vietnam. This review has two bottom line objectives. The
first is to assess the relative importance of the policy change factors identified in the
literature reviews of the previous sections corresponding to the Vietnamese context.
The second objective is to better understand the key gate keeping mechanisms that
both facilitate and obstruct major policy change in Vietnam.
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To identify the key regime characteristics of Vietnam I am referring to the
framework presented by Tim Conway (2004) in his analysis of the Vietnamese
political system. This framework includes the institutional structure of the central
authority, the relationship between local and central governments, and the formal
policy making process. Besides these components, I will add a subsection describing
the relationships between the state and society.
Institutional structure of the central authority
The formal structure of the central authority in Vietnam is guided by the
principle of “democratic-centralism” with the absolute leadership of the Communist
Party of Vietnam (CPV). Formally, the central authority of Vietnam is organized into
three separate entities. These include the legislature (National Assembly), the
Presidency, and the executive branch (Central Government). Yet, the political
structure is organized around an absolute leadership role of the CPV and gives little
room for the other political parties and social forces to participate in the political
process.
Indeed, the Vietnamese legislative body, called the National Assembly (NA),
is unicameral. Currently, 87% of the NA members are members of the Communist
Party of Vietnam (CPV) (Vietnam National Assembly Official Website). The
remaining 13% of the vote was won by candidates who were not officially CPV
members, but whose candidacy was approved by the Fatherland Front (FF). The FF is
an umbrella organization that is formally established to represent for people from all
ethnic minorities, religions, social classes and regions. However, in reality, this
organization operates under the political orientation of the CPV. Thus, the 13% of the
NA who are not officially member of the CPV are not in the position that can strongly
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deviate from or be independent of political preferences of the CPV. Constitutionally,
the National Assembly selects key leaders of the central government, approves
constitutional changes and creates laws, oversees the operation of the government,
and determines important socio-economic, defense and security policies of the State
(Article 6, Vietnam Constitution, 1992).
Although the 1992 Constitution proclaims the independence of the National
Assembly as the supreme entity elected by and representing the people, many
observers remain skeptical about the real independence enjoyed by the NA (Conway,
2004; Vu, 2012). As a component of the state apparatus, the NA is under a close
supervision of the CPV and places a role as the state entity to legitimize CPV’s
guidelines and decisions into laws and regulations. In fact, although the Assembly
sometimes gives members in the cabinet a critical review, the NA has removed none
of them in the past decade, and there remains doubt about their actual accountability
for their organizations’ performance to the NA. Also, even though there have been
increasing claims for substantial roles of the National Assembly, in Vietnam’s oneparty system, the legislative role remains weak relative to the executive (Fritzen,
2002).
The second branch of the central authority of Vietnam is the Presidency. The
President is elected by the National Assembly (NA) from among its members, and
serves a five-year term. The President then selects the Prime Minister also from
among the members of the NA and is ratified by the NA. The Prime Minister, in turn,
selects members of his/her cabinet, including Deputy Prime Ministers and Ministers.
However, in reality, the personnel decisions have always been deliberated and
approved within the Central Committee and the Politburo of the CPV before the
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National Assembly Congress legitimizes them. Constitutionally, the President’s
responsibilities are to officially promulgate the Constitution and laws approved by the
National Assembly and to symbolically represent the nation, both domestically and
internationally (Vietnam’s 1992 Constitution, Article 103).
The third organ of the central authority is the executive, which is formally
headed by the Prime Minister. The cabinet, which currently comprises four deputy
prime ministers, and the heads of 22 ministries and ministerial organizations, assists
the group of top leaders to make important national decisions. All the members of the
Cabinet are members of the CPV. In practice, the executive is collectively headed by a
small collective leadership group, comprising most notably the General Secretary of
the CPV, the Prime Minister, the Chairman of the National Assembly and the
President (Conway, 2004). All of these figures are the key members of the Politburo
and lead the key organs of the ruling regime: the Party Central Committee, the Central
Government, the National Assembly and the Presidency. Important pronouncements
by any one of these top leaders are examined and agreed by the others, which ensure
that most major speeches and policy announcements are limited to the issues which
are uncontroversial among them (Conway, 2004). This mechanism has been called
“democratic centralism” as the guiding principle for the operation of the whole
political system of Vietnam.
In short, the central authority, even though it is composed of three different
entities, is under the absolute leadership of one organization, the Party Central
Committee led by the Politburo. The most important and sensitive political and policy
issues of the country are initially deliberated and decided within the Politburo before
being passed to the Party Central Committee composing of around 170 members.
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Over the years, there has been increasing deliberation on the need for a separation
between the roles of the Party and the State and for a balance of power. Yet, the
Party’s intervention in state management remains dominant (Vu, 2012). The 1992
Constitution indicates a modest downgrading of the role of the CPV by stating that the
CPV operates under the Constitution and laws. In reality, the Party, comprising 3.6
million members out of a total population of nearly 90 million, is by far the most
important force in the Vietnamese political arena when the legislature, the military
and the bureaucracy are effectively subordinate to its guidance (Conway, 2004).
Furthermore, the Party committee system exists at every level of the bureaucracy,
from the central government to ministerial, provincial, city, district and commune
authorities to direct the operation of the state agencies. In addition, the Party’s
authority is reinforced through the hierarchies of the Party-affiliated mass
organizations (e.g. the Women’s Union, the Farmers’ Association), clustered under the
umbrella of the Fatherland Front.
The relationships between central and local governments
In Vietnam, the formal government system operates at four levels: the central
government and local levels including provinces/cities, districts, and communes.
There are two main different perspectives regarding the relationship between central
and local authorities in Vietnam. First, some argue that the relationship is a “top
down” process of strict command and control from central government agencies down
to local authorities (Conway, 2004; Hayton, 2010). Under the norms and practices of
“democratic-centralism”, the central authorities demand (and normally obtains) a
monopoly of the formal processes of political mobilization, political representation
and decision making across the country. In addition, there is a predisposition towards
58

technocratic modes of policy making, with a large number of national research
institutes and experts undertaking analysis and providing advice that assist the central
agencies in the policy making process for the whole country. To a great extent, this
structure reflects the Soviet model of government.
The alternative view of the relationship between central and local authorities is
that although the overall socio-economic policies and plans are designed by the
central public agencies, a significant degree of autonomy is extended to local
administration with regard to implementation (Fritzen, 2000; Painter, 2003). The
political system has become significantly less hierarchical over the course of ðổi Mới
reforms in which the relationships between the central and lower levels in the
formulation and implementation of policy have been radically transformed.
Government by decree leaves room for local interpretation and implementation,
enabling neccessary refinement and correction that make central decisions more
responsive to local situations (Painter, 2003).
To some extent, both of the above views of the relationship between central
and local governments are true. Yet, in the view of the author of this paper, the role of
the central government is still dominant, especially in the stages of national policy
agenda setting, formulation and adoption. There is relatively more autonomy than in
the past for local governments especially in regard to policy implementation.
However, national laws and regulations are mainly initiated and adopted by the
central government with the active roles of its policy agencies and elites, influencing
most of the daily life activities of every individual and organization in the society.
Depending on the nature of the policy issue, the central government may be more
willing than it has been in the past to delegate authority to local governments, but if
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the policy puts at risk the political principles and priorities of the CPV, the Central
Party and central government will exercise its right to impose the direction and make
the final policy decision.
The policy-making structure
At the national level, the National Congress of the Vietnamese Communist
Party (CPV) convenes every five years to examine and approve broad economic,
social, and political strategies for the whole country. Party’s resolutions and strategies
are then translated into the National Socio-economic Development Plans, which are in
turn concretized by a number of annual and sectorial plans and policies created by line
ministries for all socio-economic areas and by provincial authorities for the
development plans of the provinces. The Party Central Committee also organizes
annual meetings to deliberate and decide emerging critical issues for the government
and for the whole society. At these annual meetings, the PCC examines law and policy
proposals submitted from the government and the National Assembly and produces
guidelines and orientations to the state entities.
One critical feature of the policy making structure is the fact that there is a set
of national decision-making institutions that consult, facilitate and assist the Politburo,
Party Central Committee and central government to design and enforce national
policies. These institutions include the Offices of the Party Central Committee,
National Assembly, President, and Prime Minister and various ministerial level
organizations. In this regard, there are two parallel policy-making systems, one within
the Party and the other within the state. When a policy alternative is initiated,
formulated, reviewed and adopted, it will be examined by both systems. This dual
party-state policy-making process provides two kinds of “policy filters”, especially
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for those policies that do not have a high level of internal consensus or when there
may be far-reaching external consequences such as land ownership or higher
education autonomy. Generally, the state agencies are more concerned about the
technical feasibility of a policy alternative. These technical issues include questions
about financial allocation and resource adequacy, effective policy tools, cost and
benefit calculations, implementation feasibility, etc. The Party’s organizations and
committees are more concerned about the political acceptability involving the Party’s
political principles/core values and political priorities such as political stability, the
absolute leadership of the Party over the society, the legitimacy of the mainstream
ideology, social equality, etc.
There are several important characteristics regarding the decision-making
process in Vietnam that are important for the development of a policy change model
for Vietnam. First, the policy process may be described as “behavior-led” rather than
“rule-led” (Abonyi, 2005). That means, in practice, many formal reforms and
regulatory changes often formalize what is already happening in practice in some part
of the country or has initially been implemented as “experiments” or pilot projects.
This policy practice is characterized by the bounded rational approach of the regime.
To manage the unexpected consequences of a radical policy change, the regime allows
experimental project to test the policy initiative. A recent example reflecting this
practice is the decision to implement a pilot project on abolishing the people’s
councils at the district level in 10 provinces (National Assembly of Vietnam, 2008).
After several years of implementation, the project is continually implemented for the
period 2011-2014 before any adjustment to the Constitution is to be made. This
practice represents a “gradualism” approach of policy change and process in Vietnam.
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Second, the state relies on being relatively insulated from external political or
societal sanctions, such that contradictions can be largely contained within the circles
of the party-state system (Painter, 2003). This does not mean that the government
ignores the pressures from the public or social groups. Instead, the government tends
to filter information and feedback flows and selectively accepts ideas from outside the
public sphere. At the central level, a number of consulting agencies and research
institutes are created and maintained to provide advice to the policy elites of the
regime. The Party and state system are deliberately designed and organized to
incorporate political and administrative agencies that help the regime produce
harmonious public policies.
Third, the decision-making mechanism in Vietnam places emphasis on
collective leadership and consensus (Abonyi, 2005). The objective for effective
control and policy implementation by the central actors mandates the internal logic
and working of a wide range of institutional arrangements, traditions, and practices
that provide opportunities for a variety of agencies, groups, and individuals within the
regime to pursue their interests and goals (Painter, 2003). The “democraticcentralism” mechanism involves a number of the elites in the Party, National
Assembly and central government in an effort to compromise the political preferences
among the key politicians in any critical policy. Most of the important decisions or
policies are made by a collective committee comprised of the leaders and experts of
concerned agencies to minimize interest conflict and personal responsibility. With this
political mechanism of collective mastery, even the top leaders of the Party and
Government are not in the position to sustainably impose or arbitrate a major policy
change without a broad-based consensus within the regime. This practice leads to a
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“consensus-based” policy process, which represents for the sharing of benefit,
responsibility and of political risk but also results in a lack of clearly identifiable
accountability.
The relationship between the state and society
To understand the relationship between the state and society in Vietnam, the
following paragraphs will describe the election system, the role of civil society, the
legitimacy of the CPV as a sole political party and the political culture of Vietnam,
and examine how these factors affect the policy process.
In the first place, Vietnam has two separate election systems: one for the Party,
and the other for the State, including the National Assembly (NA) and People
Council’s elections. Both of these election systems are conducted very five years
without an election campaign among the candidates. Theoretically, in the state
election system, everyone can be self-nominated as the member of the NA, regardless
of social class, religion, ethnics, or political ideology (Constitution of Vietnam, 1992).
However, in practice, the final candidates are selected from the so-called
“compromising” meetings organized by the Fatherland Front, an organization that
operates under the auspices of the CPV. This mechanism of nomination and selection
of the legislative members does not allow for the participation of independent policy
actors or interest groups in the political process.
On paper, in the Party system, the party leaders at each level are selected
directly by the vote of the members of Party’s committees at the same level. However,
in reality, they are nominated by the predecessor leaders and approved by the higher
level of the Party’s organizations, which ensures an alignment of views and loyalty
among the various party and government levels and between the predecessors and
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successors. After being elected, more than 3,000 representatives of around 3.6 million
party members nationwide gather at the National Party Congress to select the leaders
of the Party who are also the leaders of the National Assembly, Presidency, and
Central Government. Again, in theory, the members of Party Central Committee and
the Politburo are elected by all of the participants of the Party Congress. Yet, in
reality, they are nominated and selected by the powerful core Party’s leaders behind
closed doors.
The election practice in Vietnam has several important implications for the
policy process. First, the successor party leaders at all levels are nominated and
chosen by the predecessor leaders. Therefore, they tend to be loyal to the policies and
strategies of their predecessor. This practice makes the policy preferences within the
Party and government consistent and stable over time. Second, through the
“compromising” conferences that are held at all levels to select the candidates, the
Party manages to control the candidacy of the future leaders in the Party, government
and National Assembly. A recent practice of leader nomination is the so-called
“tentative nomination - quy hoạch cán bộ”, which regulates that the future leaders
must be identified and nominated as the “tentative leader”. Thus, most of the
representatives running all levels of government are under the supervision and
scrutiny of the CPV. This mechanism helps maintain and consolidate the leadership of
the ruling regime overtime.
Regarding the civil society, civil organizations are still weak in Vietnam,
largely as a result of deliberate control efforts by the CPV. Civil society refers to the
capacity of individuals and groups to organize, speak, write, teach and act without the
state's instigation and manipulation (Kerkvliet, 2001). While Vietnam has various
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social associations such as Farmer, Women, Youth Unions and a number of
professional and social associations, they operate under the auspices of the Fatherland
Front, which in turn is supervised by the CPV (Vu, 2012). Thus, these organizations
do not meet the criteria of civil society. In addition, although the Vietnamese
Constitution in 1992 declares the right of press freedom, all the mass media agencies
fall under the supervision of the Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism and the
Party’s National Committee on Propaganda and Education (Hayton, 2010). The Prime
Minister’s Degree No 97 (2006) has been publically criticized because it is considered
to restrain social deliberation and curtail open society (Vu, 2012). As a result, Vietnam
NGOs and other signs of civil society have only recently begun to emerge (Kerkvliet,
2001). Tight restrictions make it very difficult for the formation of any organization or
interest group that can influence the policy process.
Despite a weak civil society in Vietnam, the regime enjoys a high level of
legitimacy. The victories in the wars against foreign enemies in the 20st century and
the success of the national unification have given the CPV and its government a great
deal of legitimacy. This historical legacy is reinforced by the significant socioeconomic achievements of the ðổi Mới Program, bringing about great improvement
in the living standards over the past two decades. In addition, the Vietnamese
government has been very proactive in international relations in order to stimulate the
trade in and out of Vietnam and therefore making it easy for people to access goods
and services at an affordable price (Kerkvliet, 1995). With higher income, more public
services, and increased access to basic commodities compared to the period before
ðổi Mới, the majority of the population are satisfied with the ðổi Mới process
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initiated and led by the CPV. To a great extent, today the CPV enjoys somewhat
greater legitimacy and security than its Chinese counterpart (McCormick, 1998).
Nonetheless, the legitimacy of the CPV as the leader of the whole society is
challenged by current social problems, including severe corruption, increasing income
inequities, traffic congestion, the failures of state-owned enterprises and the
increasing inflation rate over the past few years. In terms of international relations, the
regime is also facing critics who want Vietnam to resolve its territorial disputes with
China over some important islands. The challenges to the leadership of the CPV are,
on the one hand, the major driving forces for policy reforms but, on the other hand,
put the Party at risk if major policy changes fail. This paradox strongly influences the
process of major policy change that will be articulated in the next parts of this paper.
Conclusion on the characteristics of the policy process and structure in
Vietnam
The above review of the regime characteristics of Vietnam has identified some
unique features of the policy context in Vietnam. First, national laws and policy
changes are initiated and proposed from the bureaucracies that mostly belong to the
line ministries in Vietnam. Initiatives and proposals are then submitted to the National
Assembly and Central government for deliberation and review with the guideline and
direction from the Party Central Committee. This process is characterized by the
principle of consensus-seeking and collective decision-making, which does not allow
any of the policy actors to exert a dominant role in deciding the laws or policies of the
country. Notably, the proposed policies need to be reviewed by both government
agencies and Party’s organizations. For sensitive and important policy issues, the final
decisions on policy outcomes are made within the Politburo and Party Central
66

Committee before they are formally approved or rejected by the Prime Minister or the
National Assembly.
Second, in the policy making process of Vietnam, the independence of the
legislators and policy makers is very limited due to the personnel system used for the
advancement and promotion in both party and state systems. Most of the legislators
and bureaucratic leaders are members of the CPV and their political interests are
strongly linked to the Party’s ideology and priorities. The “democratic-centralism”
principle does not allow legislators and policy elites to deviate greatly from the
mainstream ideology and political preferences of the Party. This reality makes the role
of policy champions or entrepreneurs in Vietnam very limited, even though this role is
emphasized in most of the policy change theories and practices in the U.S.
Third, party centralization and government control, the constraints on freedom
of express and association, and the Confucius culture of Vietnam result in a civic
culture that is weak in terms of promoting self-help and organization within the
society. Citizens have little opportunity to establish their own organizations in order to
speak and act publicly on important policy issues (Kerkvliet, 2001; Hayton, 2010; Vu,
2012). This civic culture, along with the limited capacities of the local governments,
tends to make the policy process more state-led and centralized in Vietnam. While a
policy reform may be the result of the pressures from the society or international
organizations, it is always initiated and advocated by state actors. This view is
supported by evidence of the study on policy reforms in 12 developing countries
conducted by Grindle and Thomas (1991) whose conclusion is that the closed policymaking system and the weak and unorganized civil society limit the participation of
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social actors in the decision making process and leave higher autonomy for the state
actors in policy-making process.
Fourth, in the Vietnamese political system, the accountability mechanism for
public agencies and officials is very diffused compared to the U.S and other
developed countries. The collective decision making model, along with the dual partystate systems, make it difficult to identify the responsibility of the concerned policy
actors in the policy making process. Although the policy-making is centralized, a
powerful central individual or agency is generally not in a position to impose policy
decisions for which a broad consensus does not yet exist (Conway, 2004). As the
result of the collective and consensus decision making style, the initiation and
adoption of major policy and institutional reform usually requires sustained, timeconsuming, and nationally-led efforts at consensus building (Painter, 2003).
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Chapter III: Proposed Model of Major Policy Change in Vietnam

The literature review section has identified important elements of the
conceptual framework from which a model of major policy change in Vietnam can be
developed. Table 1 in Section 2 of Chapter II has identified the seven (7) critical
factors accounting for major policy changes found in the U.S.-centered policy process
theories. I have selected two out of these seven policy factors that are relevant to
explain major policy change in Vietnam: stressors and change in policy image. Based
on three additional reviews on (1) the studies of the applicability of U.S. policy
process theories in non-US policy systems, (2) the policy-elite model applied to
policy reforms in developing countries and (3) the regime characteristics of Vietnam, I
have added two critical factors influencing major policy change in Vietnam:
leadership predisposition to reform of the regime and consensus on political core
values/priorities. Table 3 in the nest page summarizes all of the critical change factors
and shows how each of the factors is relevant for explaining major policy change in
Vietnam.
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Table 3: The relevance of the policy factors to major policy change in Vietnam

Relevance of factor
Policy factor
Stressor/crisis

High

Medium

Low

X
X

Pluralist political system
Advocacy groups

X

Policy entrepreneur/champion

X
X

Interest conflict and mobilization
Change in policy core
belief/image/paradigm
Policy-oriented learning

X

Leadership predisposition to reform

X

Consensus on political core
value/priority

X

Notes:

Not
applicable

X

High: must be present for major policy change
Medium: to some extent necessary for major policy change
Low: rarely happen or does not have much influence on the policy process
Not applicable: does not exist in the Vietnamese context

In addition to the policy change factors identified as important variables, I
have borrowed the logical flows of the policy-regime and focusing-event models to
build the major policy change model for Vietnam that is illustrated in Figure 1 in the
following page.
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Figure 1. Proposed model of major policy change in Vietnam
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1. Explanation of components of the major policy change model for Vietnam
Figure 1 sets forth a major policy change model for Vietnam that I have
developed from the review of the policy process literature and of the regime
characteristics of Vietnam. In this section, I will explain each of the components of
this model and the relationships among the component concepts of the model. At the
end, I will conclude with some propositions I generate from the model to guide the
validation of the model by the case studies in the next chapters.
The major policy change model for Vietnam in Figure 1 has three main
components illustrated by Column A, B, and C. Column A represents different stages
of the major policy change process. Column B explains how the policy process
proceeds with the presence or absence of different causal factors at different stages of
the process. Column C illustrates different types of possible outcomes of the policy
change process depending on the existence or absence of the relevant causal policy
factors/variables at different stages. The following sections will explain in detail
specific components of the model.

Different stages of the policy process (Column A)
Column A of Figure 1 explains different stages of the policy process. At each
stage, the policy initiative may be advanced to the next stages in the pathway shown
in the model to reach the radical change at the end of the process or there will only be
other types of policy outcomes. The outcome at each stage depends on the way in
which causal factors come into play during the policy process.

Triggers to the policy domain
This is the initial state of a major policy process in the model when stressors
or focusing events occur and come into play to challenge the policy monopoly and
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status quo by attracting the attention and concerns of the policy elites to a given
policy issue or problem. Similar to other countries’ policy system, the stressors to a
policy subsystem are the precondition to trigger a major policy change in Vietnam. At
this stage, the stressors are documented mostly by the state agencies including line
ministries, research institutions and independent studies.

Agenda setting
This stage determines if any policy change initiative characterized by a new
policy goal or paradigm is to be advanced into the government’s agenda or not. After
the stressors are documented, the state agencies will submitted to the Prime Minister
with the coordination of the Office of Prime Minister. The Prime Minister will
consider and decide if the stressors need to be responded or not. If the stressors are
felt as real challenges, the Prime Minster will report to the Party Central Committee
for guidelines. At this stage, the policy elites within the Party and government with
their predisposition to reform play a critical role in determining if a radical change
policy initiative should be advanced to the Government or National Assembly for
further discussion and studies. This is due to the high level of autonomy of policy
elites in the Vietnamese centralized and closed policy structure and process that I have
elucidated in the review on Vietnam’s regime characteristics. Thus, the leadership
predisposition to reform can shed light on the advancement of radical policy change
initiative to the next stage by the issuance of Party’s resolutions or decisions.

Policy formulation
After the Party shed light on the innovative policy change initiative, the
Government or National Assembly will convene concerned and responsible
bureaucratic organizations and their representatives to produce and discuss various
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policy change alternative. New information, policy learning, and education will be
involved to identify the technical feasibility of the new policy alternatives. A variety
of meetings and hearings are organized with an emphasis on the analysis of benefits
and consequences of the policy alternatives, appropriate policy instruments, the
plausibility of policy implementation. At this stage, the significant changes in the
policy image of the policy elites are critical to the formulation of innovative policy
change alternative. The policy image in turn depends on how the policy elites relate
the policy issues under discussion with the preexisted legacies of a Socialist state. If
an innovative policy change alternative is adopted, it is then submitted to the Party
Central Committee led by the Politburo for final review and adoption.

Policy adoption
At this stage, the Party Central Committee with the leadership of the Politburo
will review the proposed innovative policy change alternative submitted by the
National Assembly or government for final decision. The final decisions will take into
accounts the Party’s core values, contemporary political priorities and the mechanism
of consensus and collective decision-making used by the Party. If the innovative
policy change alternative is congruent with Party contemporary priorities while does
not directly challenge the core policy values/principles, the chance for it to reach the
consensus within the Party is high. It takes time for collective and consensus-based
deliberation at this state that can accommodate different views and preferences among
the leaders of the Party especially those of the Politburo. If the innovative policy
change alternative is adopted, it then will be passed to the National Assembly or
Government for official promulgation. If not, it will be delayed or rejected.
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Critical policy change factors (Column B)
The following paragraphs explain the different causal factors that come into
play in the policy change model in Figure 1.

Stressor
Similar to other policy process theories and models, stressors in this model are
treated as independent variables of radical policy change in Vietnam. They are defined
broadly as critical contextual factors that make major policy changes more likely to
happen. Scholars have used different names to label this concept: stressor, focusing
event, or external shock/perturbation. Stressors to a policy subsystem in Vietnam may
include: natural and human disasters, economic crises, structural changes in socioeconomic conditions, critical changes in other policy areas, national mood, or
international pressures. Stressor make the elites fear that adverse consequences may
occur if not addressed. Thus, they provide opportunities for policy considering and
learning within the policy regime that can change policy makers’ perception of the
problems, how they rank values or priorities, and how decisive they are in pushing for
major policy change. New knowledge, new risks and changes in resource distribution
within the regime can lead to innovative policy change initiatives, and provide an
environment to trigger a major policy change.
Borrowing the views of other policy process theories and models (Wilson,
2000; Birkland, 2006; Sabatier, 2007), this model also argues that while stressors may
be a necessary condition triggering a major policy change, not all exogenous shocks,
and not all instances of policy learning are translated into policy change. Several types
of requisite for major policy change in response to the stressors must occur. In the
case of a state-led and centralized system of government like Vietnam, a superior unit
75

of Party or government outside a given policy subsystem must perceive the stressor as
a critical factor to the regime’s failures or challenges. Thus, they will act on the policy
issues and problems revealed by the stressors at hand.

Leadership predisposition to reform
The second independent variable in this major policy change model is the
concept of leadership predisposition. In the policy model proposed in this dissertation,
the concept of leadership predisposition was defined as a psychological readiness of
the policy elites to consider and advance policy change initiative. This readiness is
achieved only after the policy elites take into account the existing stressors along with
the ideological commitments and political risks. The predisposition demonstrate the
intention to reform a given policy area in response to stressors which is resulted from
how the policy elites perceive and articulate particular policy issues, how they assess
the proposed change initiatives, and how they weight political and technical factors in
dealing with policy problems. Once the predisposition to reform is reached within the
leadership of the CPV, the given policy problems and issues will be officially
advanced into the agenda of the National Assembly or government for further
deliberation and study. This in turn guarantees a chance for a policy reform initiative
to be advanced into the next stage of formulation and may be adopted in the future.
Leadership predisposition to policy reform can be linked to ideological
loyalties, political commitments and institutional constraints. In the face of multiple
stressors, the policy elites of Vietnam can refer to the ideological biases or
commitments that influence policy leaders’ perceptions of what problems are and how
they should be responded to (Alder, 1987 cited in Grindle and Thomas, 1991). The
ideological commitments can be guided by the principles of “democratic centralism”,
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“social equality”, “state of the people”, etc. Policy elites have to commit themselves
to these principles because these principles represent their deep core beliefs, which
also ensure their leadership legitimacy as a single political party representing the labor
classes in Vietnam. In addition, the political leaders and policy elites in Vietnam may
invoke Ho Chi Minh’s thoughts as the rationale for pursuing certain policy goals and
undertaking actions within the ruling regime.
A good example illustrating the concept of leadership predisposition to change
is Bruce Gilley’s (2008) research that contrasted the outcomes of the democratization
process in China and Taiwan. Although Taiwan’s 1986 successful transition and
China’s failed 1989 transition both occurred in times of rapid growth, low
unemployment, and healthy financial systems, they were greatly different. Gilley
attributed the failure of democratization in China to a missing element – the
predisposition to major political change of the then Chinese political leaders. They did
not perceive that their regime was facing a legitimacy crisis. In contrast, the
predisposition of Taiwan’s top leaders to the liberalization of the regime is the most
critical factor for understanding of political reform in Taiwan. Accordingly, the
democratic transition in Taiwan is subjective rather than objective. Thus, in the face of
stressors, how the ruling regime and its elites are supportive of reform is critical,
especially in centralized and state-led political system like Vietnam or China. Thus,
Gilley (2008) argued, “although we can, and must, study the objective conditions that
might be defined as “crisis-type” in nature, ultimately there is only a probabilistic
connection between this analysis and what relevant actors will subjectively perceive
to be a crisis”.
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Leadership predisposition is an abstract concept. Yet, in the case of a singleparty and centralized political system of Vietnam its indicators can be identified
through the policy statements and guidelines in the Party’s documents. Party’s
predisposition to reform provides the guidelines and legitimacy for a given innovative
policy change initiative. Based on the guidelines embedded in Party’s resolutions or
conclusions, state agencies will advance the initiative into their official agendas. This
however does not mean that the Party will automatically approve the final policy
alternatives or proposals produced by the National Assembly or government later.
Thus, predisposition to reform is only the preliminary perception on the need to
change not the determined agreement on reform. Due the fear of failure, the Party
needs to involve different type of public organizations including National Assembly’s
committees, central government’s agencies, ministerial agencies, and research
institutions, even international advisors or consultative groups. After the policy
change alternatives have been formulated, deliberated and selected at the state system,
the Party will be the institution to finalize and decide if the innovative policy
alternatives are accepted, delayed or rejected.

Policy image and belief
The concept of “policy image” in this policy model is borrowed from the
Punctuated-equilibrium theory. In Punctuated-equilibrium theory, policy image is
defined as how policy is understood and discussed. Policy images are a mixture of
empirical information and emotive appeals. In the Advocacy-coalition framework,
Sabatier (1988) used a similar concept called “policy core belief” which represents the
perceptions concerning value priorities, the seriousness of the policy problems, the
principle causes of the problems and the strategies to realize core values. Wilson
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(2000) in his Policy-regime model employed the concept of “policy paradigm” that
embodies ways of seeing, discussing and defining problems, and then shaping policy
solutions. Stressors can challenge the existing policy paradigm of the policy regime
and open the possibility for the acceptance of a new policy paradigm.
In the policy model for Vietnam, the concept of “policy image” refers to the
way in which the policy actors interpret given policy issues; identify the causal
relationships between these issues with the existing policies or the absence of a
policy; and rationalize their solutions resolving the issues. Policy image also reflects
the assumptions and beliefs in the best way to realize the political priorities of
Vietnam regime in the development process. The change in the policy image of the
policy elites and makers is a necessary condition for a major policy change initiative
to be produced and considered technically feasible. This condition is for the initiative
to be advanced to the final stage of adoption.

Consensus on Party’s political core values and contemporary priorities
The concept of political core value is similar to the concept of deep core belief
defined by Sabatier (1988). Accordingly, the deep core belief represents basic
ontological and normative beliefs such as individual freedom or social equality. Such
beliefs are very difficult to change in stable democracies. This is why some of the
policy change theories developed in and applied to Western and industrialized
countries do not include this kind of belief to explain policy change process and
outcome. For example, the Advocacy-coalition Framework (ACF) assumes that the
belief in individual freedom has been inculcated in the U.S democracy and
governments and is shared by all participants in the society. Therefore, to explain
policy change, the ACF does not focus on this type of belief. Instead, major policy
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change only revolves around the policy core beliefs of policy coalitions and actors
which represent policy value priorities; the assumptions on the policy problems, and
their causes; and the strategies to realize core values. This assumption, however, is not
totally true in the case of a developing and transitional country like Vietnam.
Indeed, since Vietnam has integrated into the world community, the core
beliefs articulated by the ruling regime are being challenged by the political principles
and values of the Western democratic process and governance systems such as
pluralism, freedom of press and association, check and balance, etc. The Vietnamese
regime maintains its leadership legitimacy based on its ability to keep its core political
values dominant over the alternative values from Western and developed societies.
For example, the CPV has continued to place primacy on maintaining the democraticcentralism mechanism over a pluralist system, ensuring social equality instead of
promoting a free market economy, maintaining social stability over promoting
individual freedom and protecting state-led control over the policy process rather than
open to a society-led process.
As the result, any major policy change alternative would be assessed against
two core values or principles: political stability and the absolute leadership role of the
CPV over the state system and the society. Because these principles are abstract, and
can be interpreted in a broad sense, the Party’s leaders have to refer to some
intermediate or subsidiary political goals. For example, the Party can refer to social
equality and harmonization, economic development for higher living standard, social
welfare for the mass, democratic-centralism, state-led industrialization, etc., when
examining a proposal of innovative policy change alternative. At a given of time, the
Party will consider among these goals to give the first political priority to certain
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goals. This mechanism plays a role as a “political filter” which is critical to the study
of radical policy change in Vietnam. If a given innovative policy change alternative is
congruent with the political goals at the time, it will be adopted.

Different kinds of policy outcomes (Column C)
Although the policy model in this study focuses on explaining radical/major
policy change in Vietnam, it includes different types of policy change as the potential
outcomes of the policy process. A radical policy change only occurs when all of the
necessary and sufficient conditions for it are present. Otherwise, different types of
policy change will be produced. For purposes of my study, I have identified four types
of change: policy maintenance, policy linear succession, policy non-linear succession,
and radical/innovative policy change, which will be discussed in greater detail in each
of the following parts:

Policy maintenance
The concept of policy maintenance is borrowed from the categorization of
policy change introduced by Hogwood and Peters (1982) that includes four ideal
types of policy change: policy maintenance, policy succession, policy termination,
and policy innovation. The policy maintenance is defined as a change initiative that
leaves the existing policy, program, or organization intact. The new policy is
implemented without any change in its goals, objectives, and instruments. Policy
maintenance may be the decision of the public organizations that nothing is done.

Linear and non-linear policy succession
As defined earlier, policy succession is a change initiative to produce a new
program that is closely related in some way to the policy underlying the old program,
but may have significantly different policy objectives, program characteristics and/or
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organizational form. Within policy succession, policy non-linear succession is
characterized by new policy objectives whereas policy linear succession only results
in a change in policy instruments or organizational change. The concept of policy
succession is similar to the concept of “first-order” change defined by Roberts and
Nancy (1996) in their study on policy entrepreneurship. Accordingly, the “first-order”
change describes slight variations in a system that it remains unchanged. Researchers
have assigned many names to the concept: branch change, evolutionary change,
single-loop learning, continuous change, incremental change, and momentum change.

Radical policy change
In contrast to the first-order change, radical change is considered a “secondorder” when it results in basic changes in the system itself instead of a modification of
one of its parts (Roberts & Nancy, 1996). This type of change is characterized by a
discontinuity of the old policy system and a jump to a new one, and thus represents a
qualitative rather than quantitative change in the way the system works. The concept
of radical change has many names: root change, revolutionary change,
transformational and paradigm change, major change, and innovative change (see
Roberts and Nancy, 1996). Hogwood and Peters (1982) differentiated between policy
innovation and policy succession by arguing that compared to policy succession,
policy innovation needs to overcome a much greater barrier of legitimacy. It has to
address the conflicting interests between the new and old policy regime within the
policy subsystem; and it has to develop new organizational structure for
implementation. In short, radical policy change or policy innovation concepts together
refer to the change in the goal of the policy, in the way the ruling regime gives
priorities to different policy issues, and in the way the existing policy paradigm shifts.
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Table 4 summarizes the four kinds of policy change that I use in my policy change
model for Vietnam.
Table 4: Different types of policy change
Type of policy
outcome

Characteristics

Policy
maintenance
- Old policy
goals
- Old policy
objectives
- Old policy
instruments

Policy linear
succession
- Old policy
goals
- Old policy
objectives
- New policy
instruments

Policy nonlinear
succession
- Old policy
goals
- New policy
objectives
- New policy
instruments

Radical policy
change/innovation
- New policy
paradigms/goals
- Overcomes great barriers
of legitimacy
- Deals with high interest
conflicts
- Create new
implementation structures

Hogwood and Peters (1982)

2. Integrative description of the Major Policy Change Model for Vietnam
In this section, I will describe the integrated model of major policy change for
Vietnam that I have developed in this chapter. I will focus my discussion on how the
different parts of the Figure 1 relate to one another. Before undertaking this
discussion, it is important to define the concept of “policy process model” and
identify the characteristics of a good policy model as the guidelines for the
development of the major policy change model for Vietnam.
As have been mentioned earlier in Chapter II, the term “model” in the field of
policy study is narrower in scope and more precise in its assumptions than a theory to
explain specific policy phenomenon (Ostrom, in Sabatier, 1999). A model of the
policy process communicates meaningful information about the policy process,
including direct inquiry and research, and suggests explanations for the way the
public policy process works, including the inter-related connections among the
component parts of the process (Sabatier, 1999). A policy process models should
suggest hypotheses about the causes and consequences of public policy (Dye, 1992,
cited in Birkland, 2006).
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Birkland (2006) identified several important characteristics of a good policy
model. First, it must seek to order and simplify reality; identify what is significant
about the system; and square it with reality to the extent that this is possible. Second,
a model needs to be parsimonious both in its forms and in the phenomenon it is
attempting to describe. Third, a model must help us to generate propositions about the
policy mechanisms and outcomes. In addition to these criteria, a good model must
have concepts and propositions that are clear and internally consistent. It must
identify clear causal drivers, which give rise to falsifiable hypotheses that are open for
empirical testing (Sabatier, 1999).
The major policy change model for Vietnam is based on the literature review
in Chapter II and my own professional experiences as a public official working for a
central policy agency in Vietnam (the Ministry of Education and Training). In
particular, the model adopts the interactive stages and causal mechanism of the policy
process articulated in the Policy-regime model created by Carter Wilson (2000) and is
illuminated by the Focusing-event model proposed by Thomas Birkland (2006). In
addition, the model borrows the policy concepts from the Punctuated-equilibrium
theory (policy image) and Advocacy-coalition theory (political core values similar to
deep core beliefs) and the categorizations of policy change articulated by Hogwood
and Peters (1992). It takes into account the important policy contextual factors in
developing countries which are emphasized by comparative government research,
especially by the “Policy-elite” model (Grindle and Thomas, 1991) and integrates the
regime characteristics of Vietnam as a developing, transitional and single-party
country which are suggested by the “Technical-infeasibility” model on China policy
process (Zhu, 2008).
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The proposed major policy change model for Vietnam in Figure 1 is expected
to help policy analysts have better understanding of the “mysterious” policy
phenomenon or “unexplainable” behaviors of the Vietnamese regime exposed to both
inside and outside observers in policy reforms during ðổi Mới. It seeks to explain
how and why a major policy reform initiative can be adopted or inhibited when the
policy elites in Vietnam have to deal with both internal and external pressures in the
transitional period of time. The model differs from other traditional political theories
and models those related to power struggle, democratization, or revolution domains,
by employing the languages of policy study to explain policy change process and
outcomes in Vietnam.
The policy model starts with the variable of stressor in the first policy stage of
the policy process. Following other popular policy process theories and models, the
model in this study also emphasizes the role of stressors that can challenge the policy
status quo and the existing dominant policy image, paving the way for major policy
change. Change, however, does not occur automatically even when the regime has
faced stressors. Stressors just play a role as a necessary catalyst for any major policy
changes in Vietnam and makes changes more likely to happen.
Indeed, stressors may increase policy elites and makers’ attention to policy
problems or failures and encourage policy-oriented learning but they do not
automatically bring about policy changes. To increase the likelihood of major policy
change, a stressor must be perceived as a real challenge or crisis requiring policy
reform. At this agenda setting stage, policy elites’ predisposition to reform will be the
main criteria in determining whether the government responds to the stressors or not.
The leadership predisposition of policy elites in the CPV and government is important
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in every policy system but it is especially critical in the case of Vietnam due to the
state-led and centralized nature of the single-party political system and the high level
of autonomy vested in the policy elites.
In the face of stressors, the policy elites (Prime Minister, ministers, vice
ministers, senior policy makers in central policy agencies) will defer to their
ideological commitments, political priorities and institutional constraints to make their
judgments. If the policy elites do not consider a stressor as a serious issue, even in the
case of great pressures from external international institutions, they will use their
authority and resources to ignore it or encourage resistance. As a result, nothing will
happen, that will produce a policy maintenance outcome. If the stressor is considered
a serious challenge to the socio-economic development strategies or legitimacy of the
regime, Party’s guiding resolutions and decisions will be produced to advance the
alternative policy images into the agenda of the government or National Assembly for
further deliberation and studies.
At the next stage, internal policy deliberation will involve representatives of
various responsible and concerned bureaucratic agencies. Policy feedback, new
information, and policy-oriented learning will be shared and included in the
deliberation to produce policy change alternatives. These alternatives are filtered by
the criteria of “technical feasibility” representing cost-effective calculation, the
requirements and conditions for successful policy implementation (i.e., budget,
organizational capacity, etc.), and the best way to realize political goals through the
policy change. This stage takes place mostly within the state agencies and units of the
National Assembly or government. It does not mean that the Party’s committees of
these agencies do not have any influence on the policy process and outcomes. They,
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however, only produce guidelines and direction to select the policy change
alternatives that will be submitted to the higher level of the Party. Notably, if there is a
significant change in the policy image at this stage, there will be a chance for
innovative policy change alternative to be formulated and then advanced to the
adoption stage. The significant change in policy image in turn depends on how the
policy elites calculate between the need to maintain Socialist legacies and the demand
for policy change. If no new policy image is produced and articulated, the policy
outcome will only result in a policy linear succession.
To be officially adopted, the innovative policy change proposal characterized
by new policy image will be submitted to the Party Central Committee and filtered
one more time against the political criteria. At this stage, the leading role of the
Politburo with the consultation of policy elites in the executive organizations is vital.
Within the Central Party Committee and the Politburo, the collective and consensus
decision-making model will be employed. This stage of the process may take a lot of
time, even years, to produce a solution that can integrate most of the political
preferences of key actors in the Party as well as in the government. No one in this
process can dominate the policy outcomes without the consensus of the top political
leaders in the Politburo and a popular agreement within the Party Central Committee.
If an innovative policy change proposal does not violate the guiding core
values of the ruling regime while congruent with the contemporary political priorities,
it will more likely produce a consensus within the Party. Such a policy change
proposal, however, is rare because at the same time it must meet the requirement of
congruence with the Party’s core values and political priorities as well as the
consensus among leaders in the Politburo and the government. If the innovative
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policy change proposal does not meet the test of this filtering process, the policy
proposal may be delayed or a policy non-linear succession outcome may result. If it
can meet both congruence and consensus criteria at the last stage of the policy
process, a radical policy change can occur afterward.
To summarize this model, the necessary conditions for a radical/innovative
policy change at the national level of Vietnam are the stressor and the predisposition
by the policy elites to reform. These are the preconditions for an innovative policy
change initiative to be advanced into the official agenda of the National Assembly and
government. The sufficient conditions for an innovative policy change alternative to
be formulated and then adopted are the significant change in the policy image of the
policy elites and its political acceptability. The significant policy image change help
create innovative policy change proposal while the congruence of the policy change
proposal with the Party contemporary political priorities at a certain period of time
leads to the consensus on the radical policy change within the Party and Government.
For a radical policy change to be adopted, all four policy factors identified in the
policy model need to be present during the policy change process in Vietnam.

3. Generated propositions to validate the policy model
The policy model developed and explained in the previous section of this
chapter is grounded in the literature review on policy process theories and models and
on the regime characteristics of Vietnam. Since the model is new, it is important to
validate its usefulness and relevance in explaining the policy change process and
outcome during ðổi Mới in Vietnam. From the model, (illustrated in Figure 1) I have
generated four propositions that can assist us in assessing the viability and usefulness
of the model. For the purposes of this dissertation, the case studies from chapters V to
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VIII will be organized and examined in the way that helps to verify these
propositions.
1. In the policy context of Vietnam, the stressors and Party’s leadership
predisposition to reform are the preconditions for a radical policy change
innovative to be advanced into the agendas of the government and
National Assembly.
2. Significant changes in the policy image of the regime elites are necessary
for the formulation of innovative policy change alternative.
3. For a radical change to occur there must be a consensus on the
contemporary political priorities within the regime that support the
proposed innovative policy change.
4. Political judgments based on the core political values or on the political
priority consensus of the ruling regime can predominate over the criteria of
technical feasibility to produce or inhibit radical policy change in Vietnam.
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Chapter IV: Research Design and Methodology to Validate the Proposed
Model of Major Policy Change in Vietnam
As the first step in validating the newly created major policy change model for
Vietnam, four (4) selected policy change case studies in Vietnam will be conducted. In
the selection of cases, I borrow the following indicators of policy change: (1) the
issuance of new or proposed laws and regulations on a policy domain; (2) a change in
the nature and substance of the laws and regulations being issued; (3) Change in
procedures and in the interpretation and implementation of statutes and regulations
(Birkland, 2006).
Two of these case studies involve radical change outcomes: the decision to
sign the Bilateral Trade Agreement with the United States in 2000 along with the
accession to World Trade Organization in 2006 and the radical legal change in the
integrative Investment Law of 2005, which creates a level playing field for all types
of enterprises. The other two case studies characterized by no radical change outcome
are the cases of state-owned enterprise management policy and higher education
policy on autonomy for higher education institutions. The main purpose of the case
study analysis is to assess the value of the proposed policy model in this dissertation.
The first section of this chapter will explain the research design of the case
studies and the reason for using the comparative and qualitative research design in
this type of research. Second, I will describe the methods used to collect and code the
data in the case studies. Third, I will explain how I analyze the data to validate the
relevance and usefulness of the policy factors and causal flow which are the essence
of my proposed policy change model.
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1. Research design
Since the main objective of the case studies is to validate the newly created
major policy change model for Vietnam, the research design strategy is qualitative and
comparative in nature. The subject of research is a new policy model and has never
been addressed with certain sample cases. That is why the qualitative approach is a
suitable approach for exploratory purpose. Also, the comparative method is
appropriate for discovering the empirical relationships among variables, not as a
method of measurement (Lijphart, 1971). The features of the comparative method
make it useful for the task of building new theories or models or synthesizing existing
theories (Ragin, 1987). In this dissertation, comparative studies are to provide
evidence for the validation and development of a new policy model applied to
Vietnam.
The selected cases in this study are critical cases that represent different ideal
types of policy outcomes: radical change and non-radical change. The objective of the
case studies is to examine if in the cases with similar policy outcomes, there is a
general path traveled to reach the outcome. Notably, the case studies are centrally
concerned with sequences and timing of events, with an eye toward turning points and
path dependence (Ragin, 2004). Thus, in-depth case studies are used in this
dissertation to assess the value of my proposed policy model by examining the
existence or absence of the critical policy change factors in each of the cases as well
as to verify the proposed causal flow of the policy change model. The empirical
evidence revealed in the cases can consolidate or weaken the explanatory capacity of
the policy factors/concepts and causal arguments of the proposed model.
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In particular, the case studies in this research use the theory-confirming and
theory-infirming approach (Lijphart, 1971). That is, the case studies are used to gather
the empirical evidence to evaluate the propositions I propose to validate the new
model of major policy model for Vietnam. Substantively, the case studies will
examine the role of the four policy factors identified in the policy model and their
relationships in the policy change process and outcomes. If a case is of the theoryconfirming type, it strengthens the claim made in each of the propositions. But,
assuming that the propositions are solidly based on a large number of cases, the
demonstration that one more case fits does not strengthen it a great deal. Like-wise,
theory-disconfirming case studies only weaken the generalizations marginally
(George, 1997).
Notably, George & Bennett (2005) identified several requirements that the
comparative case method must meet to overcome criticisms. First, the investigator
should clearly identify the “class” or “subclass” of events – of which a single case or a
group of cases to be studied are an instance. In this dissertation, two cases are selected
to represent radical policy change and the other two represent the absence of radical
change. The criteria to select the radical change cases rely on the definition of
radical/innovative policy change defined by Hogwood and Peters (1992) presented in
Section 2 of Chapter III (see Table 4). Second, a well-defined research objective and
an appropriate research strategy to achieve that objective should guide the selection
and analysis of a single case or several cases within a class or subclass of the
phenomenon under investigation. In this regard, the objective of the case study is to
validate a proposed policy model and identify the limitations of the model based on
the empirical evidence from the cases. Third, the case studies should employ well
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defined variables of theoretical framework for the purposes of explanation. The policy
cases in this research employ the key policy concepts (both independent and
dependent variables) and the causal mechanism of change embedded in the proposed
policy model set forth in Figure 1 in Chapter III.

2. The analysis framework for the case studies to validate the policy model
The analysis framework of each case study is composed of the following sections:

Introduction to the case
The introduction of the case will include both substantive information about
the policy domain and the institutional arrangements surrounding the policy domain
with the following aspects:

•

Policy issues/policy problems

•

Existing policy framework

•

Review on the timeline of key legal changes or policy decisions which are
arranged chronologically

•

Policy outcomes

Case analysis
The case analysis section will focus on examining the existence or absence of
the policy factors, which are identified as the independent variables in the proposed
policy model for Vietnam. It step by step identifies the evidence related to the stressor,
leadership predisposition, policy image, and consensus on political priority and
examines the role of these policy factors in different stages of the policy process with
relevant outcomes. The evidence is also related to the logical flow identified by the
proposed policy change model. It should be noted that in the cases without radical
change, because no innovative/radical policy change proposal has been advanced and
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discussed, the factor of consensus on political priority is not examined. Each of the
policy factors will be examined by answering important questions as following:

•

Stressors:

- Was there any stressor for policy change in the case? If yes, explain the indicators of
the stressor.
- What was the nature of the stressor: triggering new challenge, or consolidating an
ongoing change in policy image or tipping the positive feedback?
- How did the Party and government perceive and articulate the stressor?
- What are the roles of the stressor in the stage of agenda setting, especially its
relationship with the leadership predisposition to reform?

•

Leadership predisposition to reform

- Did the policy elites in the Party and government fell the stressors and did they
perceive it as a crisis or real challenges to the regime requiring for major policy
response? What are the indicators of leadership predisposition?
- What were the main policy arguments and statements showing the change in the
leadership predisposition to a given policy change initiative?
- How did leadership predisposition to reform advance the policy change initiative
into the official agenda of the government and the National Assembly?

•

Change in policy image of the policy elites and politicians

- How did the Party and the government identify and explain the policy problems
uncovered by the stressors?
- How did the Party and the government articulate the solutions to the identified
policy problems?
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- Was there any change in the perception of the policy elites in the way to realize
political values and priorities through given policy change proposals? Or how did the
Party and the government relate the policy problems and solutions to the general
political goals and priorities of the regime?
- In the case with significant change in the policy image of the Party and the
government, what make it change?
- In the case without significant change, what prohibited the change?

•

Political acceptability – consensus on the temporary political priority

- In the case where innovative policy change alternative was formulated, discussed
and submitted for adoption, is there any conflict within the regime in identifying the
political priority of the Party at the time the policy change was deliberated?
- What were the main arguments regarding the congruence between the radical policy
change alternatives attached to the new policy images and Party’s core values and
priorities at the examination time?
- Was the policy alternative congruent with Party’s consensus on the temporary
political priority? How do we identify the indicators of consensus?
In each of the above section, I will make use of two “within-case” analysis
methods: the congruence and the process-tracking method. With the congruence
method, I begin with the concepts and propositions embedded in the model and then
attempt to assess the model’s ability to explain or predict the policy change process
and outcome in a particular case. With the method of process-tracking, I focus on
analyzing data to elucidate the causal mechanisms including processes, events,
actions, expectations and other intervening variables that link putative causes to
observed effects. The main objective of process-tracking method is to determine
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whether the observed relationships among the variables in a case match those
predicted by the propositions. Process tracking forces the investigator “to take
equifinality into account, considering the possibility of mapping out one or more
causal paths that are consistent with the same outcomes, checking for spuriousness,
and pointing out variables that might be left out” (George & Bennett, 2005). For
example, in the two cases with radical policy change in this dissertation, process
tracking helps discover if the factors inducing change are the same or not.

Reflection on the case and the examination over the propositions
Following the examination of the policy change factors, the last section of
each case study is to develop the reflection. The evidence in each case will be related
to the policy factors and causal flow of the policy change model to verify the
relevance and explanatory capacity of the model in each study. This initial discussion
will focus on examining the usefulness of the policy change factors and the causal
arguments embedded in the model in explaining the policy change process and policy
outcome in different policy areas in Vietnam during ðổi Mới.

Conclusion: cross-case examination
To analyze the data, this research uses the technique of “qualitative
comparative analysis” in combination with the “within-case” methods. In the last
chapter, the cross-case comparison method is used to diminish the small N problems
by allowing inferences to be drawn from the maximum number of comparisons that
can be made, in terms of the presence or absence of the causal factors of policy
change, across the cases under analysis (Ragin, 2000). The goal is to verify the
validity of the policy model across the case studies by showing the cross-case
evidence supporting or disconfirming the arguments of the policy model. Table 5 is
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used to summarize the overall findings of the four cases in all policy stages and
connecting the findings of policy factors to the policy outcomes of the cases.
Table 5: The relationships between policy factors and major policy outcomes in four cases
Case/causal
factor
Case 1
Case 2
Case 3
Case 4

Stressors

Yes or No?
Yes or No?
Yes or No?
Yes or No?

Predisposition
to reform
Yes or No?
Yes or No?
Yes or No?
Yes or No?

Change in
policy
image
Yes or No?
Yes or No?
Yes or No?
Yes or No?

Congruence
with Party’s
core values
Yes or No?
Yes or No?
Yes or No?
Yes or No?

Major
policy
outcomes
Yes
Yes
No
No

3. Data collection methods
The case studies will employ the data collection methods of document review,
and secondary information analysis. Document reviews will focus on the legal
documents of both the Party and government (resolutions, laws, degrees, decision and
directives); and secondary information analysis will focus on research papers, public
officials’ and leaders’ policy statements, announcements, and interviews with press
media; and other sources of information (see table 6).
Table 6: Different types of data and information sources

Sources/types of collecting information
Party’s resolutions/conclusion/socio-economic plan
Government’s decrees/resolutions/directives/decisions
Ministerial directives/decisions/circulars
Policy elites’ statements
Policy elites’ interviews with the media
Official reports, studies of public agencies
Research and reports of third part
Other sources

In order to collect and process the information and data, the independent
variables are operationalized. Table 7 below summarizes the sources of information
that are used to obtain evidence of each of the causal factors of change in the four
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cases. Some of the evidence may include statistical and analytic data; others will
come from official government and party documents. To isolate the absence of
presence of the policy factors, I also examine the statements from senior officials in
public forums, media interviews and official addresses they have made.
Table 7: Operationalizing the policy change factors of the model
Evidence
Causal factors
Stressor

Statistical and
analytic information

Statements/announcements
of top leaders

Official and legal
documents

Negative data
regarding policy
anomaly, failure, risk,
and lost, etc.
documented in
domestic and
international reports
and research.

Leaders admit the pressures
and challenges in statements,
interviews or speeches.

Stressor admittance
documented in official
documents of Party or
government.

Statements and arguments
from official leaders in the
central government and the
Party expressing the need for
policy change.
New views and statements
about policy problems, policy
evaluation and the solutions
to change, etc.

Guidelines and directions
documented in official
documents of Party or
government regarding the
demand for policy change.
New policy goals and
paradigms regarding the
best way to realize
political goals and values
documented by different
agencies.
Party
resolutions/decisions
regarding the consensus
on political priorities and
Party’s strategies.

Predisposition
to reform

Change in
policy image

Congruence
with Party’s
political priority

New policy forums
created and opened
for policy
deliberation and
evaluation.

Top or senior leaders’
interviews or statements
clarifying the rationales of
major change.
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Chapter V: A Case of Incremental Policy Change in Institutional
Autonomy for Higher Education Institutions in Vietnam

This dissertation relies on several policy case studies to examine how well the
new policy change model proposed in Chapter III explains the policy change process
and outcomes in different policy areas during the Renovation - ðổi Mới process in
Vietnam. The policy cases are expected to provide the empirical evidence to verify the
propositions generated from the model or at least to identify the extent to which the
causal mechanism of policy change provided in the proposed model explain the policy
outcomes in each case.
This chapter focuses on higher education policy of Vietnam to explore an
example where no significant policy change has occurred despite several decades of
strong and persistent pressure for reform. The results from the case studies allow us to
understand why and how there has been no substantive reform. We can then compare
to the cases that have experienced “significant reform”. The case study is organized
into five main sections as following.
The first section provides an introduction to the higher education system of
Vietnam to identify its key indicators, challenges and policy changes during ðổi Mới.
This section provides the reader with an overall understanding of the Vietnamese
higher education system including: (1) The capacity and expansion of the Vietnamese
higher education system; (2) The education quality of the system; (3) The incremental
policy changes in state management in higher education; and (4) The Vietnamese
governmental policy on institutional autonomy for higher education institutions. The
second section will step by step employ the causal policy factors articulated in the
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proposed major policy change model to explore their applicability to explain policy
change outcomes in higher education in Vietnam over the past two decades. These
factors include: stressors to higher education policy reform, leadership predisposition
to reform, and policy image of policy elites. Notably, because no innovative policy
change alternative in terms of institutional autonomy has been formulated and
submitted to the Party Central Committee for approval, this case will not examine the
factor of Party’s consensus on political priorities. Section three examines the role of
other policy change factors in the policy process that might not be adequately
captured by the policy change model proposed in Chapter III including policy
entrepreneur and advocacy group. Finally, section four will provide some conclusions,
especially with respect to the explanatory power of the proposed policy change model
in this higher education policy domain.

1. Introduction to the Vietnamese higher education system: indicators,
challenges and policy change during ðổi Mới
Over the past years, an increasing amount of research has been conducted on
the Vietnamese higher education system and government policy in response to the
perceived challenges and problems (Hayden & Lam, 2007; Le, 2008; Harvard
Kennedy School of Government, 2008 &2011; Tran, 2009; Ho & Berg, 2010). In this
section, I will review this body of research to provide an overall picture of the higher
education system in Vietnam. The review also incorporates the most updated data
collected from the statistical reports produced by the Ministry of Education and
Training of Vietnam. This review is to provide the context for my later discussion and
analysis of the policy process and outcomes in this sector over the past two decades in
Vietnam.
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As part of my background review, I will first provide some key quantitative
and qualitative indicators characterizing the Vietnamese higher education system. This
will be followed by a summary of the key challenges and problems faced by the
system over the past two decades since Vietnam accelerated its economic reforms in
the early of 1990s. Third, I will review the policy change process by examining key
policy outcomes and the respective timeline of the policy changes. Finally, I will draw
some important conclusions about the lack of radical policy change in giving
substantive institutional autonomy for higher education institutions, even though the
government has been rhetorically announcing its intention to reform.

Government objectives of higher education in Vietnam
The overarching goals of higher education have been articulated in a variety of
legal documents of Vietnam, yet the two laws: Education Law of 2005 and Higher
Education Law of 2012 are the most important documents which identify these goals.
The Education Law of 2005 states that the general goal of education at all levels is to
“educate the Vietnamese people in acquiring comprehensive development including
morality, knowledge, good health, professional skill; and in being loyal to the ideal of
national independence and Socialism for the sake of the construction and defense of
the nation” (Article 2, Vietnam Education Law, 2005). For higher education in
particular, according to the Law, the goals are to “educate learners in acquiring
political and moral competencies and public spirit, in acquiring knowledge and
practical skills relevant to the different educational levels, and in acquiring good
health, thereby meeting the needs of construction and defense of the nation” (Article
39, Vietnam Education Law, 2005).
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In the newly ratified Higher Education Law of 2012, the goals of higher
education are quite similar to those of the Education Law of 2005 (see Article 5 of the
Higher Education Law of 2012). The only difference is the order of the goals. In the
Higher Education Law of 2012, the goals of developing human resources, improving
literacy, training talents, conducting scientific and technological research and
producing new knowledge for the sake of economic development, national security
and international integration are prior to the goals of educating learners in acquiring
political and moral competencies and public spirit. That means there is a change in the
order between the goal for “expertise” – “Hồng”; and “political competence” –
“Chuyên”. It should also be noted that the Education Law of 2005 defines the
Vietnamese education system as a socialist education system founded on MarxismLeninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought while this principle has not been repeated in the
new Higher Education Law of 2012. However, Article 3 of Higher Education Law
2012 asserts that the organization and operation of higher education institutions is still
subjected to Education Law 2005 suggesting that Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi
Minh Thought are still applicable to higher education administration.

The capacity and expansion of the Vietnamese higher education system
Higher education institutions in Vietnam are differentiated and classified into
four different sub-types including: two-year colleges, four-year
universities/academies, regional or national universities, and research institutes
permitted to organize doctoral programs (Vietnam Higher Education Law, 2012). In
terms of ownership, there are three types of institutions: public, private and foreigninvested institutions, which offer Associate, Bachelors, Masters and Doctoral degrees
(Vietnam Education Law, 2005; Vietnam Higher Education Law, 2012). Besides
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regular full-time training, there is a parallel system called “continuing education” that
provides in-service and distance learning programs. This type of education program
provides opportunities of lifelong learning for people while they are working to
improve their knowledge, and skills required for a changing labor market and society
(Ho & Berg, 2010). In 2011, about 8% students in two-year college programs and
32% students in four-year university programs were participating in continuing
education programs nationwide (Department of Information Technology (DIT) –
MOET, 2011).
Along with the rapid economic development, the Vietnamese higher education
system has rapidly expanded since the early of 1990s. In 1987, one year after Vietnam
started its ðổi Mới Program; there were only 101 four-year universities and junior
colleges (Tran, 2009). The total number of higher education institutions increased to
386 in 2011, almost 3.8 times the number in 1987 and 2.5 times the number in 2000
(DIT, 2011). In 1988, the first private university was authorized to operate in the
Vietnam. Since then, the number of private institutions has increased rapidly, reaching
80 in 2011, 20 % of the total number of higher education institutions. Regarding the
college and university network, by 2009, 40 out of 63 provinces in Vietnam have at
least one four-year university (63%) and 62 out of 63 provinces had at least one twoyear college (95%) (MOET, 2009). Notably, the number of new universities in Hanoi
and Ho Chi Minh City accounts for 43% of newly established or upgraded
universities across the country over the past years (Ho & Berg, 2010).
In 1987, Vietnam only had 133,136 tertiary students at all levels. After more
than two decades, the total number of student in colleges and universities at all levels
has increased 16.2 times to 2,162,106 in 2011 (DIT, 2011). However, the proportion
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of students in private institutions has counted for only 13% and 20% at the two-year
and four-year programs, respectively in 2011 (DIT, 2011). In total, the proportion of
students in private institutions (both two-year and four-year) has increased slightly,
from 12% in 2000 to 15% in 2011. That percentage increases falls significantly short
of the target set by the government to increase the number of students in private
institutions to 40% by 2015 (Prime Minister’s Resolution No. 14, 2005).
In 1997, Vietnam had only 80 tertiary students per 10 thousand population
compared to 166.5 in 2006, 195 in 2009, and 240 in 2011 (MOET, 2009; DIT, 2011).
This number is still small compared to the number of other countries calculated in
2005: 347 in Thailand, 407 in Chile, 316 in Japan, 359 in France, and 674 in South
Korea (MOET, 2009). The number of 240 tertiary students per 10,000 falls
significantly short of the Vietnamese higher education targets set out by the Education
Reform Agenda in 2005 to increase the enrolment rate to 450 students per 10,000
populations by 2020.
In 2009, all types of higher education institutions (both junior colleges and
four-year universities) in Vietnam had places for only 400,000 of the 1.2 million
candidates who took the annual national university entrance exams (Nuffic, 2010).
This accounted for approximately 30% of the total high school graduates. From 2000
to 2008, post-graduate institutions have provided training for only an average of 650
doctorates per year. In 2009, the post-graduate programs across Vietnam recruited an
increasing number of 2,504 doctorate students and 30,638 master level students.
These numbers fall short of the target set by the government to have 20,000 Ph.D.trained higher education instructional staff by 2020. To manage university admission,
the Ministry of Education and Training (MOET) has established two universal
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requirements: (1) national standardized entrance examinations and examination
schedules, (2) minimum scores for admission to all public and private colleges. Based
on these requirements, institutions determine the admission and recruitment quota
annually. In short, the above indexes indicate that the demand for higher education
opportunities exceed the existing capacity of educational institutions, even though the
system has been expanded dramatically since 1990s.

The quality of the higher education system
Despite impressive expansion, the higher education system of Vietnam suffers
from various quality challenges. Indeed, according to an official report from MOET in
2009, the development of higher education has been unable to provide the trained
human resources needed to support the industrialization process, to keep pace with
modernization, to facilitate international integration and to meet the learning needs of
the people. The U.S.-Vietnam Education Task Force Final Report (September, 2009)
concluded that Vietnam is under the “pressing need for significant modernization of
its higher educational system, including fundamental changes in governance,
institutional autonomy, financing and administration, faculty hiring, promotion and
salary structure, as well as in curricula and the modalities of teaching, evaluation, and
research” (Vietnam-US Higher Education Conference, 2009, pp. 3).
Especially, Vietnamese universities are incapable of producing the educated
workforce that Vietnam’s economy and society require in the economic development
process. Surveys conducted by government-linked associations have found that as
many as 50 percent of the Vietnamese university graduates are unable to find jobs in
their areas of specialization, revealing a major disconnect between the classroom and
the demands of the labor market (Harvard Kennedy School of Government, 2008). A
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good example that illustrates the weakness of the higher education system is the case
of Intel Corporation when it established the largest chip fabrication plant in the world
in Ho Chi Minh City in 2006. Among the 2,000 students selected from the top
technical universities across Vietnam, only 6% met the minimum requirements of the
company. As a result, Intel has decided to send three students cohorts to Portland State
University to obtain their degree in the U.S. with the promise of employment upon
their return to Vietnam.
Although the number of students enrolled in higher education institutions in
Vietnam has increased 16.7 times from 1990 to 2011, the total number of teaching
staffs at all higher education institutions has increased only 3.4 times (DIT, 2011).
This disparity has caused the average student/faculty ratio to increase to 31:1 for twoyear colleges and 28:1 for four-year universities. Currently, only 10.6 % of
Vietnamese university teaching staff holds doctoral degrees and 41% hold Master
degrees (DIT, 2011). This compares unfavorably with most other countries in the
region. For example, 83% of the higher education teaching staff in South Korea held
PhD degrees in 2006 (Kim, 2008). In addition to the inadequate number of university
instructors, low salary and poor working conditions have not provided adequate
incentive for teaching staff to focus on teaching quality and scientific research.
In terms of research productivity of higher education institutions, according to
a study of peer-refereed publications (PRIP) per one million people in 11 East and
Southeast Asian countries, Singapore leads the region, with a 30 times higher
publication rate than Thailand, 170 times higher than Vietnam, and 530 times higher
than Indonesia (Pham, 2010). Also in this study, compared to Thailand, Vietnam’s
total PRIP output has been smaller than that of a single university in Thailand, such as
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Chulalongkorn or Mahidol. Moreover, domestic co-authors account for nearly 80% of
PRIPs from Thailand compared to only 37% from Vietnam; and in Thailand, 95% of
the PRIPs are produced at universities compared to only 55% in Vietnam (Pham,
2010).
Part of the concern about the inadequacy of Vietnam’s higher education
system is driven by the forces of globalization, which have accelerated the need for a
highly trained and flexible work force in the labor markets of all economic sectors.
One research has identified the following five specific challenges that globalization is
posing to Vietnam’s higher education system: the comparability of quality and
standards; the multi-nationalization of higher education; the problem of brain drain;
the problem of intellectual property; and maintaining a university as a learning
organization (Luu, 2006). These challenges have become even more visible since
Vietnam joined the World Trade Organization in 2006. In the international integration
process, Vietnam’s higher education system has been increasingly exposed to
international competition and the risks of being left behind in the race with other
countries in the region such as China, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand and
Malaysia.
To summarize, higher education in Vietnam continues to face the challenges
both in the quality and the quantity of its offerings. The Vietnamese Party’s
resolutions and government’s decrees and directives have acknowledged the need for
change, but as the following section will document, actual changes have been more
symbolic and incremental than real and radical.
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Incremental governance changes in higher education
Following economic and political transformation, the Communist Party of
Vietnam has been aware of the demand for education reform in general and for higher
education reform in particular. The propensity for reform in higher education can be
traced back to the Party’s Guiding Resolution No. 4 of the VII National Party

Congress in 1993 and the Guiding Resolution No 2 of the VIII National Party
Congress in 1996 in which education in general and higher education in particular
were considered as the driving forces for socio-economic development in the
transitional period of the country. In 2005, the Prime Minister called for a
“fundamental and comprehensive” renovation in the higher education system in order
to achieve remarkable changes in quality, efficiency, and structure that would meet the
national demand for modernization, industrialization and international integration
(Prime Minister’s Resolution No. 14, 2005). Accordingly, the goals set forth in

Resolution No. 14 for achievement by 2020 were for Vietnam’s higher education
system to develop to an advanced level of performance within the region and the
world; to be highly competitive; and to be compatible with a market economy that is
guided by the Vietnamese Socialist ideology. Resulting from this resolution and the
Higher Education Reform Agenda initiated by MOET in 2005, a number of actions,
policy pronouncements and operational changes have been advanced in the form of
governmental decrees, resolutions, circulars that have affected curriculum, student
admission, financial management and the quality of equipment and facilities. In
general, incremental governance changes have taken place in the following specific
areas:
1. Organizational structure and network planning of the higher education system
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2. Training contents, methods and procedures
3. Personnel management in higher education institutions including instructional
staff recruiting, training and compensating mechanism
4. Student admission and quota setting procedures
5. Financial usage mechanism and resource mobilization within the institutions
6. State administration and management in higher education
These incremental policy changes in higher education state management have
been embedded in a number of government’s decrees, decisions and directives which
are then synthesized in the newly-ratified Higher Education Law of 2012 (See table 8
and 9 for details). The goals have been clear: to modernize higher education and
improve its quality to meet the demand for high-skilled labor force and to bridge the
development gap between Vietnam’s higher education and those of regional and
international countries. However, policy-makers have been mostly focused on
solution-based and incremental policy changes instead of radical change in policy
philosophy and in regulatory framework that can provide innovative state
management in higher education. Especially, there has been a lack of innovative
policy on institutional autonomy for higher education institutions as presented in the
following section.

The Vietnamese governmental policy on autonomy for higher education
institutions
Despite considerable operational and administrative changes in the state
management in higher education of Vietnam, academic institutions remain subject to a
highly centralized system of control (Hayden & Lam, 2007; Harvard Kennedy
School, 2008). A variety of key areas related to administrative autonomy and
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academic freedom are rigorously regulated by the government represented by the
Ministry of Education and Training (MOET) and 12 other line ministries (Hayden &
Lam, 2007). Evidence of centralization and lack of autonomy include the following
practices:

•

All universities use the national MOET entrance examination to select
and recruit students.

•

The Ministry of Education and Training creates the curriculum
framework (recently replaced by the national standards) for all
education programs, including required key contents, course structure,
time frame, and ratio of theory versus practice components. Adhering
to the established curriculum framework/national standards, each
university builds a detailed curriculum and composes textbooks.

•

Approval from MOET is required for most of the universities to open
new education programs except for the two National Universities. New
education programs must be under the approved list of subjects set by
the government.

•

The Department of Testing and Accreditation established in 2004 is
under direct control of MOET. No independent accrediting agency has
been established yet.

•

The newly established Association of University and College
Presidents does not have actual influence on policy making process in
higher education.

110

•

Except for the two National Universities, all public universities are
dependent on MOET and other line ministries for a large part of their
budgets.

•

MOET and other line ministries continue to appoint and promote all
public university presidents.

•

Public university teacher rankings and salaries are regulated by the
government’s salary system applying to all public employees.

•

All higher education institutions need to report their administrative
activities and performance to MOET and other line ministries when
required.

In the face of the low quality and backwardness of the higher education
system, many people inside and outside government have recognized the adverse
impacts of the centralized management policy on higher education, both in terms of
university quality and capacity (Luu, 2006; Hayden & Lam, 2007; Harvard Kennedy
School, 2008; Nguyen, Oliver & Priddy, 2009; Brooks, 2010; Vietnam – America
Partnerships Conference, 2009, etc.). In particular, Luu (2006) argued that the lack of
autonomy and accountability in institutional governance causes difficulties in
enhancing educational quality and competitiveness of the Vietnamese universities,
making them unable to obtain the ranks comparable to other regional or international
universities. Nguyen et al, (2009) asserted that MOET strictly controls most higher
education institutions’ curriculum and personnel decisions, thus universities have little
autonomy and freedom to operate according to their own standards of quality. Pham
(2010) pointed out that limited institutional autonomy inhibits the taking of initiatives
and proactive attitudes by higher education administrators and creates red tape and
111

bureaucratic rules in the universities, hindering the development of an entrepreneurial
spirit in institutional governance.
In fact, the Vietnamese Communist Party and government have recognized the
need to give more autonomy for higher education institutions in response to the
inadequate management capacities of state agencies, the shortage of government
budget for higher education, and the need for international integration. Many Party
and government documents refer to the need for delegation of authority to individual
institutions. However, there is still a big gap between intention and actual
commitments and concrete policies due to the intense conflicts between the reforming
and conservative views over the role of state and institutions in the administration of
higher education. Different views create a policy paradox that on the one hand the
Party and the government have made policies arguing for expanded autonomy for
higher education institutions; while on the other hand, the Party and the government
have promulgated various rules and regulations that consolidate its controls over the
institutions. Tables 8 and 9 below will present government policies and practices that
support each of the two views.
Table 8: Major policies and practices that support decentralization in higher education
of Vietnam
No

Name of the
documents

Date

Contents related to institutional
autonomy in the documents

1

Resolution No. 4

4th Plenum
of the VII
National
Party
Congress in
1993

2

Prime Minister’s
Decision No. 240

1993

Point to the need to maintain state
management of the Ministry of
Education and Training; in the
meantime increase the autonomy of
educational institutions, especially
for the universities and expand
democracy within the schools.
Set forth the guidelines for the
establishment and operation of
private universities, including the
right to establish a governing board,
financial autonomy, and the right to
recruit faculty, staff and a president.
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Policy implication for
institutional
autonomy
For the first time, an
important legal
document mentions the
need for greater
university autonomy.

Allows the
establishment of private
universities with
institutional autonomy
in some administrative
aspects but still under

No

Name of the
documents

Date

Contents related to institutional
autonomy in the documents

3

Prime Minister’s
Decision No. 477
on the Charter of
National
University in
Hanoi

1994

Set forth the establishment of the
National University in Hanoi, as a
key institution, which was granted
more institutional rights compared
to other institutions.

4

Resolution No. 2
on Development
Strategy for
Education and
Training in the
Period of
Industrialization
and
Modernization
till 2000
Government
Resolution No.
90 on the
Direction and
Guideline for
Socialization of
Education,
Healthcare and
Culture Activities

The 2nd
Plenum of
the VIII
Party
National
Congress in
1996

Emphasize the weaknesses and
challenges of the whole education
system and the demand for
renovation to meet the demand of
economic development.

In 1997

6

Conclusion No.
14-KL/TW of the
Politburo and
Party Central
Committee on the
Development
Direction of
Education and
Training, Science
and Technology
till 2010

In 2002, at
the 6th
Meeting of
the IX
National
Party
Congress

(1) Delegate the financial burden of
the public budget to the people and
private sector; (2) Allow
educational institutions to charge
higher tuition to increase their
income; (3) Encourage private and
business sectors to invest in public
services including education; (4)
Provide institutional autonomy for
universities to raise the income
from the collaboration with
enterprises; (5) Encourage
institutions to develop international
partnerships to exploit external
resources for public services
Strongly emphasize the demand for
innovation in state management in
education, including the issue of
institutional autonomy

7

Prime Minister
Resolution No.

In 2005

5

State management is one of the
reform solutions that includes: (1)
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strict control of the
government
Policy implication for
institutional
autonomy
Since 1994, the
government has
allowed for national,
regional and some
special universities
such as Vietnam –
German University to
have more institutional
autonomy.
The resolution
recognizes the need to
clarify and increase the
autonomy of
institutions. However,
the idea of institutional
autonomy is still very
abstract and is
mentioned in only one
sentence.
Due to the lack of
resources, the
government has to
allow more autonomy
for institutions in
seeking financial
resources, sharing the
financial burden with
the students and their
families, and promoting
international
cooperation that can
generate additional
external resources
This is the first time,
the Party Central
Committee and
Politburo specifically
pointed to the need to
delegate more
administrative
autonomy to
educational institutions,
especially universities,
and the responsibility
of local governments
(the People’s
Committees) in state
management in
education
This document has
been considered as the

14/2005/NQ-CP
on “Fundamental
and
Comprehensive
Renovation of
Vietnam Higher
Education for
2006−2020” and
the Higher
Education
Reform Agenda
(HERA) of the
Ministry of
Education and
Training

No

Name of the
documents

Date

8

Amended
Education Law

In 2005

9

Government’s
Resolution No. 5
reinforces the
Resolution No.
90 in 1997

In 2005

conferring on public higher
education institutions
administrative autonomy in their
operations, giving them the right to
decide and be responsible for
training, research, human resource
management and budget planning;
(2) Abolishing line ministry
supervision of universities in the
meantime ensuring the right of the
community and social
organizations, especially
professional associations, to
oversee the quality of higher
education; (3) developing the
accrediting system for quality
assurance; (4) Accelerating the
State’s stewardship role in
monitoring and inspecting the
overall structure and scale of higher
education; and (5) Building higher
education law.
Contents related to institutional
autonomy in the documents
Following the Education Law in
1998, the Amended Education Law
in 2005 has a separate article (No.
60) to regulate the rights and
accountability of vocational
schools, junior colleges and fouryear universities. Institutions have
the rights to: (1) design the
curriculum, textbooks and teaching
plans for approved academic
programs; (2) identify student
enrolment numbers, conduct the
entrance exam, validate student
graduation and offer degrees; (3)
design administrative structures,
recruit, compensate and manage
faculty and staff; (4) mobilize and
use resources; (5) cooperate with
foreign economic, education and
research organizations according to
the state laws.
Reinforce the need for socialization
of public services including
education and healthcare, putting
forward the mechanisms to: (1)
increase the financial contribution
by individuals, private enterprises
and social partners in delivering
public services; (2) Encourage selffinancing of institutions in their
operation; and (3) transferring
semi-public schools to private ones,
allowing for for-profit education
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most innovative one in
higher education. The
key idea is to reinforce
the delegation of
authority from the state
to the higher education
institutions and to
develop a new kind of
relationship between
state and higher
education (Dao &
Hayden, 2010 p. 13).
However, all of these
intentions have not
been realized by
concrete regulatory
framework. Also, this is
not a Party resolution

Policy implication for
institutional
autonomy
However, these rights
are conditional and too
general to be
implemented.
Moreover, critical
rights of admission
method, opening new
program, developing
curriculum, appointing
president, establishing
accrediting agency
were not assigned in
this law.

The word
“socialization” is used
by the government to
avoid the words
“privatization” or
“equitization”. The
policy implication here
is the change in policy
image of the role of
public and private
actors in delivering
education and health

activities.

No

Name of the
documents

Date

Contents related to institutional
autonomy in the documents

10

Joint Circular on
Instruction for
Implementing
Autonomous
Right and
Accountability of
Public Education
and Training
Institutions (No.
07/2009/TTLTBGDDT-BNV)

Signed in
2009 by
Minister of
Home
Affairs,
and
Minister of
Education
and
Training

11

Resolution No.
05-NQ/BCSD on
Innovation in
Higher Education
Management in
the Period 20102012

Issued on
January 6,
2010 by the
Party
Committee
of the
Ministry of
Education
and
Training

12

Prime Minister’s
Directive No.
296 on
Renovation in
Higher Education
Management

February,
2010

Provide instruction concerning the
implementation of autonomy and
accountability in the following
administrative areas: designing and
implementing operational plans;
establishing joint-ventures with
other organizations; promoting
international cooperation;
organizing institutional structures;
managing human resources
(recruitment and promotion and
compensation).
Emphasize the need for
decentralization and autonomy in
higher education clarifying the
responsibilities of the Ministry of
Education and Training, other line
ministries and provincial People’s
Committee. It also points to the
need to encourage the institutional
autonomy and accountability, and
internal assurance and self-control
especially in implementing
institutional missions, organizing
operational structure, and managing
human resources.
Identify a variety of higher
education challenges including low
level of educational quality, the
misalignment between higher
education reform and coherent
societal development, and the lack
of incentive systems for both
learning and teaching.

13

Ministry of
Education and

October 19,
2010

MOET urged institutions to
continue reform in higher education
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services. In the past,
these services were
taken for granted as the
sole responsibility of
the state.
Policy implication for
institutional
autonomy
The regulations in this
Circular mostly focus
on the organizational
issues realizing the
rights of institutions in
human resource
management, daily
operation, and business
activities. They are,
however, very general
and are subject to other
rules and laws.
This is the first time a
state document has
directly focused on the
issues related to the
institutional autonomy
for higher education
institutions. It is
approved by Party
Committee of the
Ministry of Education
and Training as a
leading organ of the
Ministry.
This is the first time a
document issued by the
PM has attributed the
backward management
mechanisms and
policies as the key
reasons for the low
quality and limitations
of the national higher
education system. One
of the guidelines in this
directive is to clarify
the relationship
between state and
higher education
institutions in order to
increase the autonomy
for institutions while
assuring their
accountability to the
society.
While the Guideline
mentions the

Training’s
Guideline No.
4713, on the
Focused Mission
of Higher
Education in the
2010-2011
School Year

No

Name of the
documents

14

Higher Education
Law

management including the
implementation of decentralization
for institutions that meet the
qualification. The Guideline also
emphasized the need to publicize
institutions’ commitments to
education quality and to develop
evaluation criteria and methods for
quality assurance as the criteria for
higher institutional autonomy
offered by the state.

Date

June 2012

Contents related to institutional
autonomy in the documents
This new law was expected to
resolve the problems and
weaknesses of the higher education
system that surfaced during the past
two decades of economic reform. In
particular, it was expected to clarify
the relationships between the
government and higher education
institutions, especially in loosening
central government ties on the
administration of the institutions.
This law, however, lacks a specific
framework for implementing the
institutional autonomy of higher
education institutions (See the
Appendix for details). The law is to
be specified by 36 guiding
documents from the Ministry of
Education and Training, five
decrees of the Government, one
decision of the Prime Minister and
four inter-ministerial circulars.
This is the most important legal
document that reflects the policy
images and political priority of the
regime regarding the relationship
between the state and educational
institutions. In the case analysis
section, it will be examined in
detail.
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importance of
implementing
decentralization, it
emphasizes the
evaluation criteria,
quality assurance and
standardization as the
conditions for
decentralization. This
policy argument has
been embedded in most
of the recent higher
education policies
dealing with the issues
of institutional
autonomy.
Policy implication for
institutional
autonomy
It took more than 6
years for the proposal
to be submitted to the
National Assembly for
the first time in
November 2011 since
the Prime Minister
Resolution No. 14 on
Comprehensive Higher
Education Renovation
in 2005. Yet, the
proposal was not
ratified by the National
Assembly because a
number of
parliamentary
members, along with
the public, criticized
the law for its lack of
specificity and
innovation in altering
the relationships
between the
government and higher
education institutions.
The Proposal was
submitted again to the
National Assembly
Session in June, 2012
with some revision and
restructuring and was
ratified on June 18,
2012

Table 9: Major policies and practices that limits autonomy of higher education
institutions in Vietnam
No

Name of policy

1

Decision No.
76/2007/QðBGDðT of
MOET

December 20,
2007

Focus on the accrediting
procedures and processes
for quality assurance of
vocational schools, junior
colleges and universities.

Regulate and guide the
process by which institutions
are accredited and evaluated
based on the standards set by
MOET

2

Decision No.
05/2008/QðBGDðT of
MOET

February 5,
2008

Provide guiding procedures
for student selection and
admission for colleges and
universities.

3

Prime
Minister’s
Decision No.
174/2008/QðTTg
Name of policy

December 31,
2008

Regulate standard,
promotion and removal
procedures in relation to
professor and asscociate
professors.
Main contents

Regulate and provide
guidelines for the national
entrance examinations and
the procedures that
institutions need to follow to
enroll and admit students.
The government still retains
the right to recognize and
promote professors and
associate professors at every
institution.
Policy implication

4

Decision No.
58/2010/QðTTg of Prime
Minister

September
22, 2010

5

Circular No
10/2011/TTBGDðT of
MOET

February 28,
2011

No

Date

Date

Main contents

Promulgate the higher
education institutional
charter, including: (1)
missions and rights of the
institutions; (2) organization
of educational activities; (3)
scientific research and
technology development;
(4) international
cooperation; responsibility
and rights of teachers,
public employees and
officials; (5) responsibilities
and rights of learners; (6)
institutional organization
and management; (7)
financing and assets of
institution; and (8) the
relationship between
university, family and
society. This Charter applies
to all four-year public,
private and foreign-owned
institutions.
An example when MOET
provides the guidelines for
the training process of
master programs referring to
(1) educational institution;
(2) curriculum; (3) program
management; (4) inspection,
supervision, complain
resolving.
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Policy implication

This document provides a
guiding framework and set
of principles for universities
related to organizational
structure and operational
activities in different
administrative areas within
the higher education
institution.

This is an example of how
the MOET regulates the
training process at different
levels from undergraduate
programs to master and
doctoral programs.

6

Circular No.
23/2011/TTBGDDT of
MOET

June 06, 2011

As an example when MOET
imposes the evaluation
standards for education
program in industrial
technique teacher training
undergraduate program (Sư
phạm kỹ thuật công nghiệp)

No
7

Name of policy
Circular No.
57/2011/TTBGDðT of
MOET

Date
December 02,
2011

Main contents
Instruct institutions to
identifying the student
enrollment quota at
undergraduate, master and
doctoral levels based on the
criteria of MOET.

8

Curriculum
Frameworks
for all
education
programs are
promulgated
by MOET

January 13,
2012

For example, the Program in
Defense and Security
Education is regulated by
the Circular No. 02
/2012/TT-BGDðT.

9

Circular No. 04
/2012/TTBGDðT of
MOET

February 15,
2012

Provide the list of
educational and training
programs at the master and
doctoral levels that are
allowed to be taught at
colleges and universities
(Level IV List).

10

Higher
Education Law

June 2012

Regulate all issues of state
management in higher
education. It incorporates
and restructures most of the
recent legal documents in
higher education. (The
following section will
examine in detail the
contents of this Law).
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MOET promulgates the
standards by which the
education programs at all
institutions will be designed
and taught. The standards
include the objectives of the
program, the competencies
of graduates, the content
structure of the curriculum
Policy implication
Indicate an incremental
change in admission policy
when the government allows
institutions to proactively
calculate their enrollment
number based on the
standards and guidelines of
MOET. Yet, they still need to
inform MOET of their
annual enrollment number.
MOET provides the
curriculum frameworks for
all academic programs
taught at the colleges and
universities. The curriculum
imposes (1) learning goals
and objectives (morality and
ethics, professional
knowledge, and skills); (2)
structure of the program
(number of credits and
specification of required
knowledge; and the structure
of knowledge).
All institutions, except the
two National Universities in
Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh
City, can only open
programs that are listed in
this document issued by
MOET. The two National
Universities can open new
programs as pilot projects
and subject to evaluation and
approval from MOET before
the new program is officially
taught at the university.
The law was expected to
provide a systematic
regulatory framework for the
development of higher
education system. It is,
however, still abstract and
lacks innovative policy
change that give substantive
autonomy for higher
education institutions.

2. Case analysis: how policy factors determine policy outcomes?
In the previous section, I have identified the policies and practices in Vietnam,
those that support decentralization as well as the policies and practice that consolidate
the control of government and MOET over higher education institutions. As have
been mentioned previously, these policies and practices demonstrate a policy paradox:
while agreeing to the need for greater autonomy for institutions, the government
seems cautious about the possibility of losing control over the higher education
system if autonomy is given to institutions without commensurate accountability and
binding rules (Bui, 2011). Indeed, the newly-ratified Higher Education Law of 2012,
which is the most up-to-date and important legal document related to institutional
autonomy, reveals the reluctance of the government to delegate substantial autonomy
to institutions in most of the important administrative areas, such as curriculum
design, opening new programs, professor and president appointments, quality
assurance and accreditation. The law indicates that the Socialist legacies have
triumphed over the demand for decentralization and institutional autonomy. Amid
criticisms and pressure to loosen the constraints on higher education institutions, the
government tends to compromise with incremental policy changes instead of radical
reform.
In this section, I will apply the major policy change model that I developed in
Chapter III to guide my explanation on the policy process and outcomes in higher
education sector of Vietnam. To do so, I will examine the role of the causal policy
factors including stressors, leadership predisposition to reform and policy image of
policy Party and government that are integral parts of the proposed policy change
119

model. In the following sections, I will explore each of these questions in greater
detail:
-

Have the Vietnamese Party and government been aware of the stressors
that were prompting higher education reform?

-

Has there been predisposition on the part of Party and government to
reform high education policy?

-

Have the policy images of the policy elites in the Party and Government
changed over the past years, especially in terms of the technical feasibility
and political acceptability of giving more autonomy to higher education
institutions?

The stressors to higher education policy
As have been explained in the proposed major policy change model in Chapter
III, stressors are considered as independent variables in the relationship with the
policy outcomes. Stressors to a policy subsystem may include: natural and human
disasters, economic crises, structural changes in socio-economic conditions, critical
changes in other policy areas, national mood, or international pressures. Adverse
consequences may occur if the stressor is not addressed. Stressors served as the
catalysts that make major policy change more likely to happen by disclosing new
knowledge, new risks and new challenges. Thus, by underscoring anomalies in the
prevailing policy paradigm, or raising the visibility of new problems, stressors can
provide opportunities for policy learning within the policy subsystem which in turn
change policy makers’ perceptions of the problems, how they rank values or priorities,
and how decisive they push for major policy change.
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In Section 2 of this Chapter, I have reviewed the both quantity and quality
issues in the higher education that demonstrated the challenges and difficulties faced
by the higher education system of Vietnam. In this sub-section, I will take a further
step to identify if the Vietnamese Party and government has been aware of the
external stressors and perceived the demand for higher education reform. By a reading
of the contents, statements and languages of relevant resolutions, decrees, decisions,
and directives, I hope to reveal the perceptions of the Party and government of
Vietnam about the pressure for change.

At the Party level
In 1996, the 2nd Plenum of the VIII Party National Congress of Vietnam
produced a special Resolution No. 2 on Development Strategy for Education and

Training in the Period of Industrialization and Modernization till 2000. This
document marks an important point of time when the Party and government took the
issue of education quality and development as the critical factor for the success of
economic reforms. The resolution admitted the weaknesses and challenges of the
education system, especially higher education. It pointed out that “our nation’s
education system has a great deal of limitations in scope, structure, especially in
quality and efficiency; is unable to meet the increasing demand for human resources
supporting the cause of economic reform, national construction and defense, and
Socialist-oriented industrialization and modernization” (Communist Party of Vietnam,
1996). It is the first time that an important document of the Party apparently
recognized that weaknesses in the educational system needed to be corrected if
significant improvements were to be made in the economic system. The resolution
concluded with the simple observation that state management of education including
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higher education is “inappropriate and is not able to encourage the activeness and
responsibility of the local governments and schools” (Communist Party of Vietnam,
1996) .
This 1996 recognition of the external stressors to the education subsystem
including higher education that were causing pressure for educational reform was
intensified in 2002 by Conclusion No. 14 of the Party Central Committee on

Education and Scientific Development. This conclusion pointed out that “besides
achievements, the education system is facing a variety of difficulties and weaknesses,
especially in terms of education quality and state management. The educational
system has observed a disproportionate structure between tertiary education and
vocational training and the demand for high quality human resource needed for
economic development has not been met (Communist Party of Vietnam, 2002). This
resolution indicated concern by the regime about the weaknesses and limitations of
the education system in general and the higher education system in particular after
Vietnam accepted further international economic integration by the Bilateral Trade
Agreement with the U.S in 2001. In 2005, on the threshold of WTO accession,
Vietnam adopted a revised Education Law along with a number of legal changes in
response to the pressures arising from deeper international economic integration.
In April, 2009, the Politburo of the CPV issued a special Conclusion of the

Politburo No. 242-TB/TW on the Direction for Education Development till 2020.
Again, this conclusion strongly emphasized the fact that the national education system
lags far behind the need of national development. Notably, the 2009 document is the
first official example where the Party that has attributed the “backwardness and
inappropriateness of state management in education as the key reason for all of the
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weaknesses and problems of the system” (Communist Party of Vietnam, 2009). The
Party had to admit that education management reform has been very slow and far
behind the reforms in other socio-economic sectors.

At the government level
In 2005, two of the very important government documents in higher education
were issued by the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Education and Training: (1) the

Prime Minister’s Resolution No. 14/2005/NQ-CP dated 2 November on “Fundamental
and Comprehensive Renovation of Vietnam Higher Education in the period of
2006−2020” and the Higher Education Reform Agenda (HERA) issued by the
Ministry of Education and Training. These are the two most innovative guiding
documents focusing directly on renovation in higher education. Resolution No. 14
asserted that “the achievements in the higher education development process is not
sustainable, systematic, and substantial [enough]…for the cause of industrialization,
modernization, the learning needs of the people and international integration of the
country”. The resolution reiterated the weaknesses and limitations in state
management, education system structure, institution network, teaching method,
teacher and education administrator quality, and the use of resource. These two
documents were expected to set the stage for radical changes in state management in
higher education, yet they did not provide concrete and deterministic decisions giving
significant autonomy to institutions.
In February, 2010, the Prime Minister’s Directive No. 296 on Renovation in

Higher Education Management clearly identified a variety of higher education
challenges including low level of educational quality, the misalignment between
higher education reform and societal development, and the lack of incentive systems
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for both learning and teaching (Prime Minister of Vietnam, 2010). The Prime Minister
called for a significant shift in focus from quantity to an emphasis on the quality of
higher education. Once again, this directive attributed the backward state management
mechanisms and policies as the key reasons for low quality and limited availability of
higher education, which in turn detract the economic environment for investors and
can slow the economic growth of the country.

At the National Assembly level
Following the Conclusion No. 242-TB/TW of the Politburo, the National
Assembly promulgated a special Resolution No. 50 on the Implementation of Policy

and Law in the Establishment of New Institutions, Investment and Quality Assurance
in Higher Education, dated on June 19, 2010. The resolution identified problems in
various aspects of higher education that contribute to low education quality. The
problems include the establishment of new institutions without quality assurance,
slow policy reform, limited institutional rights for universities and colleges, low
quality teaching, lack of the linkage between research and training, and a weak
accrediting system. This resolution revealed the disappointment of the National
Assembly with the speed of reform and the further decline of the quality of higher
education after two decades of reforming efforts.

At the Ministry of Education and Training level
As a national public organization in charge of state management of education
including higher education, in a assessment report in 2009, the Ministry of Education
and Training pointed out that “while Vietnam’s higher education system is developing
rapidly and on a large scale, state management is failing to keep pace and higher
education management [is] lagging behind” (MOET, 2009). On January 6, 2010, the
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Party Committee of the Ministry of Education and Training issued the Resolution No.

05-NQ/BCSD on Innovation in Higher Education Management in the Period 20102012. The resolution concluded that “the management of the Ministry of Education
and Training in higher education has not been renovated enough in accordance to the
universal governance rules in higher education and for the demands of social
development” (Ministry of Education and Training, Vietnam, 2010). Accordingly, the
state management is weak and inefficient because it violates the universal governance
rules in the following areas: (1) teaching process: curriculum and pedagogical
methodology; (2) state management and institutional administration; (3) individual
incentive system; (4) financial management; and (5) technological application. This is
the first time, an official document referred to universal rules for higher education
management, yet it did not specify such rules. Also, in the same year, the Ministry of
Education and Training issued Guideline No. 4713 on the Focused Mission of Higher

Education in the 2010-2011 School Year in October. Through this guideline, MOET
urged institutions to continue their reform initiatives in higher education management,
including the implementation of decentralization for institutions that meet the
qualifications.
In summary, from the evidence in the preceding sections, it is clear that all
authority levels of the regime have recognized the existence of external economic
stressors that trigger the need to reform the education system especially the higher
education in response to a dynamic market economy and deeper international
integration in all areas. More specifically, the regime increasingly perceived that state
management and government policies in education are the main reason for the
weaknesses and problems of the higher education system. Most recently, renovation
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of state management in education was considered as one of the three most urgent
issues of the 6th Plenum of the XI Party Congress just finished on October 15, 2012.
Nonetheless, despite the recognition by the leadership cadre in both Party and
government of the increasing stressors for innovative policy change in higher
education, this reform has not materialized. In the next section, I will explore the next
policy factor of the proposed policy model, the “leadership predisposition to reform”,
to see if the leaders in Vietnam really want to act upon the stressors they have
officially recognized.

Leadership predisposition to reform state management in higher education
In the policy model proposed in this dissertation, the concept of “leadership
predisposition to reform” was defined as a psychological readiness of the policy elites
to advance innovative policy change initiative. This readiness is achieved only after
the policy elites take into account the existing stressors along with the ideological
commitments and political risks. Thus, leadership predisposition demonstrated the
general commitments and willingness to policy change, which influence policy
leaders’ perceptions of what problems are and how they should be responded to. It can
shape how the ruling elites perceive and articulate particular policy issues, how they
assess the proposed change, and how they weigh political and technical factors in
dealing with the existing policy problems. Once the predisposition to reform is
reached within the leadership of the CPV by the issuance of relevant resolutions or
decisions, the policy problems and policy change initiative will be officially advanced
into the agenda of the National Assembly or government for further deliberation and
studies. This, in turn, guarantees a chance for a policy reform initiative to be advanced
into the next stage of the policy formulation and may be adopted in the future. In this
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section, I will document the leadership predisposition by the Party, National
Assembly, Prime Minister and MOET to grant more autonomy to higher education
institutions in Vietnam. Leadership predisposition can be demonstrated through the
statements of different authorities in their resolutions, directives, decrees, or
decisions.
Indeed, at the Party level, the first time the Central Party Committee referred
to the concept of autonomy for schools including higher education institutions is in

Resolution No. 2 of the Party’s VII Congress in 1996 on Development Strategy for
Education and Training in the Period of Industrialization and Modernization till
2000. Yet, the idea of delegating autonomy for institutions in this resolution was very
illusive. Six years later, in the face of greater international economic integration, the
Politburo promulgated Conclusion No. 14-KL/TW in 2002, which strongly
emphasized the demand for innovation in state management in education.
Specifically, for the first time, the Party pointed to the need to delegate administrative
autonomy from the central government to education institutions, especially the
universities, and the need to raise the responsibility of the local governments in
education management, including the people’s committees at the province, city and
district levels.
In the same direction, two years after Vietnam joined the WTO, the Central
Party of Committee of Vietnam in 2009 issued another Conclusion No. 242-TB/TW on

the Direction for Education Development till 2020. Under the second solution for
renovation in state management in education, the resolution calls for the need to
“increase the autonomy and accountability of the schools while promoting
transparency, publicity and supervision of the government agencies and social
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organizations in education management”. These important documents of the Party
clearly showed the intentions and awareness of the ruling Party to delegate greater
autonomy to individual institutions. They were, however, abstract endorsements and
did not provide concrete policy decisions to realize the autonomy of the institutions.
At the government level, in 2005, a very important legal document was
promulgated by the Prime Minister called Resolution No. 14/2005/NQ-CP on

Fundamental and Comprehensive Renovation of Vietnam Higher Education for the
period of 2006−2020. This resolution urged fundamental and multi-faceted
renovation in higher education in order to achieve substantial change in the quality,
efficiency, and the operation of the higher education system. The resolution called for
greater institutional autonomy, accountability and transparency. Teachers and school
administrators were encouraged to proactively participate in institutional
administration along with participation by the whole society. In the same year, a new
Education Law was adopted. Notably, these significant documents of the government
were to respond to the external pressures arising at the threshold of the accession to
WTO.
The next important document showing strong predisposition to reform higher
education was Directive No. 296 issued in February, 2010 by the Prime Minister. The
directive called attention to the weaknesses and limitations in state management of
higher education, which were cited as the major causes for the low quality and
backwardness of the national higher education system. Among the solutions for
changing the situation, the directive pointed to the need to clarify the relationships
between state agencies and higher education institutions in order to increase the
autonomy for institutions while assuring their accountability to the society. This
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directive was to realize Conclusion No. 242 of the Politburo issued in 2009. After
these guiding document, the Ministry of Education and Training accelerated the
policy making process to prepare the draft of the new Higher Education Law.
At the National Assembly level, a special Resolution No. 50 on the

Implementation of Policy and Law in the Establishment of New Institutions,
Investment and Quality Assurance in Higher Education was issued on June 19, 2010
in response to the slow speed of reforms and the low quality especially of the newlyestablished institutions. Among the solutions, the resolution emphasized the need for
decentralization and greater autonomy in higher education and clarifying the
responsibilities of the Ministry of Education and Training, other line ministries and
provincial People’s Committees in state management of the higher education system.
It also calls for greater accountability, internal evaluation and self-control of
institutions in implementing their missions, organizing institutional structure and
process, and managing their human resources.
At the Ministry of Education and Training level, on January 6, 2010, the Party
Committee of the Ministry produced Resolution No. 05-NQ/BCSD on Innovation in

Higher Education Management in the Period 2010-2012. Similar to other guiding
documents, this resolution emphasized the demand for decentralization, delegating
powers in the way that would clarify the division of role among the Ministry of
Education and Training, other line ministries and the local authorities; and encourage
autonomy and accountability and internal control of institutions along with the
increased supervision of state agencies and of the whole society. According to this
resolution, public institutions are supposed to be autonomous in the areas of mission
implementation, operative administration, faculty recruitment and compensation.
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Following the directives from the higher levels of authorities, the Ministry of
Education and Training produced Guideline No. 4713 on the Focused Mission of

Higher Education in the 2010-2011 School Year. The MOET’s slogan for the school
year 2010-2011 was “Continue to renovate management and promote education

quality”. In this document, MOET urged institutions to continue reforms in higher
education management including the implementation of decentralization for
institutions, which meet the qualification. The guideline also emphasized the need to
publicize institutional commitments in education quality and to develop evaluation
criteria and methods for quality assurance as to support decentralization. The ministry
considers these requirements as the criteria for granting increased autonomy to
individual institutions.
To summarize, by reviewing the key documents at all authority levels over the
past two decades, we can conclude that there was predisposition by the Vietnamese
Communist Party and government leaders to reform the state management in higher
education including policy reform in administrative autonomy for tertiary institutions.
The Party and government have continuously showed their commitments and
intentions to decentralize and to delegate power as a solution to the existing problems
and challenges of the higher education system. Yet, despite the recognition of the
pressures for reform in order to address external stressors to higher education system
and despite the predisposition of leaders to embrace reform, significant change has
not occurred. How much of this resistance to change can be accounted for by the
failure of the Party and government leaders to alter their policy image? In the next
section we will explore the importance of this factor identified in my policy change
model presented in Chapter III.
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Policy image on state management in higher education
In chapter III, I have isolated “change in policy image” of the policy elites as a
potentially important factor in explaining major policy change in Vietnam. The
concept of “policy image” was defined as the belief through which the policy actors
interpret given policy issues; identify the causal relationships between these issues
with the existing policies or the absence of a policy; and rationalize their solutions
resolving the issues. Policy image also reflects the assumptions on the best way to
realize the core values and political priorities of the Vietnamese regime in the
transitional process of development. Significant change in the policy image is a
precondition for the formulation of innovative/radical policy change alternative,
which in turn enables the adoption of radical policy change in the next stage of the
policy process.
In following section, I will document the evidence to answer the following
questions: have the Party and its leaders seen decentralization as a solution to a
particular set of policy problems? In another word, have the Party’s and the
government’s policy image identified decentralization of higher education as the key
solution to low quality performance in higher education? How have the Party and
government perceived the roles of higher education institutions in the development of
the country and the relationship between institutional autonomy and the legacies of a
Socialist state in Vietnam?
Indeed, the early years of the 1990s witnessed a strong push for economic
reform to attract a larger amount of foreign direct investment to Vietnam and to
promote exports. During this period, the central-planning economic system was
dismantled and replaced by a Socialist market-oriented system. With the initial and
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impressive achievements in economic development, the CPV and the government of
Vietnam started to take into account the quality of the human resources in the market
labor which were greatly influenced by the education system, especially the quality of
higher education. To bring the quality of higher education into alignment with the
growing economic vitality of the country, the Party and government have identified
the factors that affect education quality and the solutions to improve the system in a
variety of resolutions, directives and legal documents.
Beginning as far back as the first years of ðổi Mới, Resolution No. 4 of the 2nd

Plenum of the VII Party National Congress in 1993 identified education and training
as “the motor to push and ensure the success of socio-economic goals”. However, this
resolution did not recognize backward state management and policy deficiencies as
the sources of problems and weaknesses in the education system including higher
education. In the solution section of the resolution, renovation in education
management was listed as the last solution (the 12th), which mentioned the need to
clarify the rights and responsibilities of the Ministry of Education and Training, line
ministries, local government in education management. Only one sentence refers to
the need for decentralization, “while the state’s responsibility must be raised,
education institutions need to be given rights, especially institutions of higher
education, in order to promote democracy within these institutions” (Communist
Party of Vietnam, 1993). The resolution indicated that at this point of time the Party
did not consider state management including the policy on institutional autonomy as
the key solution for quality improvement in education in general and in high
education in particular.
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Three years later, Resolution No. 2 on Development Strategy for Education

and Training in the Period of Industrialization and Modernization till 2000 issued at
the 2nd Plenum of the VIII Party National Congress in 1996 was produced as one of
the key guiding documents of the Party for a long period time. The resolution
recognized the challenges and difficulties in economic development if the education
system, including higher education was not commensurately developed. The
significant difference between this resolution and other previous documents of the
Party and government related to the policy image. For the first time the Party
identified inappropriate state management in education as the first reason for the
weaknesses and problems of the education system. Among the problems in the state
management system, the resolution identified the lack of strong autonomy and selfresponsibility of education institutions and local governments. However, in the
solution section of this resolution, change and improvement in state management in
education is ranked the 4th as the last solution. Moreover, within this solution, the
need to increase the autonomy for institutions, especially higher institutions, was
listed as the last point. This suggests that even though the Party started to consider
state management as the reason for the weaknesses and problems in the education
system, state management in general and especially the policy on autonomy for higher
education institutions had not yet been recognized as the most important target of
policy and governance reforms.
The Conclusion No. 14-KL/TW of the Party Central Committee in 2002, at the
6th Plenum of the IX National Party Congress, was the first important document of the
Party that strongly emphasized the demand for innovation in state management in
education as the solution for quality improvement. However, the first point in the
133

solution section of the conclusion is to “increase the leadership of the Party and to
improve leading capacity of the state” in higher education management instead of
giving more autonomy for institutions (Communist Party of Vietnam, 2002). The
conclusion repeated the need for delegation and decentralization in education
management that promotes autonomy and pro-activeness of education institutions,
especially of higher education institutions, along with the assurance of their
accountability to the students, families and the whole society. The role of local
people’s committees and agencies in education management was also raised. Again, at
this point, the Party had perceived the important role of innovation in education state
management for quality improvement but did not see decentralization and delegation
of administrative power as the first priority of reform.
The Prime Minister Resolution No 14/2005/NQ-CP on “Fundamental and

Comprehensive Renovation of Vietnam Higher Education for 2006−2020” and the
Higher Education Reform Agenda (HERA) issued by MOET in 2005 have been
considered as the key documents which included the most innovative ideas and
proposal in developing the higher education system in Vietnam over the past two
decades. Produced at the threshold of the WTO accession, the resolution pointed to
various solutions and policy reforms in order to improve higher education quality,
meeting the demand for national economic development and international integration.
However, in the resolution, changing the policy on autonomy and responsibility of
higher education institutions is listed as the last goal of the reform. Especially, in the
solution section, among six solutions, the solution that gives public institutions
autonomy and self-administration in training, research, organization, personnel, and
finance, was ranked 5th after the solutions of reforming the institution network,
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curriculum innovation, personnel management, teacher training, and financial
management. This indicates that until 2005, the Vietnamese government had not
considered decentralization and greater autonomy as the first priority of reform, even
though the right and autonomy of higher education institutions had been legalized in
the Education Law of 1999 and the Amended Education Law of 2005.
Both of the laws had a separate article (article 55 in the 1999 law and article
60 in the 2005 law) to regulate the institutional autonomy of higher education
institutions. Interestingly, after 7 years, the two articles in the two laws are exactly the
same. They both generally identify five administrative rights of institutions in the
following areas: (1) designing curriculum, textbook, teaching and learning plans for
academic programs that are allowed to be taught by the Ministry of Education and
Training; (2) identifying enrollment number, administrating the entrance examination,
organizing education programs, offering degrees, and certifying successful graduates;
(3) creating the organizational structure of the institution; hiring, managing and
compensating teaching staffs; (4) Mobilizing and managing resources; (5) Partnering
with international organizations. Yet, all of these rights are conditional because they
are bound by other requirements and regulations of the government. For example,
institutions can design their own curriculum for the education programs, but they
must be based on the frame curriculum imposed by MOET; or institutions can open
new programs but they must be in the government list of permitted programs and
must get the approval from MOET; or institutions can identify the admission quota
but the final quota for each university must be approved by MOET.
The Resolution No. 05-NQ/BCSD on Innovation in Higher Education

Management in the Period 2010-2012 issued by the Party Committee of the Ministry
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of Education and Training on January 6, 2010 is the first document in a series of
guiding documents issued by the Ministry of Education and the Prime Minister in
relation to renovation of state management in higher education. The resolution
emphasized the need for innovation in the “quality” of higher education state
management including (1) building rules that regulating the role in state management
of different entities, the organization and operation of university council, and the
development of the accrediting system; (2) enhancing administrative reform in higher
education management; (3) encouraging institutional autonomy and accountability,
and internal assurance and self-control especially in implementing institutional
missions, organizing operational structure, and managing human resources (Ministry
of Education and Training, Vietnam, 2010). It is discernible in this resolution that the
government and MOET did recognize the strong demand for innovation in the higher
education management system, including the demand for more autonomy for
institutions. However, increasing autonomy for institutions has still not been
considered as the first priority in reforming state management in higher education.
Autonomous rights for universities and colleges are frequently mentioned together
with the need to consolidate state supervision and oversight. For example, the
resolution asserted that “promoting internal autonomy, self-responsibility and selfmonitoring within the institutions based on the regulations of the state and institutions
while increasing oversight and inspection of the state, society and the institutions
themselves” (Section 2.3.3).
One month afterward, the Prime Minister’s Directive No. 296 in February,
2010 vehemently called for reforms of the higher education state management system.
It considered renovation in state management of higher education as an opportunity to
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create a significant and comprehensive improvement in quality. However, again, when
identifying the concrete solutions for renovation in state management of higher
education, giving more autonomy to higher education institutions and clarifying the
management responsibilities between institutions and government agencies was
ranked only 6th among the 12 solutions. Still, the directive only gave general
principles instead of specific guidelines for bestowing greater autonomy on higher
education institutions. Moreover, it emphasized the need to increase the role of local
governments in higher education management (to supplement the role of the central
government) and the supervision of the state and society over the institutions.
In the Ministry of Education and Training’s Guideline No. 4713 on the

Focused Mission of Higher Education in the 2010-2011 School Year in October, 2010,
MOET urged institutions to continue reform in higher education management
including the implementation of decentralization for institutions that meet the
qualifications. The only difference between this document and the previous
documents in the same year is that it put decentralization of higher education
management as the first task to implement management reform. However, similar to
the previous documents promulgated by the Party and government, this document
provided only a general understanding of the need to giving more autonomy for
institutions but did not articulate a strong linkage between institutional autonomy and
improvement in educational quality and state management. Also, it did not identify a
concrete regulatory framework for decentralization and as usual, institutional
autonomies were accompanied with conditions and criteria. For example, the
government and MOET argued for quality standards and accreditation as the criteria
to identify different levels of autonomy granted to individual institutions. Institutional
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autonomy for higher education is not considered as the inalienable rights of
institutions as being considered in some Western countries.
In addition to the review of official documents produced by the Party, the
government and MOET, the following section will review some interviews of policy
elites in order to get more evidence on the policy image of the regime regarding
institutional autonomy for higher education institutions.

Additional evidence of the policy image of the policy elites in MOET
In this part, I am going to review three interviews I retrieved from the website

Báo Dân Trí (Intellectual Forum) which is one of the most popular public news
agencies covering the topic of education in Vietnam. The interviews provide
additional information about the policy image of the policy elites that will supplement
the review of the legal documents summarized in previous sections of this chapter. I
was particular interested in isolating the information that would shed light on whether
there had been any shift in “policy image” regarding institutional autonomy for higher
education institutions on the part of party and government leaders at the moment.
Two of the interviewees are particularly well situated to shed light on this
inquiry. Both of them play a role of official spokespersons for the Ministry of
Education and Training, which is the focal point agency in designing and proposing
the Higher Education Law of 2012. Their views revealed in these interviews represent
the most recent views of the policy elites and policy makers of the CPV and
government with regard to the institutional autonomy of higher education institutions.
The first interviewee is Bùi Văn Ga, the Vice Minister of Education and
Training. He used to be the President of ðà Nẵng University before he was appointed
as vice minister in 2009. At MOET, Vice Minister Ga is in charge of management of
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higher education and serves as the primary official assisting the Minister in this policy
domain. The first interview was recorded at the press conference on 26/10/2011
published by Báo Dân Trí (Bui G. V., Dan Tri, 2011). This interview was conducted
right before the Higher Education Law was submitted to the National Assembly for
review in November, 2011. Mr. Ga was charged with providing an introduction to the
media press on the key points of the proposed law. His views represent for the policy
images of the Party and government in higher education at that time.
To begin with, the Vice Minister asserted that “delegation of autonomy to
institutions and quality assurance are the key objectives of the proposed law.
Autonomy and accountability cover the following areas: organization and personnel,
financial and asset management, training and research management, international
relations, quality assurance and accreditation”. However, he continued, “Autonomy
needs to be attached to accountability of institutions because right now institutions are
not really accountable. For example, whenever there is a scandal or problems, the
learners come to see the state agencies and require them to resolve their problems
since the relationship between the learners and the institutions are not so good”. Thus,
he argued that autonomy needs to go along with accountability and whenever the
accountability is high then autonomy will be higher accordingly.
The Vice Minister emphasized that due to the diversity of the higher education
system with universities and colleges of different tiers and capacities, if the
institutional autonomy is delegated to all institutions, there will be “chaos” within the
higher education system. Therefore, there needs to be a “pathway that only
institutions with adequate capacities are to be granted autonomy along with their
accountability”. The Ministry of Education and Training will grant autonomy to
139

individual institutions based on the accreditation results. If a school lacks capacity or
violate the rules, its autonomy will be withdrawn. This is intended to create
competition among the institutions.
Two main principles are employed to decide the autonomy for institutions: (1)
institution classification is used to identify the type and level of autonomy for each
institution; (2) the accreditation system is the tool to identify the quality and
capacities of institutions which in turn determine respective institutional autonomy for
individual institutions. For example, regarding the student admission and enrolment
quota, based on the capacities of institutions, some institutions will have the rights to
decide the enrolment number and admission methods by themselves.
The second interview with Mr. Ga was recorded at the press conference
announcing the New Higher Education Law of 2012, on June 17, 2012 (Bui G. V.,
Dan Tri, 2012). This is a press conference that was conducted right after the National
Assembly ratified the law in June 2012. It should be noted that in November 2011, the
proposed law was first submitted to the National Assembly. However, it was not
approved in 2011 due to a great deal of criticism of the proposal. A number of national
assembly members and scholars argued that the proposal lacked decisive ideas and
solutions for innovation in state management and it needed careful revision.
At this conference, Vice Minister Bùi Văn Ga asserted: “The Ministry of
Education and Training will not interfere deeply into the operation of institutions
when the autonomy is expanded to every institution”. This is the first time a senior
official of MOET stated that “releasing the ties to the central government is important
for the improvement of education quality”. Notably, the Vice Minister pointed out that
“autonomy is an inalienable characteristic (thuộc tính) of higher education
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institutions”. However, he also asserted that “autonomy should be relevant to and in
accordance with the capacities and conditions of institutions to ensure the quality of
education and training”. These seemingly conflict views, again, demonstrated a
compromise between the need for greater institutional autonomy and the requirement
of control and oversight on the part of the Vietnamese government.
The Vice Minister continued to emphasize that autonomy must be attached to
accountability and the highest social responsibility of institutions is to ensure
educational quality. Quality should be linked to the brand name of institutions. In
delegating autonomy to universities, the new law refers to the need for increased role
of university councils. Also, accreditation is compulsory to every institution because
based on the accreditation results; the state agencies decide the type and degree of
autonomy delegated to individual institutions. Vice Minister Ga raised two new points
in the new law. First, instead of dictating curriculum, the law allows the government
to regulate the standards on minimum knowledge and skills for each of the education
programs at universities and colleges. Second, the law permits institutions to raise
tuition fees for high quality programs.
To conclude, the Vice Minister informed that the new Higher Education Law
of 2012 would be specified and implemented by the issuance of 36 guiding
documents from the Ministry of Education and Training, five decrees of the
government, one decision of the Prime Minister and four inter-ministerial circulars.
That means the law just provides general terms and principles for higher education
management. In order to realize the autonomy of higher education institution and to
implement the law, the government and its agencies need to issues a variety of
decrees, directives and circulars to concretize the terms and regulations of the law.
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The policy implication is that it will take more time, even years, for the Party and
government to consider and build a comprehensive framework providing specific
reforms in statement management in higher education sector.
Another interviewee was Ngô Kim Khôi, the Deputy Director General of the
Higher Education Department of MOET. Mr. Khôi was the Deputy Director of the
Proposing Committee of the Higher Education Law. The interview was conducted on
October 26, 2011, right before the proposed law was submitted and reviewed by the
National Assembly in November 2011 (Ngo K. K., Dan Tri, 2011). The following are
the most important points raised by Mr. Khôi.
-

The Higher Education Law was based on the guiding principles of the
Resolution of the XI Party National Congress, the Resolution No. 2 of the
VIII Congress and other conclusions and resolutions of the Party Central
Committee and the Politburo. Concretely, the law is to realize the views
and strategies of the Party in higher education management, to increase the
leadership of the Party, and to promote the participation of the people in
quality improvement of higher education.

-

The law enhances decentralization, autonomy and proactiveness of the
higher education institutions in the following areas: organization and
personnel, training and scientific research, international relations and
quality assurance. However, autonomy must be linked to the accountability
and the capacity of the institution and must be ensured by a transparent
accrediting system.

-

The new Higher Education Law will specify the general terms in the
Education Law of 2005 in relation to higher education.
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-

The new law will systemize and integrate the existing separate rules and
regulations in various legal documents related to higher education
management.

All of these points raised by Mr. Khôi did show the intention of the
government and MOET to delegate the power to institutions. Yet, the autonomy must
be conditional on accountability. Also, the key autonomous aspects are not specified
and only mentioned in abstract manner.
To summarize, over the recent years, the Party and government have
increasingly recognized the need for the educational system to be restructured to
address economic stressors and the leadership has shown a predisposition to follow
through with intentions of reform. At all levels of leadership, the regime has come to
attribute the backwardness and limitations in state management in higher education as
serious problems that needed reforming; and among the solutions to renovation of
state management in higher education, increasing institutional autonomy for higher
education institutions was identified. Yet, based on the evidence found in this section,
we can conclude that there was no significant change in the policy image of the Party
and government of Vietnam with regard to state management in higher education. The
Party and government have not perceived and clearly articulated a strong positive
correlation between increase autonomy and higher education quality. Although
delegation and institutional autonomy have been mentioned as one of the solutions for
better performance of state management (which in turn has been identified as the key
for quality improvement in higher education), they are not considered by the
government the first priority of policy change. In addition, the legacies of a socialist
state prevent the regime from freeing the higher education institutions. The
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government’s lack of trust and credibility on higher education institutions make the
state cautious about the negative consequences if autonomy is not guaranteed by
adequate accountability and quality assurance.
In this regard, there has been a policy paradox between a desire of the
government to decentralize decision-making to higher education institutions for the
purposes of achieving greater efficiency and effectiveness in the use of resources and
a desire to retain control of the Socialist orientation over higher education. Senior
policy makers in the Ministry of Education and Training have expressed in the
interviews their intention to delegate a greater degree of autonomy to the colleges and
universities to (1) reduce the workloads of national decision makers due to the rapid
increases in the numbers of institutions; (2) facilitate educational management
innovation; and (3) integrate well-accepted mainstream principles of good education
management (Ho & Berg, 2010). These desires tend to conflict with the Party’s need
to maintain the Soviet model of managing higher education with the following
principles.
First, the higher education institutions are mandated to provide the human
resources for specific economic development demands and to support a state-led
industrialization process rather than operating on the rules of free labor market.
Higher education system development should be led by the will of the state and state
should be in the position to determine the direction of education development. There
is a fear that without state control, families, students and schools will not be able to
promote a well-organized higher education system meeting the demands of the socioeconomic development strategies directed by the state. Second, the Party is concerned
about ensuring accessibility of higher education for the economically disadvantaged
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students. This argument is supported by the fact that the National Assembly rejected a
proposal for increasing tuition in 2006 and that the government still set the frame of
tuition rate for both public and private institutions. Ensuring social equality and the
welfare system of its citizens allow the CPV and its government to maintain the
leadership legitimacy as the single political force representing for the labor classes in
Vietnam. Third, the Party wants to maintain control over the ideological content of
education to ensure the indoctrination of the younger generations, especially those
students educated in private and foreign programs. In practice, except for programs
organized by foreign institutions and for foreign students, all higher education
programs need to teach political courses that ensure the “socialization” of younger
generations in accordance with Marxist-Leninist ideology and Ho Chi Minh Thought
(Education Law, 2005).
Until now, in the face of the above policy paradox, the regime still embraces
the legacies of a Socialist state rather than a decentralized system. That explains the
lack of significant change in the policy image on the role of institutional autonomy in
quality improvement, which in turn prohibited the Vietnamese government to adopt
innovative policy change alternative to change the relationships between the state and
higher education institutions. The Higher Education Law of 2012, which was
expected to be an innovative and comprehensive legal framework, has demonstrated
the triumph of the Socialist legacies over the demand for higher institutional
autonomy and even the demand for higher quality of the human resources (see the
Appendix for the details of the Higher Education Law). As the result, policy changes
in this policy domain have been incremental and conditional over the past two
decades even though the Party and government of Vietnam have repeated pointed to
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the need for policy change in state management in general and in giving more
autonomy for higher education institutions in particular.
It should be noted that due to the lack of significant change in the policy
image of the Party and government in relation to institutional autonomy for higher
education institutions, I am not going to review the forth policy factor of the proposed
policy model (consensus on Party political priority) because no innovative policy
change alternative has been formulated, and proposed to the Party Central Committee
for final adoption. The Higher Education Law of 2012 is no more than a gathering of
previous regulations in higher education with some incremental changes.

3. Process-tracking of the cases
In order to consolidate my proposed major policy change model for Vietnam,
it is necessary to examine whether other policy factors have been at play in the policy
change process. Specifically, I will explore whether other factors such as policy
entrepreneurs, advocacy coalitions or interest groups may have been more important
than the policy factors proposed in my policy change model in Chapter III and
discussed in detail in section two above. Indeed, from what I have observed and
studied, there is evidence that an advocacy-coalition or interest group factors may
have played some influences on the higher education autonomy debate in Vietnam.
For example, the Association of Non-public Universities, which was established in
2004 has been a strong voice in favor of higher education autonomy. This association
represents the non-public universities that have been established with significant
investments from private enterprises and/or social organizations. Members of this
association have lobbied for more institutional autonomy for their institutions. They
want to have greater autonomy over the use of their investment dollars.
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This association is not in a position to strongly influence policy-making
process in higher education of Vietnam. For example, there was a meeting organized
by the association to comments on the proposed Higher Education Law in 2010.
However, no representative from the Ministry of Education and Training attended the
meeting to take into account the views and ideas raised at the meeting. In addition,
according to the law of Vietnam, this association is a kind of social organization,
which in fact is under the supervision the Ministry of Home Affairs. That means it is
not officially authorized to have an independent voice and legitimate policy input to
the policy making process in higher education, and is subject to government control
and oversight. This kind of control prevents the organization from having the kind of
influence and role that meets the test of interest group and advocacy coalition
theories. In addition to this association, the newly established Association of Public
University and College Presidents is supposed to participate in the process-making
process in higher education. However, it is still in the initial stage of development and
dependent on MOET for resources.
In addition to these associations, there are some scholars and members of the
National Assembly who have advocated for increasing autonomy for higher education
institutions such as Mr. ðào Trọng Thi, Mr. Nguyễn Minh Thuyết, and Mr. Nguyễn
Ngọc Trân. They used to be senior professors and administrators at the universities
before becoming National Assembly members. During their terms at the National
Assembly, these members have argued for significant and substantive autonomy for
higher education institutions. However, their views and ideas have not influenced the
final policy outcome. In fact, the policy is deliberated within different authorized
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committees of the government and Party and must be a product of a collective and
consensus-based decision making process.

4. Conclusions on the relevance of the proposed policy change model to the
case
The proposed policy change model in Chapter III has demonstrated its
explanatory capacity in analyzing the policy phenomena in the higher education
sector of Vietnam. The policy factors including stressors, leadership proposition to
reform and policy image help clarify the policy context of the policy process in higher
education over the past two decades. In particular, the concept of policy image is
helpful in explaining the absence of innovative/radical policy change in higher
education sector in Vietnam. Indeed, due to the lack of policy image change in the
state management in higher education, no innovative policy alternative related to the
level and type of institutional autonomy in the Higher Education Law of 2012 was
discussed and adopted. Thus, without examination of the Party’s core values and
political priorities, the lack of policy image is enough for me to explain the absence of
radical policy change in this area. The following is a summary of the major findings
in the case, which are relevant to the proposed policy model.

The Party and government have recognized the stressors for reform in
higher education
Over the past two decades, there have been increasing stressors on the Party
and government of Vietnam that have pushed them to grant more institutional
autonomy for higher education institutions in Vietnam. The leadership at both Party
and government levels has been aware of the demand for changes in the way the state
manages the higher education system. Quality and quantity indicators reviewed in
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Section 1 of this chapter have revealed the challenges to the higher education sector in
Vietnam which in turn can undermine the success in the economic reforms initiated
by the Party and government since ðổi Mới. By reviewing different legal documents
in subsection 2.1, I have shown that the stressors have been embedded and expressed
at all levels of authority within the regime. The stressors have come mainly from the
demand for high-skilled work forces to meet the development of the economy and the
deeper international economic integration of Vietnam especially when Vietnam joined
the WTO.
Indeed, recent reports produced by McKinsey Global Institute, the
Consultative Group Meeting of 2011, and the Economic Committee of the National
Assembly have revealed low productivity level in Vietnam and declined contribution
of productivity and labor skill in the overall economic growth (McKinsey Global
Institute, 2012; The Vietnam Consultative Group Meeting, 2011; National Assembly
of Vietnam, 2012). Two well-known reports on higher education system in Vietnam
produced by the Harvard Kennedy School of Government in 2008 and 2010 even
used the word “crisis” to describe the status of the system. From 2005 until the
present, the CPV, the National Assembly, the Prime Minister and the Ministry of
Education and Training have repeatedly admitted the problems and weaknesses of the
higher education system and the need to change state management in this area for
quality improvement. The newly ratified Higher Education Law of 2012 and the fact
that renovation of education system was set as one of the three urgent issues at the
important 6th Plenum of the CPV just finished on October 15, 2012, demonstrated
increasing pressure on the CPV and government to act in this area.
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The Party and government have demonstrated a predisposition to reform
In subsection 2.2, I have reviewed the key official documents of both Party
and the government of Vietnam and have shown that the Party and the government
demonstrated their leadership predisposition to reform state management of education
in general and higher education in particular. The Party and the government have
repeatedly expressed their intention to delegate more institutional autonomy to higher
education institutions. The magnitude and visibility of the predisposition of leaders to
reform has increased gradually along with the visibility of stressors from international
economic integration that push for more and faster educational reform.
The Prime Minister’s Resolution No. 14 on Comprehensive Renovation in

Higher Education in 2005 indicated a strong intention by the government to make
radical change in this area to improve quality in response to the prospective accession
of Vietnam into the WTO. Four years later, in 2009, the CPV issued a special

Resolution in Education, which reinforced the previous predisposition to policy
reform in education in general and in higher education in particular. Following this
Party’s resolution, the Prime Minister’s Directive No. 296 on Renovation in Higher

Education Management, and the Resolution No. 05-NQ/BCSD on Innovation in
Higher Education Management in the Period 2010-2012 in 2010 demonstrated
government’s intention to renovate state management of higher education. As the
result of this strong leadership predisposition in this area, from 2010, the proposed
law on higher education management was advanced to the legal agenda of the
Ministry of Education and Training and then the agenda of the National Assembly.
Two years later, after a delay in 2011, the Higher Education Law was ratified in June
2012.
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Notably, even though the Vietnamese Communist Party have issued a number
of resolutions and conclusions to direct the development of education and changes in
state management of education, these documents are general to all types of education,
including higher education. In fact, there has been no specific Party’s resolution
directed at renovation of higher education despite the National Assembly’s resolution
in 2009 and Prime Minister’s directive in 2010 targeted directly at state management
of higher education. The lack of a resolution on state management of higher education
produced by the Party Central Committee shows a vacuum of the Party leadership in
this area.

The lack of significant change in policy image prohibited innovative change
in higher education policy on institutional autonomy
In subsections 2.3, I have examined the policy image of the Party and
government in relation to state management of higher education in general and of the
issue of institutional autonomy for higher education institutions in particular. By
reviewing official documents of the Party and government and three interviews with
two policy elites in higher education, we conclude that the regime has changed the
policy image in the role of state management in quality improvement by attributing
the weaknesses of state management as the main reason for the low performance of
higher education institutions. The concept of state management, however, has been
defined in broad terms including all the issues such as teacher training and
compensation, financial policy, curriculum innovation and training organization, state
oversight, the relationship between state and institutions and so on. Within state
management, increase in institutional autonomy has not been considered as the first
priority and solution for better education quality. The regime has not clearly
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articulated the lack of institutional autonomy as major liabilities to low performance
of the education system.
Even though, recently, Vice Minister Bùi Văn Ga stated that “institutional
autonomy is an inalienable right of the tertiary institutions”, this statement has not
been institutionalized in specific legal framework (Bui G. V., Dan Tri, 2012). The
idea that institutional autonomy is something naturally belonging to the higher
education institutions rather than granted by the government has not been accepted
within the Party and government of Vietnam. The much anticipated recent Higher
Education Law of 2012 was expected to substantively deliver on the repeated
rhetorical promises of reform. However, the legacy of a Socialist state that has
inculcated the policy elites makes them consider higher education institutions as
agencies that need to be mobilized for the cause of industrialization and
modernization. The dominated policy image has been that universities are established
and supported by the state and therefore, they need to focus their missions to serve the
socio-economic development goals initiated and led by the state. As the result, the
Vietnamese Party and government might refer to the need to give more autonomy for
universities and colleges, however its leaders do not necessarily see the strong and
direct link between greater institutional autonomy and the demand for better human
resources.
To conclude, over the years of ðổi Mới, the Vietnamese Party and government
have struggled to balance two development visions – a “market – led” versus a
“Socialist-oriented” vision in higher education (Tran, 2009). In striking this balance,
the Party and government have accepted a number of incremental policy changes that
increase the institutional autonomy for institutions in some administrative and
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management areas. However, whenever, the regime has faced the issue of endorsing
the principle of decentralized autonomy, the Socialist legacy of concern for political
stability and state control has had greater priority. The dominance of the Socialist
legacy over the demand for decentralization makes significant change in the policy
image in this domain impossible. As the result, a specific regulatory framework
providing substantive and significant institutional autonomy for higher education
institutions in Vietnam has not been adopted despite considerable pressure and
rhetoric to do so.
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Chapter VI: How was radical policy change made under the Bilateral
Trade Agreement between Vietnam and U.S?

After eleven years of negotiations for admission, Vietnam eventually became
the 150th member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in November 2006. This
was a long process with a critical breakthrough that occurred in 2000-2001 with the
negotiation and signing of the Vietnam-United States Bilateral Trade Agreement
(VNUSBTA). Together, these radical changes in trade liberalization triggered
increasing optimism in the prospects for growth and development of the country
through the expansion of international trade, increase in foreign direct investment and
further domestic governance reform (Vo & Nguyen, 2009). On the surface, the
process of liberalizing international trade and joining the WTO seemed to be an easy
effort and an inevitable consequence of Vietnam’s integration into the world
economy, resulted from the Renovation Program - ðổi Mới since 1986.
However, when we take a deeper look at the policy process over a decade
before Vietnam became a member of WTO, the liberalization of trade policy does not
seem easy or inevitable. We will see that as ðổi Mới reforms have deepened, there
has been a lack of consensus within the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) as to the
speed, depth, and pace of further reforms (Dinh Q. X., 2000). To reach the final
decision to sign the trade agreement with the U.S and then to join the WTO, the
Vietnamese Party and government had to reach consensus and overcome contentious
debates and divergences in the policy images and the political priorities deemed best
for the regime.
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This chapter will examine the reform of trade liberalization to delve more
deeply into Vietnam’s policy process in order to better understand the factors that
seem to be associated with major shifts in policy outcomes. The objective of this
study is not to evaluate the concrete negotiation terms or the achievements of Vietnam
through the Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) or to identify the effects of trade
liberalization on economic performance. Instead, I will focus on the critical policy
factors that were in play at given points in time during the period of debate over the
liberalization of trade policy and how they affected the policy outcomes. In so doing,
the case will shed light on the subtleties and nuances of Vietnam’s policy making
process that can help validate the explanatory capacity of the proposed major policy
change model in Chapter III of this dissertation.
In undertaking this case study, I will focus particularly on the role the
following factors playing in the debate over the liberalization of trade policy: the role
of stressors, leadership predisposition to reform, change in policy image and
consensus on political priorities of the Communist Party of Vietnam and government
at given points of time. In examining the role these factors playing in the trade
liberalization debates, I hope to uncover how the Vietnamese Party and government
gradually changed the policy beliefs and reached a working consensus to initiate a
major change in this policy area.
To be clear, I will only focus on the VNUSBTA signed and ratified in 20002001 as my main subject of analysis in this chapter. There are two reasons for limiting
my focus. First, the objective of the case studies in this dissertation is to verify the
applicability of the policy change model proposed in Chapter III. To accomplish this
goal, I do not need to examine every case in a given policy domain but to focus on a
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critical case. Second, the VNUSBTA is considered the breakthrough event in the trade
liberalization process that set the stage for Vietnam to enter the WTO. The radical
policy change outcome of the VNUBTA is the relevant unit of analysis for the
purpose of selecting a trade liberalization case study for this dissertation.
I will undertake an examination of the negotiation and adoption of the
VNUSBTA in four steps. First, I will review the context of ðổi Mới in which
Vietnam negotiated and made necessary commitments to trade liberalization and legal
reforms. This part will include the timeline with critical points of policy change in
liberalizing Vietnam’s trade regime from 1986 to 2006 when Vietnam was finally
admitted as a member of the WTO. In the second part, I will review the potential
benefits and challenges that occur as Vietnam went through the process of liberalizing
its international trade policy. This second part of the chapter serves as the foundation
for the analysis of the policy factors in the following sections. The third part of this
chapter will examine how the policy factors (stressors, leadership predisposition to
reform, significant change in the policy image, and the Party’s consensus on political
priorities) came into play to determine the policy outcomes at different points of time
before Vietnam finally accepted the VNUSBTA in July, 2000. Finally, some
conclusions will be drawn about the relevance and explanatory capacities of the
policy change model proposed in Chapter III in analyzing the radical policy change in
this case study.

1. Introduction to the case: ðổi Mới and the requirements for trade
liberalization
Vietnam's renovation process since 1986 was influenced by both internal
circumstance and the external environment. Internally, by the second half of the
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1980s, Vietnam was suffering a serious economic crisis. According to World Bank
statistics, the annual food output per capita fell from 304 kg in 1985 to 281 kg in
1987; the inflation rate was 90% in 1985, and 455% in 1986; and GDP per capita fell
from $101 in 1976 to $91 in 1980 (World Bank Report cited in Vu, 2010). Externally,
the collapse of the Soviet Union Block in Eastern Europe had caused the decline of
assistance from and trade with the former Socialist ally countries. The crisis forced
the CPV to end decades of isolation and embark on a series of economic and social
reforms (Dinh, 2000).
The Renovation Program – ðổi Mới was marked by the shift from centralplanning economy to a market-oriented economic system characterized by: (1) the
expansion of the private sector in both domestic and international business; (2) the
promotion of international trade with an export-driven integration with the world
economy; (3) a variety of governance reforms in the areas of agriculture production,
banking, international exchange rates, taxes, land ownership and state-owned
enterprises. The key objective of all these reforms was to rely more on market forces
in the allocation of resources and in the determination of prices with a corresponding
reduction in Party and government command structures for allocating resources (Chu
& Dickie, 2006). The reforms yielded unprecedented levels of growth. Vietnam’s
economy doubled in size during a decade after ðổi Mới, while its poverty rate halved;
in average, exports grew by 20 percent per year (substantially faster than GDP), and
foreign direct investment (FDI) increased by 10 percent per year reaching the peak in
1996 (Dinh, 2000).
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Critical turning points in Vietnam’s accession to the WTO
Among the reform areas under ðổi Mới, international economic integration in
general and trade liberalization in particular was a strong focus. Vietnam first applied
for membership in the GATT/World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994 and became
an observer country of this organization in 1995. However, the first important
cornerstone of the international economic liberalization towards a market economy
was the Foreign Direct Investment Law promulgated in December 1987 (Nguyen &
Haughton, 2002). This law was considered a rather liberal and progressive legal
framework at the time, demonstrating the desire of the Vietnamese government to
attract foreign capital and promote international market access for Vietnam's exportled economic strategy (Chu & Dickie, 2006). The law welcomed FDI in all economic
sectors, permitted 100 percent foreign ownership in a number of areas, provided
generous tax and duty exemptions in many preferable areas, and guaranteed
repatriation of capital by foreign investors. The FDI initiative was followed in 1990
by the promulgation of the Private Enterprise Law and the Law on Companies. These
two laws allowed private enterprises that satisfied a number of conditions to obtain an
import license from government authorities to engage in import-export activities
(Pham, 2011). The third important law in the progression toward the liberalization of
Vietnam’s trade policy was the passage of the first Import and Export Duties Law of
Vietnam in 1991, which was then amended in 1992 and 1998 to integrate and
systematize the tariff practices of the country.
In parallel with these domestic legal reforms, Vietnam has undergone a
process of negotiation with regional and global economic entities by joining the
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1995 and becoming a member
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of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). In the same year, Vietnam started its
negotiation process to be a member of the WTO. Vietnam then became a member of
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1998.
Beginning in 1996 as an integrative part of WTO accession, Vietnam started
to negotiate the Vietnam-United States Bilateral Trade Agreement (VNUSBTA),
which was a milestone in Vietnam’s trade liberalization process. This is because it
contains many fundamental principles required of members of the WTO, including
Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, transparency, discipline related to trade in goods,
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS), General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the
WTO’s Basic Telecom Reference Paper (Pham, 2011). The Asian Financial Crisis in
1997 pushed Vietnam to accelerate economic reforms including trade liberalization.
However, as a key bilateral trade agreement for Vietnam, the Vietnam-US BTA is one
of the most controversial documents and witnessed contentious and divided
deliberations within the highest authorities of the regime over a period of five year
from 1996 to 2001.
Despite difficulties and controversies, the VNUSBTA was finally signed in
July 2000 the two governments and then ratified by the U.S Congresses and the
National Assembly of Vietnam to become law on 10th December, 2001. The BTA
with the U.S consolidated the will of the regime in Vietnam to adopt further policy
reforms for WTO accession. In 2005, one year before Vietnam officially became a
member of the WTO, a large number of laws including the Law on Enterprises and
Investment Law were passed. With the radical legal change to harmonize
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investment/registration procedures and establish an equal playing field for all foreign
and domestic enterprises, Vietnam was admitted to WTO in November 2006.
The following Table 10 provides a summary of the changes that occurred in
the path toward the liberalization of trade policy in Vietnam from 1986 to 2006.
Table 10: Timeline of Vietnam’s accession process to WTO
No

Date and Time

1

1986

2

1995

3

1996

4

1998

5

1999 and 2000

6

November 28,
2001

7

December 11,
2001
December 10th,
2003

8

9

2005

Events

Policy Implications

The VI National Party Congress of
Vietnam officially adopted
Renovation Program – ðổi Mới
The WTO accepted application of
Vietnam and established Working
Commission on Vietnam.
Vietnam joined the ASEAN Free
Trade Area (AFTA).
- Circulated a Memorandum on the
Foreign Trade Regime
- Started negotiation with the US
on the Bilateral Trade Agreement.
Vietnam became a member of
Asian Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC).
Most of the technical issues of the
BTA with U.S were approved by
both sides and the BTA was
supposed to be signed in 1999; yet,
there was a deadlock in which the
Vietnamese Party and government
agonized over whether the
completed agreement should be
formally concluded.
- In November, 1999, China signed
the BTA with the U.S.
- The VNUSBTA was finally
signed on July 13, 2000.
The Bilateral Trade Agreement
with the U.S. was signed by the
National Assembly after the U.S.
President signed the BTA on
October 18, 2001.
The VNUSBTA came into effect
on 10 December 2001.

Marked a shift from a closed and
central-planning economy to a
“Socialist-oriented” market economy
Vietnam submitted the WTO
Application Document in January,
1994 and became an observer of
WTO since 1995.

China became a member of the
WTO.
The WTO Working Party started
negotiating the terms of Vietnam’s
membership
The Vietnamese government tried
to conclude the negotiations for
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Followed by a period of questions
and answers beginning in March
1998 to clarify Vietnam’s politics
and institutions.
In the midst of VNUSBTA
negotiations.
Even in the last months before
signing the agreement in July 2000,
there was "an intensive period of
analysis and soul-searching" within
the highest levels of the Vietnamese
Party and government in which the
defenders of inefficient state-owned
enterprises and those concerned with
"security" clashed with the free
traders.

While application to the WTO was
initially made in 1995, virtually no
major progress toward accession was
made until 2001, after the
Vietnamese Communist Party at the
highest levels made the political
decisions necessary to open the
market, initially by signing the
VNUSBTA.
China action became an impetus for
Vietnam’s accession to the WTO
From this point of time, Vietnam
stood firm on its will to join WTO
soon.
However, Vietnam ran into
difficulties in negotiation with the

WTO accession.
By this time, agreements with
many major players, including the
European Union, Japan, China,
and Canada were reached.

No
10

Date and Time
December, 2005

11

In 2006

12

November 7, 2006

13

November 28,
2006
January 11, 2007

14

Events
Vietnam missed its primary target
date for admission at the Hong
Kong WTO Ministerial Meeting in
December 2005 and had to settle
instead for the beginning of 2007.
The last bilateral agreements are
with Mexico in April 2006 and the
United States in May 2006.
Vietnam was officially admitted
by the WTO Council at the APEC
Summit in Hanoi.
WTO accession was approved by
the National Assembly.
Vietnam officially became the
150th member of WTO.

United States, despite President
George Bush’s promise of
collaboration on WTO negotiation,
made during Prime Minister Phan
Van Khai’s June visit to the United
States. These difficulties dashed
Vietnam hopes for WTO accession in
2005.
Policy Implications
Vietnam demonstrated a proactive
attitude the accession to WTO: in
2005, a number of radical legal
reforms were made in response to the
requirements from WTO
To cope with anticipated
international competitions and
pressures after being a member of
WTO, Vietnam started to establish
giant state economic groups in key
economic areas and consolidated the
existing state-owned enterprises.

2. The potential benefits and challenges in liberalizing Vietnam’s trade policy
This section will review the major pros and cons that provided the background
for the debate over the liberalization of Vietnam’s trade policy. It will help the reader
with a better understanding of circumstances, in which the Vietnamese Communist
Party and government had to calculate the balance between the political interests and
the economic health of the regime.

Potential benefits from international trade agreements
In theory, Vietnam’s trade agreement with the U.S. and then its accession to
the WTO was expected to help Vietnam sustain the economic growth of the first
decade after ðổi Mới, especially after the occurrence of the Asian Financial Crisis in
1997. Scholars who have studied Vietnam liberalization of trade policy have
identified at least five major benefits of trade liberalization for Vietnam.
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First, entry into the WTO was expected to boost industrial production as
exporters are given quota-free access to the global market, which was expected to
result in projected annual GDP growth rate of around 10 percent (Chu & Dickie,
2006). The second anticipated benefit of trade liberalization was a large increase in
Vietnam’s imports and inward FDI. In hindsight, it is not clear that WTO accession
has directly encouraged Vietnam’s exports. However, with a strong bidirectional
relationship between FDI and exports, WTO accession might have indirect influences
on Vietnam’s exports through the FDI channel (Pham, 2011). Facilitated by FDI
inflows, significant new markets would be opened up in the United States and Europe
for products from Vietnam, especially in the face of declining exports to Asian
countries after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997.
Third, WTO membership and bilateral agreements were expected to give
Vietnam a higher status in international relations with foreign partners and countries.
As a member country, Vietnam would have permanent and unconditional MFN
offered by other WTO member countries and would be provided with access to a
dispute settlement mechanism (Nguyen & Haughton, 2002). Vietnam would have a
stronger voice and more credibility to resolve commercial disputes with other
countries such as the catfish price-dumping dispute with the U.S.
The fourth potential positive impact of international trade liberalization is that
it would foster domestic legal and governance reforms. To join the new playing field,
the Vietnamese government would have to accept a variety of legal changes that
might be very beneficial in the longer term (Chu & Dickie, 2006). For example, a
move towards a greater uniformity in tariff rates might help in reducing delays and
corruption involved in customs procedures (Athukarola, 2006). Further adjustments in
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investment and business laws and reforms in state-owned enterprises, financial and
banking sectors and in human resource development would help Vietnam sustain high
long-run growth rate and income improvements.
Fifth, trade liberalization would force Vietnam's domestic industries to adjust
to full international prices, which in turn would encourage international
competitiveness for the entire economy (Chu & Dickie, 2006). Full implementation of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Free Trade Area (AFTA) Agreement in
2006 and the bilateral trade agreements under World Trade Organization (WTO)
accession might increase the competitiveness for domestic products and services and
required more restructuring of the domestic economy (Luong, 2006; Nguyen &
Haughton, 2002). Although international competition might adversely impact
domestic firms in the short term, in the long run it would help domestic firms,
especially the state-owned enterprises, restructure, find their niches, and increase
efficiency.
In the bottom line, free trade would help Vietnam take advantage of its lowcost labor force, abundant natural resources, favorable geographic location, and a
large proportion of young workers. The potential economic gains of the Bilateral
Trade Agreement with the U.S and then accession to WTO were expected to be
sufficiently strong to motivate the Vietnamese negotiators to reach quick agreement
(Luong, 2006). The sustainability of economic growth, in turn, would help the regime
sustain its political legitimacy and social stability, which was being challenged by
incidents of social unrest in 1997. However, this is just one side of a coin. Along with
the potential benefits, Vietnam would face many challenges upon becoming a full
member of the international economic community.
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Challenges to Vietnam when deeper liberalization of international trade
In order to participate in both bilateral and multi-lateral international trade
agreements, Vietnam would need to accept equal treatment of both domestic and
foreign firms, reduction in the import taxes and abolishment of quotas for most of the
commodities from abroad. The challenges arising from deeper international economic
integration are summarized in greater detail in the paragraphs that follow.
First, many expressed concern that obligations in trade agreements might
increase competitive pressures on local firms. For example, Viet Nam would have to
remove subsidies to the garment industry and some agriculture sectors. While this can
be viewed as an advantage in the long run, in the short run there would be unknown
and perhaps extensive dislocations of many local businesses (Chu & Dickie, 2006).
Impacts on small and medium size private domestic enterprises as well as a weakly
competitive state-owned sector raised concerns about the possible collapse of the
whole domestic economy. This challenge, in turn, might risk state control and
increase political instability within the country.
Another concern that was raised about trade liberalization was whether the
Vietnamese exporters would be able to compete in the globalized market with their
rivals in other WTO members, especially those from China. For example, one
research report predicted that the export growth rate of Vietnam might fall from its
2005 pace of more than 22 percent to 19 percent in 2008 as the impact from WTO
membership was felt, especially with regard to the loss of subsidy programs for textile
producers (Chu & Dickie, 2006). At the same time, continued rapid growth of the
domestic economy at 8 percent in real terms would result in an acceleration of imports
from an estimated 16 percent in 2005 up to nearly 20 percent in 2008. As a result, the
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current account deficit was expected to grow from near balance in 2005 to a deficit of
US$2.8 billion in 2008 (Chu & Dickie, 2006).
A third concern of trade liberalization was that the Party and government
would have to accelerate critical governance reforms, including: (i) administrative
procedure reform, (ii) removal of restrictions to trade, and (iii) harmonizing of the
legal system with the fundamental principles of international law (Pham, 2011).
Among the most important reforms in administrative procedure was tariff reform that
would include: reduction of tariff rates, introduction of a duty drawback system and
the adoption of the Harmonized Tariff System. These administrative and legal reforms
would require strong political commitments by the Party and government to delegate
many of its powers and authority to the market forces. This decentralization, in turn,
was thought by some to adversely affect the political control and leadership of the
Party over the society (Kerkvliet, 1995 & 2001).
Fourth, even though liberalization in trade and WTO accession might play an
important role in attracting FDI as well as in encouraging Vietnam’s imports, deeper
integration into the globalized market could make Vietnam more vulnerable to a
financial crisis or a global economic slowdown in the future (Pham, 2011). For
example, the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 intensified debate within the leadership of
the CPV about the best way for Vietnam to deepen its reforms and the pace of
international integration. Conservatives within the CPV were inclined to attribute the
serious impacts of the 1997 crisis on other Asian countries to their deep dependence
on international markets (Dinh Q. X., 2000). Such views were likely to affect the
debate over the pace and degree of trade liberalization.
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In short, while trade liberalization appeared to bring clear economic
advantages to a country like Vietnam, the discussion of multiple political and
economic factors that needed to be taken into account made such a decision much
more problematic than it first appeared. The choice for political leaders was not
simple. Political stability of the country was of great concern because of the close
interconnection between state-owned enterprises, the Party and the overall functioning
of the economy. As the result, trade liberalization was somewhat of a paradox: while
the leaders of the regime wanted to strengthen the economy and improve the quality
of life, their view of how and when to do so was divided. This paradox was strongly
reflected in the policy process when Vietnam negotiated the bilateral agreement trade
with the U.S. The following section will explore this process in detail to elucidate the
paradox.

3. Case analysis: how did policy factors influence the outcomes?
Vietnam started its negotiation with the U.S. on the bilateral trade agreement
in 1996. Some may assume that the BTA with the U.S was an inevitable consequence
of Vietnam’s commitment to economic reforms initiated in 1986, especially after it
joined the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and applied for WTO membership in
1995. However, the negotiation process was accompanied by strong internal debate
within the Party and government about whether and how fast to proceed. This debate
produced a deadlock in negotiations from 1999-2000. Indeed, by the middle of 1999,
most of the important technical issues had been resolved and the BTA was ready for
signing at the 7th APEC Summit in New Zealand, in September 1999 (Nguyen D. L.,
2010). However, at the last minute, the highest leadership of the Party decided not to
sign the agreements. For nearly one year, further deliberation and education took
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place within the highest body of the Communist Party and, finally, consensus was
reached to move forward with this critical but controversial trade agreement. The
BTA was signed in July 2000, and Vietnam needed one more year before the National
Assembly officially ratified the agreement in November 28, 2001, only one day after
the Party Central Committee of Vietnam promulgated a special Party Resolution on
International Economic Integration.
In this section of the chapter, I will use the policy change factors identified in
my proposed major policy change model presented in Chapter III to shed light on the
internal party and government deliberation over the liberalization of Vietnam’s trade
policy. My model advances the following three propositions:

•

Only when facing significant stressors, does the Vietnamese regime
seek and adopt radical policy change in response to the stressors.
Together with stressors, the leadership predisposition to reform is the
precondition for the advancement of radical policy change in the
politics of Vietnam.

•

Significant change will not occur without a shift in the policy image
held by party leaders (i.e., what is the origin of the policy problem and
the corresponding solutions?).

•

Due to the collective and consensus-based decision making style and
the principle of democratic centralism of the Vietnamese regime, a
radical policy change initiative will only be adopted when it is
congruent with the expressed political priorities of the Party that are
held at a given period of time. This proposition means that party
judgments can trump the technical arguments for radical change.
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In the following sections, I will seek to determine whether each of the above
propositions is true in the case of changes in Vietnam’s trade policy.

The role of stressors in accelerating trade reforms
The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 devastated the economies of most Asian
countries, especially those of South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia.
However, compared to its ASEAN neighbors, Vietnam appeared to have weathered
the crisis quite well (Kokko, 1998). Official statistics indicated a GDP growth rate of
5.67% for 1998 (Nguyen H. T., 2007). This growth rate was much higher than other
Southeast Asian countries. Export growth remained positive, and the Dong currency
depreciated by only 20% against the USD after the crisis, which was acceptable
compared to other Asian countries (Kokko, 1998).
However, the relatively favorable picture has more to do with controls than
with sound economic fundamentals. Key economic indicators gradually revealed a
sharp decline compared to the pre-crisis period. Indeed, Vietnam's GDP growth was
halved, from 9.5% in 1995 to 4.8% in 1999, the lowest level since ðổi Mới (Nguyen
H. T., 2007). This slowdown had negative effects on employment and poverty with
unemployment in urban areas estimated at 7.4% for 1999, while underemployment in
rural areas was reported at 28.2% (Dinh Q. X., 2000). Even if the GDP growth had
resurged to 7% per annum, the peak experienced in the rapidly growing Asian
economies prior to the financial crisis of 1997, it would still take at least three decades
for Vietnam per capita income to reach the current levels in neighboring Thailand
(Nguyen & Haughton, 2002). By the end of the 1990s, Vietnam was still one of the
poorest countries in the world (with a per capita income of U.S. $350 per annum). By
the standards set by the government of Vietnam, at that time, some 37% of the people
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were considered poor, with an income less than $128 per person per year, and over
40% of children less than 5 years of age were malnourished (Dinh Q. X., 2000).
Slower rates of growth along with pressure from rural disturbances and growing
dissent (social chaos in Thai Binh province in 1997) pressed the Party and
government to take urgent actions to improve the living standards of the people,
especially the poor.
On another front, foreign investment declined sharply over the first four years
following the 1997 financial crisis, descending to the lowest level in 1999 and 2000.
Implemented foreign direct investments had fallen from a peak of approximately two
(2) USD billion in 1996 and 1997 to around 600 million USD in 1999 and 2000
(Nguyen H. T., 2007). Two main factors adversely affected FDI flows to Vietnam: (1)
the Asian financial crisis of 1997 reduced FDI from other Asian countries to Vietnam,
and (2) the FDI-diversion into China resulting from its bilateral trade agreement with
U.S. and a foreseeable entry into the WTO (Nguyen & Haughton, 2002). The decline
in FDI was a major impediment to the government’s goal to attract massive foreign
investments in transportation, energy and telecommunication. By 2000, the required
investments were estimated at 3.4-3.9 billion USD (World Bank, 2000, cited in
Nguyen & Haughton, 2002) of which a large part was expected from FDI.
In terms of international trade, Vietnam faced fierce competition from the
products of other Asian countries after these countries depreciated their currencies in
response to the 1997 financial crisis. This widespread depreciation made products
from other Asian countries relatively cheaper than the same products manufactured in
Vietnam. In addition, without international trade agreements, exports from Vietnam
suffered from high import taxes and quotas by other countries. Chinese exports were
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an especially significant stressor. For instance, Vietnam's garment exports remained
subject to quota in the U.S. market. By contrast, China with the BTA agreement with
the US since 1999 and WTO membership since 2001 benefited from the removal of
textile and garment export quotas. At the turn of the century, Vietnam was one of only
a handful of countries that did not have permanent normal trade relations (PNTR)
with the United States. Increased American investments and favorable access to
American markets through the granting of PNTR would have helped Vietnam arrest
the erosion of the economy which became increasingly slowing-down after the
regional crisis in 1997. According to the World Bank, the reduction in U.S. tariffs by
as much as 40% would have quickly raised the revenues of the Vietnamese exports to
the United States to $800 million from the 1999 level of $500 million (Pierre, 2000).
Finally, the lack of comprehensive tariff reform added another stress to the
economic drivers of change. By the end of 1990s, Vietnam’s tariff structure was still
out of line with the general patterns of the ASEAN countries and China (Athukarola,
2006). Tariffs are still high and non-uniform. The effective rate of protection for
traded goods (manufacturing, in particular) has recorded a significant decline over
time. Moreover, higher import duties on intermediate goods had make the products
produced in Vietnam more expensive than the same products from other countries.
In the face of the above difficulties, the Resolution of the IV Plenum of the

Party Central Committee under the VIII National Party Congress in December 1997
admitted that “the internal weaknesses of the economy, especially the low quality and
efficiency of development, low competitiveness of domestic products and the new
difficulties rising from the impact of the ongoing financial crisis in the region and the
world is a big challenge for us to realize the goals of the socio-economic development
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plan till 2000” (Communist Party of Vietnam, 1997). In 1998, Prime Minister Phan
Van Khai stated publicly that “the lowest rate of economic growth since 1990," was
causing stockpiles of unsold goods and poor competitiveness at a time when "foreign
investment is low and unemployment is serious, resulting in social evils" (Nguyen H.
M., 2000).
To summarize, there was evidence of great pressure on the Vietnamese
government to deal with economic slowdown after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997.
In the absence of comprehensive reforms, the Vietnamese economy would gradually
slide into a deeper recession (Kokko, 1998; Nguyen & Haughton, 2002). In 1999,
slow growth and increases in unemployment in the two years after the Asian Financial
Crisis, along with the impact of floods in several provinces, put pressures on the
government to push for further and deeper reforms (Dinh, 2000; Nguyen & Haughton,
2002). The gains from the initial reform beginning in the end of 1980s were nearly
exhausted, requiring a second phase of reforms to induce high growth of the industrial
sector from increased FDI and exports (Kokko, 1998; Nguyen & Haughton, 2002;
Chand, Duncan, & Quang, 2001). Given the severe deterioration in Vietnam's
economic situation, the trade agreement was the most likely effective solution to
reverse the economic decline (Pierre, 2000).
In this regard, two scenarios of policy direction seem possible: (1) a return to
stricter government control over the economy and tougher political repression, or (2)
a new round of economic reforms, a ðổi Mới II (Kokko, 1998). The first scenario
based on a return to central planning and political isolation was preferred by
influential interest groups, such as SOEs and their supporters (Kokko, 1998). The
alternative scenario was to increase outward orientation and structural reforms to
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improve the efficiency of the economy. Such reforms would necessarily have to reach
beyond incremental policy change, for example, the adjustment of the exchange rate
to make exports more competitive. ðổi Mới II would need to include measures to
simplify and liberalize the trade regime, strengthen the financial system, reform SOE
management and promote private enterprises, and increase transparency at all levels
of the economy (Kokko, 1998). While stressors were certainly influencing party and
government leaders, it is important to see if these stressors were received with a
strong leadership predisposition to radical change in trade liberalization before the
BTA with U.S was accepted. The next section will examine this important change
factor identified in the major policy change model discussed in Chapter III.

Leadership predisposition to radical change in international trade
The economic stressors discussed in the previous section illustrate increasing
both internal and external pressures on Vietnam to speed up its integration into the
world economy, especially after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. But the question
here is: did the Party and Government of Vietnam demonstrate their leadership
predisposition to reform international trade policy? The answer is “yes”. Indeed, there
had been important evidence of the leadership predisposition to liberalize its trade
regime starting with the decision to join the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Free Trade Areas (ASEAN-AFTA) in 1995 right after Vietnam normalized its
diplomatic relationships with many countries in the region and the world. In
becoming a member of AFTA, Vietnam agreed to reduce the average import tax to
5% for products from all member countries by 2006. In the same year, Vietnam
initiated its negotiation with the United States for the BTA in October 1995. A second
important sign that there was a predisposition by leaders to change occurred in 1995
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when the Vietnamese government submitted an application to join the WTO and
expressed its desire to meet its goal of WTO membership by 2005. The Five-year

Socio-economic Development Plan promulgated by the Party Central Committee in
1996 produced at the VIII National Party Congress in 1996 demonstrated the
predisposition of the Party to become a more important member of the global market
economy. For example, the Development Plan urged for acceleration in economic
integration into the region and the world by setting the target of an average annual
export and import growth of 28% and 24% respectively in five years of the plan. Also
in five years, the country was supposed to attract 13-15 billion USD through the FDI
channels (Communist Party of Vietnam, 1996).
In 1997, right after the occurrence of the Asian Financial Crisis, the Party
Central Committee of Vietnam in its Resolution of the 4th Plenum under the VIII

National Party Congress clearly expressed its emphasis on export promotion and
international trade liberalization. The third solution in the resolution pointed out that:
It is important to encourage and create the most favorable conditions for export and
import by clarifying a small number of prohibited products for export and quotalimited import products. The procedures for exportation must be simplified. All
registered firms are allowed to export and the quota limits are replaced by a tariff
system.

Also, the fourth solution emphasized creating an equal status for both
domestic and foreign companies and applying an integrated tariff, price and service
fee system for every kind of enterprise. These administrative reforms were intended to
compete for the FDI with other countries in the region and promote exports.
Especially, in the solution number five, the Resolution emphasized a
“proactive and positive attitude to penetrate and expand into the international market”.
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More concrete, the Party urged for the need to “be proactive to prepare for necessary
conditions in terms of negotiating official, legal framework and especially fostering
competitive products in order to integrate into regional and world markets; and
conduct quick and solid negotiation for BTA with the U.S, participate in APEC and
WTO” (Communist Party of Vietnam, 1997).
In terms of legal reforms, the Vietnamese government showed its commitment
to simplify regulatory procedures as a condition for the BTA with the U.S. First, the
Import and Export Duties Law was revised in 1998, which helped integrate and
systematize tariff practices. The Law on Foreign Investment of 1996 was revised in
2000 and the Law on Domestic Promotion was promulgated in 1998. Also, the
Enterprise Law was adopted for the first time in 1999 to establish a common set of
rules for all types of private enterprises. Especially, the year 2001 witnessed a major
positive shift in trade policy in which a tariff reform roadmap for the period 2001-05
under the Decision 46/2001/QD-TTg in April 2001 was announced, creating a more
transparent and predictable export-import environment in Vietnam. In particular, most
quantitative restrictions were removed in 2001 ahead of schedule and at that time
there were only two products, namely petroleum and sugar, subject to quantitative
restrictions (Vo & Nguyen , 2009).
To summarize, since 1995, Vietnam had shown its desires for comprehensive
trade liberalization by joining AFTA, accelerating trade negotiation with the WTO
and with the U.S. In 1996, the Five-year Socio-economic Development Plan 1996-

2000 directly pointed to the intention to join the WTO and other international
economic institutions. However, the document did not directly discuss the BTA with
the U.S. After the occurrence of the Asian Finance Crisis starting from 1997, the
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leadership predisposition to trade liberalization reform was intensified by the

Resolution of the 4th Plenum under the VIII National Party Congress, which directly
pointed to a quick negotiation for BTA with the U.S. In November 2001, the CPV
released the specially Resolution No. 7 on International Economic Integration which
confirmed the irreversible path for Vietnam to fully integrate in the world economy.
Nonetheless, the BTA with U.S was a sensitive and controversial issue that
caused contentious deliberation within the highest organs of Party and government
about the pace and scope of international economic integration. To adopt the BTA,
the policy image had been changed to pave the way for consensus within the Party
and government. The following subsection will examine in detail how the policy
image of the policy elites in this trade domain was changed.

Change in policy image of the regime to the BTA with the U.S
The above discussion provides strong evidence to support the conclusion that
the political leaders of Vietnam exhibited awareness of external stressors requiring
major policy changes in trade liberalization with a strong predisposition to embrace
the need for these changes. But as I pointed out in the discussion of the major policy
change model in Chapter III, these causal factors may not be enough to bring change
about if the policy images of the Party and government regarding the technical
feasibility of the policy change initiative have not changed. Thus, it is important for
the policy elites in the Party and government to change their perception of the role
and consequence of the BTA with US. Persuasive technical and economic arguments
for change would pave the way for the BTA to reach the consensus within the Party
for final approval and adoption.

175

In exploring the policy image of the policy elites on the BTA with U.S, I will
rely heavily on a series of interviews with the heads and senior officials of the two
Vietnamese and U.S. negotiation delegations. The web-based newspaper TuanVietnam.net conducted the series of interviews in July 2010 with four people. On
the Vietnam side, the interviewees were Mr. Nguyễn ðình Lương, the head of
delegation, and Mr. Mai Liêm Trực, the then Director of the General Department of
Postal Services who was in charge of the negotiation on telecommunication markets.
On the U.S. side, the interviewees were Joe Damond, the chief U.S. negotiator for the
BTA and Virginia Foote, President of the U.S.-Vietnam Trade Council. These
officials were the representatives of the two governments and had been working
closely with each other from the beginning to the end of the negotiation process.
A careful examination these interviews reveals the following three sets of
factors related to the policy image of the Vietnamese policy elites that greatly
influenced the process and substance of the BTA negotiations with the U.S side: (1)
the obsession with the Vietnam War; (2) the role of national interest; (3) the
reassessment of the potential BTA consequences. The role of each of these three
factors will be discussed in greater detail in the sections to follow in order to elucidate
how the policy images of the elites had been changed overtime.

Obsession of the War
According to Nguyễn ðình Lương, the Head of the Vietnamese Delegation,
the negotiation between Vietnam and U.S. was undertaken against the common
backdrop of a shared legacy of being recent warring countries. It is not like the cases
when the former communist Eastern European countries negotiated the BTA with the
U.S as a step in a larger process of joining the EU and NATO. It is also different from
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other developing countries, which considered negotiating BTA agreements with the
U.S. as an opportunity to expand their national development and influence into the
international community. Vietnam “has her own circumstances, calculations and
negotiation principles and had to overcome very unique barriers on her own” (Nguyen
D. L., 2010).
Since the early 1990s, Vietnam had expressed its willingness to diversify both
bilateral and multilateral relationships and be a friend with all nations in the world for
the sake of peace and development. However, this commitment did not mean that the
negotiations with the U.S. would be smooth and easily reach consensus. Differing
from the previous negotiations, these negotiations were a first step in rebuilding
mutual understanding and trust with the Americans. However, Mr. Lương admitted,
“At the starting point, we did not have such things”. He continued, “The war had
brought miseries and sorrows for my family. Our generation is loyal to the teaching of
Uncle Ho: Fight to kick the Americans out” (Nguyen D. L., 2010).
Thus, the psychology on the Vietnamese side at that time was colored by
anger at America and the lack of trust. Mr. Lương posited that even though
Vietnamese history was the history of war, there had not been any war like this
before, as brutal and devastating. None of the cities in Vietnam were intact and almost
every family in Vietnam had someone who had been lost in the war. The pain was not
just in Vietnam, it was also a political disaster for Americans as Mrs. Virginia Foote,
the President of US-Vietnam Trade Council asserted: “The war is still around…Some
politicians, senators, and people in the US still do not want to normalize relation with
Vietnam” (Foote, 2010).

177

As the result, mutual suspicion resulting from the past war overshadowed the
negotiations. The brutality and devastation of the war made the Vietnamese people
and leaders worry about the possibility of the “return of Americans to their land”. By
that time, Vietnam still considered America as a “long lasting and essential enemy”.
Anti-American psychology had been infused deeply into every social class, even after
Vietnam had normalized the diplomatic relationship with the U.S. in 1994 (Nguyen
D. L., 2010). The difference in ideology made the mutual suspicions even greater;
especially when the Vietnamese recalled the famous saying of Henry Kissinger
“Americans did not win in the war but will do so in peace time”.
So the first step for successful negotiations was to break the ice and gain
mutual understanding and trust between the two sides. The Head of U.S. Negotiation
Delegation, Joe Damond, observed, "Vietnam spent a lot time in determining whether
they could trust what was being proposed by the American side. The American side
always said that the Agreement would bring benefits to both sides” (Damond, 2010).
But, Mr. Damond noted, “some Vietnamese thought that we were cheating”.
According to Mr. Lương, some people in the Vietnamese leadership group used the
word “plot” to characterize the ideas proposed by the U.S. side. Some on the Vietnam
side believed that the U.S. was using the BTA as a plot “to transform Vietnamese
political regime” or “to destroy the socialism path in Vietnam” or “to destroy the
Socialist-oriented economy of Vietnam”. A big question was raised on the
Vietnamese side: How can Vietnam partner with an “enemy”? This cautious attitude
was strong within a group of leaders at the highest level of the Party and government
and, as Mr. Lương posited “resulted in careful attention to every word and term in the
BTA agreement” (Nguyen D. L., 2010).
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The triumph of national interests over suspicion
In the face of such high levels of distrust, how did the Vietnamese side
overcome its suspicion and come to believe in the benefits of the BTA with the U.S?
In fact, during about five years of negotiation, the conservative leaders of Vietnam
were against the BTA and the reformers were in favor. While both proponents and
opponents were patriotic, they differed in their understanding, view, and vision
regarding the BTA. Mr. Lương observed that he underwent a change in thinking over
the course of the negotiations. He gradually began to recognize that what Vietnam
needed from him “was not the anger and suspicion”, but to overcome such
psychology on his own part and “to seek for opportunities and interests for the people
and nation”. Both Mr. Lương and Mr. Trực asserted that without taking a much larger
view of the overall national interests in negotiating the BTA, it would have been
impossible to reach mutual agreements on the most important technical issues of the
BTA by September 1999. Thus, pragmatic perspective had gradually triumph the
suspicion in order for the Vietnamese side to move forward with the agreement.

Reassessing the potential consequence of BTA to Vietnam
In addition to pragmatism, in order to reach the agreements with the U.S.
Delegation on the technical issues, the benefits and risks of the BTA had been taken
into account and deliberated within the Party and government elites in the period from
1996 to 1999. At the beginning, the Vietnam delegation was worried about the
adverse impacts that a globalized capitalist system would have on its Socialist
objectives. Mr. Lương recalled that during the negotiation process, some Vietnamese
leaders posited that:
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Signing the BTA with the U.S. based on the principles and rules of WTO means that
we accept to participate into the process of globalization. We need to reexamine the
class nature of the globalization process which is led by capitalism. If it is led by
capitalism, it will only bring in benefits for the capitalist class. The less developed
people will be poorer and the gap between the rich and the poor countries will grow
larger. Should we wait for another globalization process led by the proletariats?

Some also argued that if Vietnam signed the BTA to allow the inward flow of
money and products from the U.S., it could cause Vietnam to lose the control it
needed to achieve a Socialist society. Mr. Lương remembered that some leaders of the
Party asserted “if we lose the control over the flow of capital and products, we cannot
build a Socialist society; thus, we must prohibit capitalists from coming into Vietnam
and do their business” (Nguyen D. L., 2010). In the same manner, some suspected
that “America is very rich and strong; their products are good and abundant. So if
Vietnam opens its doors for American products, only after one week, or less, our
economy will collapse” (Nguyen D. L., 2010). When dealing with agreements about
copyright laws, some worried that “Commitment to copyrights means that we make
difficulties for ourselves. Our country is poor, so we need to use the inventions of
others to develop our country. How can we have money to buy copyrights?” (Nguyen
D. L., 2010).
To change the above described policy image of some leaders in the Party and
government and induce them to support the BTA, members of the Vietnamese
Negotiation Delegation and other senior technocrats had to change their own beliefs
first and then explain and persuade their leaders in the Party and government of the
benefits of the BTA. Indeed, the early concerns about the adverse consequences of
capitalism on the country’s Socialist goals were gradually tempered by the collection
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and analysis of data and by the process of participating in the negotiation itself. Mr.
Lương observed that he and others began looking at the experience of other countries
that had signed the BTA with the U.S. and argued, “If such countries had trust in
protecting their national interests while being trade partners, why couldn’t Vietnam
have similar trust in its self-governing capacity?” (Nguyen D. L., 2010). And that
without actual integration and innovation, Vietnam will be backward forever.
Gradually, representatives of the Vietnamese Delegation began to change their own
thinking as they examined the experiences on international trade liberalization by
other countries and reflected on their capacity to be controlling agents of their own
destiny. As a consequence, after a long internal deliberation process and exchange of
views, the members of the negotiation delegation and senior technocrats had changed
their policy images. They then educated their leaders in the Party and government to
make them recognize the BTA as the right direction for Vietnam to fully integrate into
the world economy. The benefits and advantages would be much greater than
disadvantages.
To summarize, it took time for the change in the policy image held by the
policy elites and leaders in Vietnam in order for them to accelerate the negotiation
process. Notably, reaching the agreements on the technicalities of the BTA with the
U.S. side was very difficult; however, it was even more difficult to reach internal
consensus within the Vietnamese Party and government (Nguyen D. L., 2010; Mai L.
T., 2012). Many conferences, meetings and reports were conducted to educate the
leaders in the Party and the government to make them believe in the benefits of the
BTA. After much dialogue and discussion, collection and analysis of data and some
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concessions on the U.S. side, the Vietnamese side began to believe that “the BTA
would make the economy of Vietnam stronger not weaker” (Damond, 2010).
The BTA negotiation process illustrates the important role that technocrats and
specialized public officials play in Vietnam’s policy process. Since these technical
experts were responsible for the gathering of data and its analysis, they played a
critical role in changing the universe of discourse during the negotiation process.
However, as Mr. Nguyễn ðình Lương, the Head and Mr. Mai Liêm Trực, a key
person of the Vietnamese Negotiation Delegation stated, they themselves were not in
the position to finalize the BTA. In the middle of 1999, most of the technical issues
were accepted by both negotiation delegations and the BTA was ready to be signed at
the APEC Summit in New Zealand in September 1999 between Vietnamese Prime
Minister Phan Văn Khải and U.S. President Bill Clinton. However, the signing was
postponed without any publicized explanation (Nguyen D. L., 2010). It was not until
July 2000 that the BTA was signed. This raises the question of what was happening in
the internal leadership of Vietnam during that time. Why did the Party and
government delay signing the BTA after being convinced that doing so was a good
thing on both policy and technical grounds? In the following section, I hope to shed
light on this important question.

Consensus on political priorities as the sufficient condition for radical
policy change
The policy change model presented in Chapter III emphasizes the importance
of obtaining party consensus on policy priorities even when there is agreement that
policy needs to change and agreement on what that policy should be. Consensus on
these technical issues and factors does not mean that agreement on these issues should
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be given first order priority at the moment over other political goals. For a radical
policy change alternative to be adopted, the CPV leaders must reach the consensus on
the temporary political goals that support the change alternative. As mentioned
earlier, even though Mr. Lương and Mr. Trực were senior officials of the negotiation
delegation, they were not in the position to decide the final outcomes of the
negotiation process with the U.S. Mr. Trực recalled that at that time the Vietnamese
Negotiation Delegation wanted to sign the BTA with the U.S. before China signed the
same BTA with the U.S. However, this intention was not allowed by the highest
organ of the CPV (Mai L. T., 2012).
In Vietnam, the technocrats were in charge of technical issues and always
needed to report to leaders of the Party and government to obtain a final decision from
the highest levels of the Party, including the Party Central Committee and the
Politburo. Within the Politburo, the process of reaching consensus among its members
is complicated and political in nature. To explain why the BTA was delayed from
September 1999 when it was supposed to be signed until July 2000 when it was
signed, I will draw from the following three bodies of research: (1) Vietnam’s

Contradictions by Andrew J. Pierre (2000); (2) The Lessons of Le Kha Phieu:
Changing Rules in Vietnamese Politics by Zachary Abuza (2001); and (3) Vietnam in
1999: The Party's Choice by Nguyen Manh Hung (2000).
Conflict of values within the Party leadership
After the Asian Financial Crisis (1997), the Vietnamese Party and government
were faced with two different choices: (1) continue with the direction of placing
priority on political stability and accepting only incremental change at the expense of
urgent economic reforms and sustainable growth; or (2) undertake comprehensive
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economic reform including trade liberalization and signing of the BTA with the U.S.
The proponents for the former were conservative leaders in the Politburo who
perceived that radical change would entails many risks, including unemployment in
the public sector, SOE divestitures, and possible social unrest (Dinh Q. X., 2000). In
contrast, the reformers advocated the later choice, which necessitates broader
institutional and political reforms. They perceived that although the BTA might
induce short-term difficulties but it would strengthen Vietnam's long-term
development prospects.

The conservative view
The conservative members of the leadership group in Vietnam were strong
believers in socialist orthodoxy. After a lifetime of belief in and struggle for MarxismLeninism, they were uneasy about the market economy and trade liberalization. Thus,
they had and continued to have a strong preference for a "Socialist-based market
economy" that conforms to Socialist ideology and practices. Even though they think
that the country needs to attract resources from outside, they feared that ideas such as
democracy, human rights, civil society, good governance, and so on, would infiltrate
the country and undermine Communist Party dominance (Pierre, 2000). The
conservative leaders believed that the market economy, albeit with a Socialist
orientation, might distract the country from the Socialist path and risk the control and
leadership of the Party over the economy and the whole society. They were afraid of
the threat of peaceful evolution (a code for the capitalist/imperialist menace) through
free trade and the creation of a market economy. The conservatives were composed of
a broad group of party ideologues, security apparatus and military members, and SOE
directors, with "impeccable class backgrounds" but with minimal exposure to the
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outside world and the running of a market economy (Pierre, 2000). For example, the
conservative members were reluctant to equitize the SOEs and did not want to open
the domestic market for international competition due to the weak competitiveness of
the SOEs. Thus, the main beneficiaries of protectionism were SOEs. For
conservatives, the SOEs and state control over the economy offer the possibility of
prolonging the CPV's control. They have significant political and economic power,
and might be able to retard trade liberalization because they have grown accustomed
to a protected economic environment (Pierre, 2000).Thus, the conservatives tended to
support the political status quo and policy stability instead of radical economic
reforms.

Reformer’s view
In contrast, pragmatic reformers argued that in order to sustain development,
Vietnam required rapid change to catch up with neighboring countries. They had
worked with, and been exposed to the outside world and most of them belong to the
executive branch (for example, the late Prime Minister Võ Văn Kiệt). That does not
mean that the reformers did not believe in the core values and priorities of the Party:
Party leadership and a Socialist state. However, they differed from the conservatives
in pressing for the efficient functioning of the political and economic system rather
than the survival of ideology (Pierre, 2000). The reformers represented a group of
technocrats, senior party members, and senior policy makers, advocating change.
They hoped that a well-developed system of governing institutions might evolve as
ideology grew less important, thus facilitating Vietnam’s economic development. As

ðổi Mới has taken root and the political system became more open, the reformers
gained a larger support base from the growing group of technocrats, western-educated
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people and reformers or retired senior party members. Thus, the reformers wanted
Vietnam to join the global market to cultivate its strengths (such as low labor price,
young population, and advantageous geographic location) and facilitate its long-term
development prospects.

Leadership deficiency in economic reforms in 1999
After a new leadership generation took greater power during the second half of
1997, the conservatives and reformers were split over the extent and pace of reform
(Dinh Q. X., 2000). The main difference between them was how much risk Vietnam
should take in continuing with the process of reform, including the BTA with the U.S.
This led to a debate over what constitutes a "market economy with socialist
orientation" in Vietnam's development strategy and produced a reluctance to discuss
the comprehensive reforms in trade liberalization with the “old capitalist enemy” – the
United States - which would be considered a "deviation from the Socialist-based
market economy" (Dinh Q. X., 2000).
Because each leadership group interpreted the BTA differently and embraced
different priorities, further discussions were required, thus delaying the achievement
of consensus. As a consequence, the implementation of reforms slowed down and no
consensus was reached to finalize the BTA with the U.S. from the second half of 1997
to the middle of 2000. All leaders did agree on the need to continue with change, but
there was debate over how much the party should risk deeper reforms. It was the pace
of reform that became the main point of contention rather than differences over the
substance or the direction of the reforms (Dinh Q. X., 2000).
According to an in-depth research of Zachary Abuza (2001), Prime Minister,
Phan Văn Khải raised the alarm on the economic downturn in 1999, but the Politburo
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was bitterly divided along factional and ideological lines and unable to come to an
agreement on the advancement of the reform program. There was no consensus within
the politburo on which steps to take. Reformers understood that economic growth was
contingent on exploiting Vietnam’s comparative advantage, joining the global
marketplace, attracting foreign investment and engaging in trade. In contrast,
ideological conservatives, such as the Party General Secretary, Lê Khả Phiêu, saw
international trade and globalization as ways that the first world would continue to
exploit Vietnam and keep it poor and underdeveloped. He warned that “When
imperialism speeds up trade and services liberalization and the globalization of
investments, the rich countries become richer and the gap between rich and poor
countries widens” (Abuza, 2001).
A serious leadership and decision-making vacuum in the CPV increasingly
complicated the ideological divide between the conservative and liberal wings of the
CPV during the 1999-2000 period. Scholars studying this period are in agreement that
Party General Secretary Lê Khả Phiêu provided no strong leadership in response to
the economic downturn after the crisis and no leadership to bridge the division within
the leadership organs of the CPV (Pierre, 2000; Abuza, 2001; and Nguyen, 2000).
Mr. Phiêu was unable to close the gap between the conservative and liberal positions
and to form a consensus policy to move forward further economic reform, including
the BTA with the U.S. As a result, in the midst of continuing economic recession in
1999 and 2000, the majority of the Politburo rejected the final draft of the bilateral
trade agreement (BTA) with the United States.
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Lack of Party’s consensus on political priority for economic reform
Another reason for the delay in signing the BTA was related to the diverging
political priorities in 1999. Indeed, the Party Central Committee convened many
Plenums in 1999, the Sixth (second round) from January 25 to February 2, the
Seventh from August 9-16, and the Eighth from November 4-11. However, these
Plenums did not focus on the economic reforms, including the BTA with the U.S.
Instead, the CPV agenda focused on the need for political stability and internal
reshuffling of the Party. It was clear that, as the BTA was ready for signing, party
unity and political stability, rather than economic issues, were the main concerns of
the three plenums. The CPV deferred the adoption of a comprehensive economic
reform package that was being urged on it by the progressive group of the party and
international donors.
Indeed, the Sixth Plenum focused on a number of fundamental and urgent
issues important to the strength and role of the Party as a controlling governing
institution. The resolution of this plenum showed that the main concern of the CPV
was to maintain internal stability and party unity in the face of a regional crisis and
the forces of globalization. The stated intention was to ensure the creation of a
politically, ideologically, and organizationally strong Party in parallel with the
requirements of social stability. The survival of the CPV as a ruling party required
that it rid itself of internal disunity and close ranks against external challenges.
Reforming the Party, rather than economic or political liberalization, became a
number one priority at the Plenum. Speaking to the Plenum, General Secretary Lê
Khả Phiêu said that the CPV was plagued by several problems, including abuse of
power, corruption, illegal enrichment, and internal disunity. He noted, "Some of these
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phenomena have serious consequences... and created conditions for hostile forces to
sabotage our party, our regime." (Nguyen H. M., 2000). In response, the plenum
adopted a resolution to launch a two-year intensive campaign of criticism and selfcriticism between May 1999 and May 2001 with the aim of improving the
"revolutionary ethics [of party members] and fighting individualism" (Nguyen H. M.,
2000).
At the Seventh Plenum (August 1999), the main concern of the CPV was over
the issues related to the organization and apparatus of the political system, wages and
social allowances funded by the state budget, and preparations for the forthcoming
Ninth National Party Congress. With salaries not having been revised for many years,
the plenum focused on the need to increase public service salaries and allowances.
Again, it suggested that internal political matters, rather than economic reform to cope
with Vietnam's decreasing economic growth, were to be the main preoccupation of
the Party at this point of time.
In short, even though a comprehensive trade agreement with the U.S. was
ready to be signed to complete the normalization process between the two countries,
to open up the Vietnamese economy and further integrate it into the global economy
in response to the Asian Financial Crisis, the BTA was not the main priority of the
Party in 1999. Until the Eighth Plenum of the Party Central Committee of the Eighth
National Party Congress of the CPV met in Hanoi from November 4-11 to discuss the
pressing problems facing the country, no new major economic reforms had been
undertaken (Nguyen H. M., 2000). The CPV continued to focus on political issues
instead of pushing the economic reforms, including the BTA with U.S. As a result, the
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anticipated signing of the trade deal with the U.S. was postponed in the last minutes,
which surprised many from both the Vietnamese and U.S. sides.
By 2000, Vietnam had felt fierce and devastating consequences of the Asian
Financial Crisis more clearly. Within the leadership segment of the Party, there was a
change in the balance of power among the conservatives and reformers. The Secretary
General, a conservative leader, was faced with many political problems and losing his
personal leadership legitimacy (Abuza, 2001). He gradually lost the leadership role to
the reformer groups who advocated for comprehensive economic changes. In
addition, China had signed the same BTA with the U.S. in November 1999. All of
these factors led to the dominance of the reformer group within the Party, which in
turn allowed for the signing of the BTA with U.S in July 2000. However, it should be
noted that it took one more year for the leaders to wholeheartedly accept the BTA
marked by the Resolution on International Economic Integration in November 2001
directing the National Assembly to officially ratify the BTA.

4. Conclusion on the relevance of the proposed policy change model to the
case
The case of the Bilateral Trade Agreement with the United States has proved
the accuracy and explanatory power of the major policy change model proposed in
Chapter III. The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 put a great deal of pressures on the
Vietnamese Party and government for comprehensive reforms, including the BTA
with the US. Under the stressors, the Vietnamese Communist Party and government
had already committed themselves to opening up its economy, and integrating deeper
into the regional and global economic system. With the strong leadership
predisposition to reform, Vietnam advanced the negotiation process with the U.S.
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sides on the BTA from 1997. During the three years from 1997 to 1999, there were
changes in the policy images of the policy elites over the benefits and risks of the
BTA and the technical issues under the BTA were resolved and agreed upon by the
middle of 1999. However, at the time the BTA was ready to be signed, the highest
leadership organ - the Politburo of the CPV decided to delay the BTA.
This delay can be well explained by the lack of consensus among the top
leaders of the Party in terms of the pace and extent of economic reforms. While the
reformers wanted to accelerate economic reforms to cope with the slowing economy,
the conservatives were strongly concerned about the political risks and problems
arising from rapid changes. At that time, the Party Secretary General was unable to
take the leadership role in reaching consensus among the top leaders who were
divided over the pace of change. Also, in 1999, there is extensive evidence that the
top priorities of the CPV were political stability and internal unity instead of
economic reform. As a result, even though the BTA was considered technically
feasibility, it was not signed in 1999. This policy phenomenon supported the
proposition No. 4 of the proposed policy model in Chapter III that political judgment
can dominate technical feasibility of a major policy change initiative in Vietnam.
It took almost one year of additional internal debates and deliberation within
the leadership of the Party to ensure the signing of the BTA. By the middle of 2000,
the reformers managed to persuade the conservatives and gained the leadership
position within the Politburo. As the result, the BTA was finally signed in July 2000.
However, the National Assembly did not officially pass the BTA until one day after
the CPV issued a special Resolution on International Economic Integration on

November 27, 2001. Earlier, in April 2001, the new Party Secretary General was
191

elected, which helped the reformers reach the final consensus on trade liberalization
and the CPV stood firm on its will to push for ðổi Mới II, especially after the signing
of the BTA with the U.S.
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Chapter VII: A Case of Lacking Significant Policy Image Change in
State-owned Enterprise Management in Vietnam

In recent years, few issues have evoked more passionate debate in Vietnam
than the issue of state ownership in the market economy and the recent scandals
related to some state general corporations and economic groups. More than 20 years
since Vietnam’s Renovation Program (ðổi Mới) for a transition to a market-oriented
economy, the outsiders would be surprised that by 2009, the share of state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) in capital, fixed assets, bank credit, and employment in the
enterprise sector was still as high as 39, 45, 27, and 19 percent, respectively (The
Vietnam Consultative Group Meeting, 2011). In the highest official documents and
statements by Party and government leaders, state-owned enterprises remained the
cornerstone of the entire economy. Despite negative economic performance on the
part of most of the state economic groups (SEGs) and general corporations (SGOs),
the Party and government has stood firm on its will to retain a strong state economic
sector as the tools for macro-economic monitoring and for assuring the social welfare
system of the country. Over the past two decades, the government has conducted a
variety of incremental changes and adjustments in its legal framework for the SOE
sector, especially when the country integrated more fully into the world economy.
However, no comprehensive reform in the state economic sector has been made when
the General Party Secretary of CPV in his closing speech at the 6th Plenum of the
Party Central Committee under the XI National Party Congress, on October 15, 2012,
announced that state-owned economic sector would remain its central role in the
economy (Nguyen T. P., 2012). Thus, people both inside and outside the country have
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posed several important questions: Have the Party and government leaders felt the
stressors to reform the state economic sector? If so, have they committed to reform? If
the answer to both questions is yes, what has prohibited Vietnam from bringing their
reforms to fruition?
This case study is structured to shed light on answer of these questions. The
first section reviews the role and economic performance of the state-owned enterprise
sector in Vietnam, which will provide the policy context for this case study and for
my descriptive analysis in the following sections. I will include a timeline of policy
changes in state management over state-owned enterprises that have occurred over the
past two decades. In the second section of this chapter, I will use the proposed major
policy change model presented in Chapter III of this dissertation to explain the policy
process and outcomes with respect to the state economic sector and its enterprises.
Specifically, I intended to use the change factors and the causal flow of change
identified in the model including stressors, leadership predisposition to reform, policy
image to explain the lack of radical policy changes and innovation in the state
economic sector. Finally, some conclusions will be drawn to evaluate the explanatory
capacity of policy model proposed for Vietnam in this case.
The method I am using for this case study is secondary document review. In
order to identify the performance data and information related to state-owned
enterprises, I will rely on a critical study that is summarized in the recent Vietnam

Development Report 2012: Market Economy for a Middle-Income Vietnam, presented
at the Vietnam Consultative Group Meeting in December 06, 2011, sponsored by
World Bank (hereafter cited as The Vietnam Consultative Group Meeting, 2011). I
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will supplement reliance on this report with information from Party and government’s
official documents, empirical researches, and policy statements of policy elites.

1. Introduction to the state economic sector in Vietnam
Over the past two decades since ðổi Mới in 1986, the government of Vietnam
has conducted a number of changes in the relationship between the government and
SOEs, especially in replacing central planning powers with substantial enterprise
autonomy. Compared to the period before ðổi Mới, SOEs have much higher authority
to set most of the prices based on the marketplace, select appropriate production
inputs, determine their own investment strategies, manage their human resources and
assets, and apply appropriate institutional organizations (The Vietnam Consultative
Group Meeting, 2011). These policy changes were intended to help state-owned
enterprises catch up with the rules of the market economy and to increase the
efficiency.
Along with providing more autonomy to state firms, during the 1990s and the
past decade, Vietnam equitized small and medium-size SOEs, and consolidated others
into larger entities, called General Corporations. Between 1989 and 1992, thousands
of small, loss-making and inefficient SOEs were closed or merged, reducing their
numbers from 12,084 to some 6000 (Dixon, 2003). The number of SOEs did not
change much between 1992 and 1999 which was a period for the government to
consolidate the state economic sector by ending the mechanism of direct subsidies,
revising the incentive structures for workers and managers and increasing the level of
autonomy (The Vietnam Consultative Group Meeting, 2011). From 2000, the process
of equitizing state-owned enterprises was accelerated again, especially in two years
before Vietnam accession to WTO in 2006. Notably, among the 3.388 equitized SOEs
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in the period 2001-2011, 58% were local firms, 32% were managed by line ministries
and only 10% were general state corporations and state economic groups under the
control of the central government (Vu A. T., 2011). After 20 years of equitization,
only 15% of state capital in SOE sector was transferred to private holders, which was
a very modest number.
From 2006 to 2010, the trend was reversed compared to the previous periods,
especially after Vietnam joined the WTO and after the issuance of the Government

Decree No. 101 on Pilot Establishment of State Economic Group in November 2009.
This reversal can be explained by the desire of Vietnam leaders to emulate the
experiences of Japan’s Keiretsus and the Republic of Korea’s Chaebols (Beresford,
2008). Indeed, in 2005, Vietnam accelerated the process of creating State Economic
Groups (SEGs), which represent the loose alliances of a number of SOEs with similar
business interests prior to the country’s accession to WTO to ensure the international
competitiveness of the domestic economy. By the end of 2010, according to an
official report, there were 3,364 SOEs in which the government had a controlling
stake by owning 51 percent or more of the charter capital (GSO, cited by The
Vietnam Consultative Group Meeting, 2011). Among those, some 1,300 SOEs were
100% state ownership.
Generally, the importance of the state sector in the overall economy has
steadily declined as the domestic private and foreign sectors have rapidly grown over
the last two decades. In 2000, SOEs accounted for nearly 68 percent of capital, 55
percent of fixed assets (such as land), 45 percent of bank credit, and 59 percent of the
jobs in the enterprise sector (The Vietnam Consultative Group Meeting, 2011). Since
then, these numbers have steadily fallen, though at different speeds. The steepest
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decline has been in the employment share of SOEs, from 59 percent in 2000 to 19
percent in 2009, as the labor-intensive SOEs have been equitized and the domestic
private and foreign enterprises have rapidly expanded their labor force. Except for a
few subsectors such as construction and insurance, the number of enterprises under
state ownership is fairly small relative to the number of firms operating in the nonstate and foreign-owned sectors (The Vietnam Consultative Group Meeting, 2011).
However, the state sector still has a sizable presence in the economy. As has
been mentioned earlier, by 2009, the share of SOEs in capital, fixed assets, bank
credit, and the employment in the enterprise sector were still 39, 45, 27, and 19
percent, respectively. Notwithstanding relatively declined proportion of state
ownership within the economy, the state not only controls all the critical business
sectors, but also has considerable presence in various commercial activities. The stateowned enterprises enjoy near-monopoly status in the production of key goods and
services, including fertilizer (99 percent), coal (97 percent), electricity and gas (94
percent), telecommunications (91 percent), water supply (90 percent), and insurance
(88 percent) (The Vietnam Consultative Group Meeting, 2011). The state justifies a
large state presence in these business areas by considering them as basis for the
economy and seems reluctant to allow non-public sectors to invest in these areas.
More surprisingly, the state has also maintained its presence in various consumer
goods such as cement (51 percent), beer (41 percent), refined sugar (37 percent),
textiles (21 percent), and chemicals (21 percent). Until 2011, among the 100% SOEs,
a third of the total enterprises (417 out of 1,300) operated in the areas of commerce,
service, and tourist which do not necessary need the participation of the state (Vu A.
T., 2011).
197

Especially in the banking section, by 2010, among the largest banks, the state
controls 100% capital of two banks and from 80-92% of other three (The Vietnam
Consultative Group Meeting, 2011). The number of joint-stock banks (JSBs) with
state capital progressively increased to 22 by 2010 compared to five in 2005, implying
that nearly 60 percent of JSBs had some charter capital from the state. The amount of
state capital in the JSBs has steadily increased from nearly VND 1 trillion in 2005 to
VND 15 trillion in 2010. Thus, both in terms of the number of banks and the absolute
amount of charter capital, the state’s presence in the banking sector has increased.
Notably, the large majority of state ownership in the banking sector comes through
the SOEs, which hold charter capital in as many as 19 JSBs (The Vietnam
Consultative Group Meeting, 2011).
From the above review, we can see that even though the relative position of
the SOEs within the national economy of Vietnam has declined, the size and influence
of this sector is still very large. In order to maintain a strong state economic sector, the
government has provided the SOEs with preferential access to banking credit,
procurement contracts, and research and development, etc., compared to their peers in
the private sector. For example, over the past years, SOEs have received averagely
about 70% of the total ODA of Vietnam. Now, the question turns to the economic
performance of this economic sector.

Inefficiency and low productivity
According to the report of the Vietnam Consultative Group Meeting (2011),
the SOEs use several times more capital to produce one unit of output than the
industry average. In 2000, the average ratio of turnover to capital in SOEs, which is a
proxy for the productivity of capital, was 1.6 compared to 8.8 for the enterprise sector
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as a whole. This implies that on average SOEs required nearly five times units of
capital to produce one unit of output (turnover) than the industry average level. This is
not entirely unexpected since SOEs specialized in the production of more capitalintensive products at that time. What is quite alarming, however, is that by 2009 the
average ratio of turnover to capital for the SOEs fell to 1.1 while it increased to 21.0
for the industry. Thus, while the enterprise sector, as a whole was getting better at
using capital more economically, the SOEs were becoming even more inefficient.
The growth of labor productivity in SOEs has not kept pace with the rest of
the industry too. Since SOEs have higher capital intensity than the rest of the industry,
and since this intensity has rapidly increased in recent years, one would expect SOEs
to experience higher and rising labor productivity relative to the rest of the enterprise
sector. The evidence, however, shows the opposite. As indicated in the report of the
Vietnam Consultative Group Meeting (2011), between 2000 and 2008, the turnoverto-employee ratio in SOEs, which represents for the productivity of labor, increased
from 0.6 to 1.7. During the same period, the turnover-to-employee ratio for the overall
enterprise sector increased from 2.7 to 16.3, indicating that labor productivity gap
between SOEs and the rest of the enterprise sector widened from 1:4 in 2000 to 1:10
in 2008.
SOEs are also less efficient in their use of fixed assets such as land and
machinery. Research shows that the turnover-to-fixed asset ratio, a proxy for the
productivity of land and machinery, fell for SOEs between 2000 and 2008, while it
remained unchanged for the whole enterprise sector during the same period (The
Vietnam Consultative Group Meeting, 2011). Moreover, the average net loss of stateowned enterprises is 12 times higher than those of non-state sector enterprises.
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According a report from the Ministry of Finance (Vneconomy, 2012), the total
accumulative loss of the state corporations and economic groups by the end of 2011
was 26,100 billion VND (approximately 1.25 billion USD). Among the worst
performance companies, the General Electricity Corporation (EVN) lost 12,313
billion VND (around 600 million USD); Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group
(Vinashin) lost 5,000 billion VND (around 200 million USD) in 2010; the General
Telecommunication Corporation lost 1,026 billion VND (around 50 million USD) in
2009. Thus, the SOEs have not only used production factors inefficiently, but their
level of inefficiency has greatly accelerated in recent years.

In serious debt
Along with being operationally less efficient, SOEs are also found to be
financially less prudent. The SOEs have the highest debt-to-asset ratio among the
three groups and have been exposed to a large proportion of debt within the entire
economy. Between 2007 and 2009, the debt-to-equity ratio of SOEs averaged 307
percent relative to 183 percent for non-state domestic firms and 145 percent for
foreign firms (The Vietnam Consultative Group Meeting, 2011). Especially, the debtto-equity ratio of the state economic groups increased to 3.2 times from the level of
2.6 in 2005 before they were upgraded from the general state corporations.
By September 2011, the total debt amount of state-owned economic
enterprises was 415,347 billion VND (around 20 billion USD), occupying up to
16.9% of the total debt of the banking system (Vneconomy, 2012). According the
Proposal of Restructuring State-owned Enterprises documented by the Ministry of
Finance in late 2011, only 12 state economic groups and general corporations have a
debt amount of 218.738 billion VND (around 10 billion USD), accounting for 8.76%
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of the total debt of the economy and 52.66% of the total debt of the state economic
sector (Vneconomy, 2012). Also, according to this document, 30 out of 85 state
economic groups and general corporations have a debt amount of more than three
times and seven of ten times higher than their total equity. More seriously, SOEs in
general and the state economic groups and state general corporations in particular are
responsible for about 70% and 53%, of the total bad loans of the whole banking
system, respectively. (Dinh M. T., 2012).

Non-core investment
Another problem with the state-owned enterprises is their large scale
investments in non-core business activities while their core businesses witnessed huge
losses. Instead of focusing on their core missions and on promoting their international
competitiveness (as expected by the government), many state-owned enterprises used
the preferable loans from the government and state banks to invest in stock markets,
real estates and joint-stock banks to gain short-term profit. For example, by the end of
2010, according to a report of the General Accounting Office, the General Electricity
Corporation of Vietnam had invested more than 4,551 billion VND (around 220
million USD), accounted to 13% of charter capital in none-core activities; the State
Economic Group of Vinalines had invested 672 billion VND, accounted to 10.37 % of
charter capital; and the Vietnam National Coal - Mineral Industries Group State
Economic Group had invested 1.828 billion VND, accounted to 12.1% of charter
capital (Electronic Newspaper of Vietnam State Bank, 2012).
All of the negative performance of the state economic sector came to a climax
when the Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group (Vinashin), one of the largest state
economic groups (SEGs), had to announce bankruptcy. In the middle of 2010, more
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than 5,000 Vinashin workers lost their jobs and the company failed to pay US$12
million in salaries and social insurance. The total debt of Vinashin was reported to be
US$4.4 billion in July 2010 –more than 300 percent of its annual sales and as much as
10 times its equity base (The Vietnam Consultative Group Meeting, 2011). According
to a report by the General Inspection Office, which was submitted to the National
Assembly in July 2010, Vinashin’s problems can be traced to the following factors:
(a) violating regulations on project formulation, approval, and bidding, and incurring
huge debt; (b) falsifying financial reports; (c) establishing as many as 200 subsidiaries
and expanding outside its core business operations (such as securities, real estate, and
tourism); and (d) the chairman committing serious violations and infringing
regulations on the mobilization, management, and use of state capital (cited in the
Vietnam Consultative Group Meeting, 2011). The day after the General Inspection
Office’s report was submitted to the National Assembly; the chairman of Vinashin
was suspended and detained on mismanagement charges. Several other senior
Vinashin officials were also subsequently arrested. A steering committee, chaired by a
deputy prime minister, was set up to restructure Vinashin.
The Vinashin scandal is not the only case. In 2012, another state economic
group, Vinalines, was also under investigation and the Director General of the
Vinalines was convicted and arrested for the mismanagement and abuse of power.
Some prominent businessmen and leaders of the biggest domestic banks in Vietnam
were also arrested and investigated in 2012. The weaknesses and problems of many
other state-owned enterprises were gradually revealed, especially after the Vinashin
scandals triggered investigations over the whole state economic system. These
incidents spurred a nationwide debate about the role of the state involvement and
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ownership, including the role and efficiency of the SGCs and SEGs in Vietnam’s
economy. Key elements that led to the negative performance of the SOEs have been
repeatedly mentioned in state documents including weak corporate governance
(including ineffective internal controls, limited transparency and disclosure, no
independent external audits), lack of effective oversight and monitoring, and the
excessive power of senior management to operate and expand the business without
effective transparency and accountability regulations.
At all of the political forums within the Party Central Committee, the National
Assembly, the central government and its ministries, participants have joined a
growing consensus that SOE restructuring is now required. Opinion is divided,
however, about the nature and extent of restructuring. There are some who believe
that only minor restructuring (such as trimming capital expenditure) is enough to
restore the health of SOEs and they can then return to playing their leading role in the
economy. There are others who think that a more radical restructuring, including
equitization of SEGs and transferring the role and function of SOEs to the
marketplace, is in the country’s long-term interest. To this view, if the problems that
led to the fall of Vinashin reflect the generic issues affecting the state sector, then
SOEs do face serious challenges that can be addressed only through a comprehensive
reform program.
An accumulated set of SOE scandals in recent time have confronted the
Vietnamese Party and government with essential the problems of SOEs and the urgent
need for restructuring this sector. In fact, a variety of legal documents and directives
have been promulgated with the hope of increasing the efficiency and performance of
the SOEs over the past two decades especially after the recent scandals related to poor
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performance of the state economic groups. However, the policy changes have been
incremental and have focused on equitization of inefficiency small firms and on
internal enterprise management improvement instead of innovative changes in the
policy image on the roles of SOEs and the nature of state ownership. Following are
some critical documents promulgated by the Party and government reflecting the
regime’s views over the state economic sector and state management in this sector.
Table 11: Resolutions, decrees, and directives of the CVP and government regulating
the state economic sector in Vietnam
No
1

2

3

Name and Date

Main contents

June 1991: The Political
Report at the VII
National Party Congress
and the Resolution on
“Development Strategy
of the Nation during the
Transitional Period
toward Socialism”
March 1994: Prime
Minister’s Decision No
91/TTG on the Pilot
Establishment of State
Business Groups and
Decision No. 90/TTG on
the Restructuring of
State-owned Enterprises
April 1995: Law on State
Enterprises

These two documents started to
recognize the rights and roles of
private enterprises while reaffirming
the pivotal role of the state
economic sector.

Raised the constraints and
limitations of the state
economic sector and the need
to consolidate the role and
improve the performance of
this sector.

The main goal of these Decisions
was to create favorable conditions
for the accumulation and
concentration of resources and
increase the competitiveness of key
state-owned enterprises.

Allowed state economic groups
to do business in different
areas with a requirement to
focus on their core business.

The Law distinguishes between
state enterprises that operate for
profit and those that have wider
social obligations such as public
utilities and national defense.
The State economic sector was
designated to take the pivotal
position in the economy, especially
involving industry, infrastructure
and finance.

This is the first Law which is
aimed at providing a regulatory
framework for the Party and
government to direct, manage,
and control the SOEs.
Continued to raise the need for
consolidating the roles of the
state economic sector. No
major concerns were expressed
about the performance of the
SOE sector.
This is first document of the
CPV specific to SOEs. It
recognized the weaknesses of
the sector and called for
renovation in state
management and restructuring,
especially after Vietnam signed
the BTA with the U.S. in July,
2000
To implement this Resolution,
in 2004, the Government

4

June 1996: VIII National
Party Congress: the
Political Report and
Five-year Socioeconomic Strategic Plan

5

August 2001: the
Resolution of the Third
Plenum of the Central
Party Committee of the
IX National Party
Congress regarding
reorganization, reform,
and development of the
SOEs.
June 2003: the
Resolutions No. 28-

6

The Resolution established the
development strategy and principles
for state management of SOE
sector.

The Party wanted to reshuffle and
restructuring the state enterprises in
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Policy implication

NQ/TW of the Politburo
on reshuffling, reforming
and developing state
farms and forestry firms.
No
7

Name and Date
December 2003: Revised
Law on State Enterprises

8

November 2009:
Government Decree No.
101 on Pilot
Establishment of State
Economic Group

9

November 2009:
National Assembly’s
Resolution No.
42/2009/QH12 on
Increasing the Law
Enforcement and Policy
Implementation in
Management, Resource
Usage, and Asset
Management of SEGs
and SGCs
July 2010: Special
Conclusion No. 78 KL/TW of the Politburo
on Reinforcing the
Implementation of the
Resolution of the Third
Plenum at the IX Party
Congress and the

10

agriculture sector.

promulgated Decree No. 170
and 200 stressing the need to
increase efficiency of state
farms and restructuring this
sector by equitization.
Main contents
Policy implication
This Law revises the Law on State
The Law is to realize Party’s
Enterprises in 1995.
strategies and resolutions
especially the Resolution of the
Third Plenum of the Central
Party Committee of the IX
National Party Congress in
2001
The main goal is to concentrate the
This Decree intended to realize
investments and mobilize resources
the strategy in the Party’s
to establish large-scale state
Resolution in 2001 on
economic groups in key economic
restructuring the state
areas in order to increase
economic sector. In response to
competitiveness of the domestic
trade liberalization and
economy and to help monitor the
international economic
industrialization process. It allows
integration (WTO), from 2005the establishment of
2010, Vietnam established the
State Economic Groups (SEGs),
following pilot SEGs: Vietnam
which are a loose alliance of several Post and Telecommunications,
SOEs with similar business
Vietnam National Coalinterests.
Mineral Industries, and
Vietnam National Textile and
Garment in 2005; Petro
Vietnam, Vietnam Electricity,
Vietnam Shipbuilding
Industry,
Vietnam Rubber in 2006;
Baoviet Insurance in 2007;
Vietnam National Chemical
Industrial Group, Industrial
Construction Group in 2009;
and Vietnam Housing and
Urban Development in 2010.
This Resolution strongly emphasized the
This Resolution was issued
weaknesses and problems of SOEs andafter some independent
called for more effective state
investigations revealed the bad
management and restructuring.
performance of SOEs.

Although the Conclusion admitted
problems and difficulties of SOEs
and the need for reforming and
restructuring the state economic
sector, it continued to confirm:
“Party’s principles on the key role
of SOEs in the national economy
are proved to be correct”.
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The Conclusion attributed the
bad performance of the leaders
and the limitation of internal
management to the constraints
and problems of SOEs instead
of the ownership nature of
SOEs. It also encouraged the
development of the State

No
11

Resolution of the X
Congress regarding
reorganization, reform,
and development of the
SOEs.
Name and Date
January 2011: The
Socio-economic
Development Plan 20112020

Main contents
Continued to affirm that “state
economic sector play a central role
as the important material force for
the state to direct and monitor the
entire economy, contributing to the
macroeconomic stability”.

12

February 2011:
Government Resolution
No. 11/NQ-CP on
Retaining Inflation Rate,
Stabilizing Macro
Economy, and Ensuring
Social Welfare.

The Resolution emphasized the
importance of providing solutions to
high inflation rate from 2008 to
2011, including measures of
reducing bank credit, public
expenditure, and investment in real
estate.

13

March 2011: Prime
Minister’s Decision on
Standards to Classify the
SOEs

This Decision classified different
types of SOEs, setting the stage for
restructuring the state economic
sector by equitization

14

March 2011: Conclusion
No. 2-KL/TW of the
Politburo on the Socioeconomic Situation in
2011

15

July 2011: Government
Decree No. 59/2011/NðCP on transforming
100% state-owned
enterprises into joint-

Among the solutions for the socioeconomic development, the
Conclusion emphasized “enhancing
SOEs restructuring by equitization;
focusing on the core business areas
of SEGs; not encouraging
investment in non-core activities;
clarifying state ownership in SOEs;
promulgating more regulations to
identify the accountability of
individuals and organizations in
using state resources”.
The Decree guided the process and
procedures to transform notrequired 100% SOEs into jointstock companies with multiple types
of ownership in order to increase

206

Capital and Investment
Corporation to facilitate
restructuring SOEs and
consolidate the role of the state
in key economic areas.
Policy implication
This is the key five-year
development plan of the Party
that influences all policies of
the Government in the coming
years. Unless, there is a special
document of the Party to
change the status quo, no
radical would be made.
This Resolution demonstrated
strong concerns of the
Government regarding the
macroeconomic performance
of the entire economy. Among
the solutions, it mentioned the
need to cut back unnecessary
investments of SOEs and to
restructure low performing
SOEs to save the money.
In many previous documents,
the Vietnamese Party and
Government emphasized the
need to classify SOEs into
different categories. According
its classification, the
Government would retain the
control over the important
economic areas and equitize
SOEs in not-so-important
economic areas. The Decision
differentiated SOEs by the
following functions: those
related to social welfare system
and those related to economic
monitoring.
This is another document
showing great stressors to the
regime due to the negative
economic indicators from 2008
and the impacts of the world
financial crisis.

It should be noted that the
Government only wants to
equitize SOEs whose
businesses are not in the key
economic areas.

stock companies

efficiency and performance of the
enterprises.
Main contents
At the Conference, the Minister of
Finance, Vuong Dinh Hue,
presented a keynote speech on
“Solutions for Restructuring SOEs,
with emphasis on State Economic
Groups and General Corporations”.

No
16

Name and Date
December 2011: The
Ministry of Finance
organized a Conference
on “Restructuring the
Economy” chaired by the
Minister of Finance.

17

July 2012: Prime
Minister’s Resolution
No. 929/QD-TTg on
“Program on
Restructuring Stateowned Enterprises with
emphasis on State
Economic Groups and
General Corporation in
the period 2011-2015”

The Resolution identifies areas in
which the government retains
different proportion of ownership:
100%, over 75%, from 60-75%, and
from 50-65%. SOEs operating in the
rest of economic areas will be
equitized. The Prime Minister also
urged completing the regulatory
framework in managing the SOEs.

18

November 2012:
Government Decree
No.99/ND-CP on
Dividing and Delegating
Rights, Responsibilities,
and Missions of the State
Ownership in SOEs and
State Investments in
Enterprises

The Decree is to clarify the roles
and responsibilities of different
public authorities in the state
management over the SOE sector
and to delegate some power from
the central government of the line
minstries and provincial authorities

Policy implication
The Minister reaffirmed the
critical role of SOEs as the
macroeconomic monitoring
tools and to the primary agents
for ensuring the welfare of the
state. Moreover, restructuring
is not to curtail the role of
SOEs but to consolidate their
functions and missions as the
cornerstone of the socialistoriented economy.
Restructuring should include
both adjustments in the policy
framework and improvement
in internal management within
the individual enterprise.
This is the most updated and
key document of the
Government that demonstrated
the key policy images and
political values of the Party
and Government related to the
role of state economic sector.
Yet, it reveals that the state still
wants to retain the control over
most of the important business
areas.
The Decree continues to
confirm the will of the state to
invest in key business areas of
the economy in order for the
state economic sector to
maintain the leading role and
for the state to monitor the
economy.

2. Case analysis: explaining the lack of radical change in state-owned
enterprise management policy of Vietnam
This section will take a deeper look at the policy process in the state economic
sector over the past decades and explain the final policy outcomes produced recently
in this sector. I am using the policy factors and arguments embedded in my major
policy change model in Chapter III to guide the policy analysis. Specifically, I will
employ the concepts of stressor, leadership predisposition, policy image to elucidate
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the policy process and outcomes in the policy areas of Vietnam. The main goal is to
explain why radical change has not been made even after the recent scandals and
mounting evidence of bad performance of the SOEs, especially the state general
corporations and the state economic groups. My argument is that the Vietnamese
Communist Party and government have not changed their policy image in terms of the
central role of the state economic sector within the national economy. This policy
image assumed that there was no conflict between a large and dominated state
economic sector and the operation and development of a market-oriented economy in
Vietnam. As the results, over the past years, although Vietnam regime has felt the
stressors and expressed the predisposition to reform the state economic sector, only
incremental policy changes have been made instead of radical and innovative reforms.

Increasing stressors for reforms in state economic sector
In a span of five years, between 2003 and 2008, Vietnam’s GDP more than
doubled from US$40 billion to US$90 billion, and its exports more than tripled from
US$20 billion to US$63 billion (The Vietnam Consultative Group Meeting, 2011).
During this time, Vietnam also became a member of the WTO, which triggered an
unprecedented inflow of foreign direct investment; mounting to 72 registered billion
USD in 2007. Domestically, this period coincided with the establishment of state
economic groups (SEGs), a loose alliance of SOEs with similar business interests,
which were expected as the strategy for Vietnam to cope with increasing international
competitions when Vietnam accelerated it international economic integration. This
period also saw booming total social investments, a thriving stock market, escalating
real estate prices and rising prosperity throughout all sectors of the economy. It is,
therefore, easy to overlook the fact that this period also coincided with declining
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contribution of productivity to growth, increased macroeconomic instability,
fragmented development and the inability of public institutions to keep pace with a
rapidly globalizing economy (The Vietnam Consultative Group Meeting, 2011).
Indeed, over the period from 2008 to 2011, Vietnam had one of the highest
inflation rates in Asia, averaging nearly 16 percent a year. Along with high inflation,
Vietnam was coping with persistent pressure on its currency, falling levels of foreign
exchange reserves, an underperforming stock market, and high domestic capital flight.
Vietnam was an exception to the broader trend of the rest of the emerging markets in
Asia with appreciating currencies, rising foreign exchange reserves, and increasing
capital inflow (National Assembly of Vietnam, 2012). Affected by the World
Economic Crisis, since 2008, Vietnam’s economic growth has continuously slowed
down. The average GDP growth of the period 2006-2010 was only 7.0% compared to
the target of 7.5-8.0% (National Assembly of Vietnam, 2012). The growth rate
declined under 6% in 2009 and 2011, and 5.2 % in 2012 - the lowest level since 2000.
The serious slowing of the entire economy and the poor economic
performance of the state economic sector over the past few years have led to a
macroeconomic report in June 2012: From economic instability to the restructuring

path, produced by the Economic Committee of the National Assembly with the
support of the International Economic Policy Consultative Group. The report strongly
emphasized the low quality of the economic growth of Vietnam. Specifically, from
1991-1995, with a total social investment/GDP rate of 28.2%, the economy reached
an average annual growth rate of 8.2% while from the 2006-2010, with the rate of
42.7%, the average growth was just 6.9%; the numbers for 2011 were 34.6% and
5.9%. In the period from 1990-2000, the contribution of capital to GDP was 34 %
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while in the proceeding ten years; this rate was 53%, reaching the highest level in the
Asian region. The contribution of the total factor productivity (TFP) to the economic
growth in the period from 2000-2008 was only 26% (much lower than China, India
and other Southeast Asian countries) compared to 44% of the period 1990-2000.
In addition, Vietnam’s competitiveness been threatened because power
generation has not kept pace with demand, logistical costs and real estate prices have
climbed, and skilled worker shortages have become more widespread (National
Assembly of Vietnam, 2012). The country has to face many new social challenges
including: poverty is becoming concentrated among ethnic minorities, rural-urban
disparity is growing, land disputes and complaints are increasing and the pace of job
creation is slowing. For example, according to the Vietnam Household Living
Standards Survey 2010 conducted by Vietnamese General Statistical Office (General
Statistic Office of Vietnam, 2010), the gap in monthly average income per capita of
the richest household quintile and the poorest one was 9.2 times, increasing in
comparison to the gap of previous years (8.1 times in 2002, 8.3 times in 2004, 8.4
times in 2006 and 8.9 times in 2008). These social problems, taken together, pose a
serious threat to Vietnam’s medium-term socioeconomic aspirations and the
legitimacy of the Communist Party.
The reviewed negative signals of Vietnam macroeconomic situation over the
past few years along with the low performance and inefficiency of the state economic
sector summarized in the previous section have put fierce pressures on the Party and
government for policy reforms in this state economic sector. The stressors have been
revealed in a number of directives and legal documents of all levels of the regime
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from the Politburo, Party Central Committee, National Assembly, Central
Government, and the Ministry of Finance.
One of the first such efforts to reinforce reforms in SOE sector was undertaken
on November 27, 2009 when the National Assembly issued Resolution No.

42/2009/QH12 on Increasing the Law Enforcement and Policy Implementation in
Management, Resource Usage, Asset Management of SEGs and SGCs. This
resolution strongly emphasized the weaknesses and problems of SOEs and called for
more effective state management and restructuring of the sector. Notably, this
resolution was produced right after an official investigation on the performance of
SEGs and SGCs, which revealed serious problems of the state economic sector.
On July, 26, 2010, the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam produced
a special Conclusion No 78 - KL/TW reiterated the demand for reforms in SOE sector
and reinforced the previous resolutions of the CPV, including the Resolution on SOEs

of the Third Plenum under the IX (2001) and the Socio-economic Development
Resolution of the X Party Congress (2006). The conclusion admitted problems and
difficulties of SOEs and the need for reforming and restructuring the state economic
sector including “the backward legal framework, low efficiency of SOEs, high level
of debts and insecure financial status, SOG large investments to non-core business
areas, low technology application levels, low productivity, slow reform in internal
enterprise management, low international competitiveness, and misalignment and
misuse of government investments that were intended to promote higher levels of
SOG competitiveness in the global economy” (Communist Party of Vietnam, 2010).
In March 2011, the guiding Conclusion No 2-KL/TW on the Socio-economic

Situation in 2011 identified several strategies to deal with the economic recession,
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including important changes in SOE practices. These changes included the
requirement for “enhanced SOEs restructuring by equitization to SEGs; focusing on
the core business areas of SEGs; not encouraging investment in non-core activities;
clarifying the state ownership in SOEs; promulgation of more regulations to identify
the accountability of individuals and organizations in using state resources”
(Communist Party of Vietnam, 2011). The most recently approved Five-year National

Socio-economic Development Plan 2011-2015 emphasized three areas that need
urgent attention: restructuring of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), improving the
effectiveness of public expenditure and stabilizing the financial sector.
In December 2011, in response to the fierce pressures from the public and
international organizations, the Ministry of Finance organized a conference on
“Restructuring the Economy” chaired by the Minister of Finance. At the conference,
the Minister of Finance, Vuong Dinh Hue, presented a keynote speech on “Solutions

for Restructuring SOEs, with Emphasis on State Economic Groups and General
Corporations”. The Minister publicly admitted the seriously poor performance of
SOEs and the pressures to reform this sector. After this conference, on July, 17, 2012,
the Prime Minister promulgated Resolution No. 929/QD-TTg on “Program on

Restructuring State-owned Enterprises with Emphasis on State Economic Groups and
General Corporation in the period 2011-2015”. Most recently, the 6th Plenum under
the XI Party Congress just finished on October 15, 2012, in response to the pressures
on this sector and to the ongoing economic recession, the Vietnamese Party and
government considered state-owned enterprise management as one of the three urgent
issues of the Plenum.
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The above summary of actions undertake by the Party and government,
coupled with the negative performance indicators of SOEs, clearly demonstrated that
the CPV and government policy elites have recognized and felt the stressors for
reform in the state economic sector. However, since state ownership is not just an
economic issue but also a political choice, major restructuring of SOEs is unlikely
without strong political support. Any restructuring plan would need to be firmly based
on a clear consensus on the role of the state in the economy and the desirable
institutional arrangements to achieve that goal. Thus, in the following section, I will
review the critical Party and government documents involving the debate over the
political role of SOEs in achieving the larger goals of the regime.

Strong leadership predisposition to reform in state economic sector
The leadership predisposition of the Vietnamese Party and government to
restructure and reform the state economic sector can be traced back to the early 1990s
when Vietnam started its economic reforms and international integration. In all of the
resolutions, political reports, and five-year socio-economic plans issued at the VII,
VIII, IX, X and XI National Party Congress, the Communist Party of Vietnam had
mentioned the need to restructure the state economic sector. The goal was to equitize
small and inefficient firms, to increase the performance of the SOEs, and consolidate
the role of state economic sector in the national economy. This was deemed necessary
in order to ensure a successful integration of the SOEs in the market-oriented
economy especially when Vietnam accepted deeper trade liberalization since 2001. In
August 2001, the Third Plenum of the Party Central Committee under the IX National
Party Congress produced a special resolution guiding the development strategies and
principles for state management of the state economic sector and the special role that
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SOEs would play in leading the national economy. This is the first special document
of the CPV to emphasize the weaknesses of the SOEs and the predisposition to
renovation in state management and restructuring of this sector. Notably, this
resolution was promulgated right after Vietnam signed the Bilateral Trade Agreement
with the U.S. in 2000 and accelerated the negotiation to join the World Trade
Organization since 2002.
Since 2009, the weak performance of the economy after the 2008 worldwide
economic crisis coupled with poor performance, inefficiency and scandals in the
operation of some SOEs created stronger pressures for the government to initiate
reforms. The leadership demonstrated a stronger predisposition to respond to these
pressures in a great number of directives and legal documents at all levels of the
regime from the Party Central Committee, the National Assembly, the government,
and its ministries.
On November 27, 2009, the National Assembly issued an alerting document:

Resolution No. 42/2009/QH12 on Increasing the Law Enforcement and Policy
Implementation in Management, Resource Usage, Asset Management of SEGs and
State General Corporation. Earlier, a special Committee of the National Assembly
had conducted an investigation on the economic performance of state general
corporations and economic groups. Based on the results of the investigation, this
resolution urged the government to implement a number solutions including:
adjusting and completing the regulatory framework in the SOE sector; separating the
ownership rights of the state and the administrative rights of the individual
enterprises; continuing to evaluate the models of state general corporations and
economic groups for important adjustments and reforms; accelerating the equitization
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process including the second tier companies within the state economic groups; and
improve internal management within the SOEs (National Assembly of Vietnam,
2009).
On July 26, 2010, the Politburo produced a special Conclusion No. 78 -

KL/TW on the Implementation of the Resolution of the Third Plenum at the Ninth
Party Congress regarding reorganization, reform, and development of the SOEs. The
conclusion continued to confirm the predisposition of the CPV to accelerate
equitization and restructuring; improve the efficiency and the role of SOEs in the
operation of the economy; and push for a breakthrough change in the near future
(Communist Party of Vietnam, 2010). Again, the conclusion reiterated the demand for
a completed legal framework, comprehensive auditing reports on the performance of
SOEs, and acceleration of equitization.
In the following months, the Five-year Socio-economic Development Plan and
the Conclusion No. 2-KL/TW on the Socio-economic Situation in 2011 called for
“restructuring of SOEs by equitization to SEGs; focusing on the core business areas
of SEGs; not encouraging investment in non-core activities; clarifying the state
ownership in SOEs; and promulgating more regulations to identify the accountability
of individuals and organizations in using state resources” (Communist Party of
Vietnam, 2011). Among the three areas identified for urgent attention in the five-year
socio-economic plan was restructuring of the state-owned enterprises.
Guiding by the Party, the Prime Minister issued a series of directives and
decrees in 2011, in response to the pressures and criticisms of bad economic
performance, especially in the state economic sector. On February 24, 2011,

Government’s Resolution No. 11/NQ-CP focused on the need to curtail the inflation
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rate, stabilize the macro economy, and ensure social welfare. Among the solutions, it
mentioned the need to cut back on unnecessary investments of SOEs and restructuring
low performing SOEs to save state budget. In March 13, 2011, Prime Minister’s

Decision on Standards to Classify the SOEs was produced to help the government
classify different types of SOEs. This classification provided the basis for
restructuring the state economic sector. On July 18, 2011, the Government Decree No.

59/2011/Nð-CP directed the transformation of some 100% state-owned enterprises
into joint-stock companies.
In 2011, the Government charged the Ministry of Finance with the
responsibility to build a Comprehensive Program on Restructuring the State-owned

Enterprise Sector. Since then, conferences, hearings at the National Assembly and
deliberations within the Party, government, and National Assembly agencies and
committees have been conducted to seek ideas and consensus on the restructuring
program. As a result of this process, on July, 17, 2012, the Prime Minister
promulgated Resolution No. 929/QD-TTg on “Program on Restructuring State-owned

Enterprises with emphasis on State Economic Groups and General Corporation in the
period 2011-2015” and the Government Decree No.99/ND-CP on Dividing and
Delegating Rights, Responsibilities, and Missions of the State Ownership in SOEs and
State Investments in Enterprises in November 2012. These are the most updated and
important document that clearly showcases the policy image and direction of the Party
and government with respect to the role and management of SOEs.
To summarize, by reviewing the relevant Party and government documents in
the state economic sector, we can discern a strong leadership predisposition to reform
this sector. From the beginning ðổi Mới, the Party and government of Vietnam have
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shown continuous commitment to reform the SOEs. Most recently, in the 6th Plenum
of the XI Party National Congress just finished on October 15, 2012, restructuring
SOEs was of the three focuses of the meeting. Notably, prior to 2010, the idea of
restructuring the state economic sector was more concerned with the problems of low
efficiency and competitiveness of SOEs while over the past two years, the Party and
government have emphasized on the need to ensure the central roles of the SOEs
especially those of SGCs or SEGs. Despite fierce pressures and strong leadership
predisposition to reform, to date, no comprehensive reform and innovative policy has
taken place. To explain this phenomenon, in the following section, I will review the
policy image of the Party and government regarding the role and function of the state
economic sector.

The lack of significant change in policy image prohibits adoption of radical
policy change
There is considerable evidence over the last 25 years following ðổi Mới that
the Vietnamese Communist Party and government have continuously considered the
state-owned enterprise sector as the dominant economic and political pillar of the
regime. This is congruent with the fact that the Party and government have repeatedly
emphasized the desire to create a market economy that preserves a Socialist
orientation, the so-called “Socialist market-oriented economy”. Since the early 1990s,
along with developing a multi-sectorial ownership structure and moving toward a
market-oriented economy, various resolutions of the CPV have always emphasized
the leading role of the state economic sector. Neo-liberal advocates for free market
economy may see a contradiction between the existence of a large state economic
sector and a market economy, but in Vietnam the two goals were seen to be
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compatible (The Vietnam Consultative Group Meeting, 2011). A reading of the
various resolutions of CPV suggests that its leaders did not necessarily see a conflict
between the existence of a large state economic sector and market rules. Following
are three main reasons for the Vietnamese Party and government’s belief that state
institutions needed to play a central role in the development of the market-oriented
economy and the state needs to develop and control a strong state economic sector.
First, the central role of SEGs and SGCs has been justified as a tool for
macroeconomic adjustment and to perform important social functions. For example,
during periods of high inflation, the government has controlled the price of
commodities and services provided by SEGs such as electricity (EVN), petroleum
(Petro Vietnam), and coal (VINACOMIN). It has also instructed SEGs and state
banks to reduce their investment in order to curb excessive demand and inflation rate.
The charter of all parent companies of the SEGs lists a number of welfare and social
responsibilities that have been assigned to them by the state. For example, the
Vietnam Post and Telecommunication Group is responsible for providing telephone
and internet services to isolated and remote areas, thereby facilitating local and
national socioeconomic development. Similarly, Government Decree 101/2009/ND-

CP has set several developmental goals for SEGs, including introducing new and
advanced technologies in the country and facilitating the development of other
industries and sectors of the domestic economy. Thus, by controlling the state
economic sector, especially the SGCs and SEGs, the regime believed that it would be
able to direct the cause of industrialization and modernization while maintaining
Socialist goals and the political control of the CPV.
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Second, the Party and Government would like to emulate Korea and Japan in
developing giant domestic enterprises, which receive intensive support and privileges
from the government to increase their international competitiveness. Starting in 1991,
the Resolution of the VII Party Congress asked to establish General Corporations
(GCs) along with the development of a market-oriented economy and to build some
big enterprise groups in order to attain sufficient prestige and competitiveness in
foreign markets. In 1994, the VIII Party Congress gave clearer direction to
concentrate state economic development resources in essential industries to create the
so-called “iron punch – quả ñấm thép”. These industries included the social and
economic infrastructure; financial, banking, and insurance system; important business
productions and services; and the provision of products and services in the national
defense and security sectors. In 2001, the Resolutions of the Third Plenum of the
Party Central Committee under the IX Party Congress issued instructions for the
establishment of SEGs, by selecting some of the general corporations that are strong
enough to play a more catalytic role.
Especially since 2005, the government’s decision to create state economic
groups (SEGs) seems to have been hastened by its desire to achieve competitiveness
in an increasingly globalized world. When Vietnam was preparing to join the World
Trade Organization, its leaders feared that most domestic companies, including the
SGCs, were too small and weak to withstand competition from foreign competitors.
The government, therefore, moved decisively to establish SEGs and provide them
with privileged access to state resources and autonomy to enable them to compete
with foreign firms. This move was further strengthened by the idea that with a
calibrated industrial policy in which the SEGs play a catalytic role, Vietnam could
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transform itself into a modern and prosperous country. Like Korea, Singapore,
Taiwan, and China, in order for Vietnam to catch up and be competitive, it was
believed that in the absence of a strong private domestic sector, Vietnam needed to
develop strategic industries such as cement, oil, power, steel, telecommunications,
and so forth; and this could be done only by large business groups with enough
resources, capital, and technical capacity under close state control (The Vietnam
Consultative Group Meeting, 2011).
The third reason for the Vietnamese Communist Party and government to
believe in the central role of the SOEs is related to the nature of the state economic
model. Indeed, ruling regime has not recognized the nature problems of state
ownership as the main causes of poor economic performance within the sector.
Leaders stand firms on their views that the problems of SOEs mostly come from the
weaknesses of internal management and leadership within the enterprises. To resolve
these administrative problems, only changes in regulations that increase
accountability, transparency, and abiding rules are required. As the result, the recent
guiding documents mostly focus on producing more regulation for a stricter state
management in the state sector rather than on introducing a policy paradigm shift.
In recent years, however, after a series of scandals along with extremely
negative results of investigations on SOEs, renewed questions have been raised about
the actual role and capacities of SOEs, including state general corporations and
economic groups. As reviewed in the previous sections, reports from Nationals
Assembly and government have to admit that SOEs have taken advantage of weak
oversight and transparency in the system, expanded their operation into areas beyond
their core competency, mismanaged their finances, and concealed information from
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the government, thereby tarnishing the reputation of the entire sector (National
Assembly of Vietnam, 2012). Critics also focused on the cronyism created by strong a
connection between the SOEs and senior public officials. They also identified the
responsibility of the government and the Prime Minister in the bad performance of
SOEs. As a result, the National Assembly in one of its resolutions indicated that
restructuring the SOEs should be a top priority of the government in the Five-year
Socio-Economic Development Plan, spanning from 2011 to 2015. Does this call for a
renewed reexamination of the role of state economic enterprises? Have the Party and
government changed the policy image regarding the political, social and economic
role of these institutions in securing the well being of the regime? In the paragraphs to
follow, I will seek to answer this question.
On November 27, 2009, in response to the negative results of the report on the
performance of SOEs made by the Oversight Committee, the National Assembly
issued the Resolution 42/2009/QH12 on Increasing the Law Enforcement and Policy

Implementation in Management, Resource Usage, Asset Management of SEGs and
State General Corporation. In the Vietnamese state system, the investigations
conducted by the National Assembly have always been considered as the most
independent and objective public sources of information and this case was not an
exception. The resolution urged for a reassessment of the model of state general
corporations and state economic groups to bring about necessary institutional and
policy reforms. Concretely, it pointed to a number of solutions to resolve the
problems and difficulties of state general corporations and economic groups,
including regulatory adjustments, separation between state ownership and institutional
administration, separation between social missions and pure economic activities,
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improvement in internal governance and leadership; and equitization (National
Assembly, 2009). However, the resolution still viewed the state general corporations
and groups as important macroeconomic tools for domestic economy monitoring and
for maintaining competiveness in the global economy.
In the same month of November 2009, the government promulgated Decree

No. 101 on Pilot Establishment of State Economic Groups. The government’s goals in
establishing SEGs were: to concentrate the investments and mobilize resources to
establish large scale firms in key economic areas in order to promote international
competitiveness; to ensure the monitoring roles of the state economic sector within
the whole economy; to promote the use of high-technology; and to create incentives
for the development of other areas and the entire economy (Prime Minister of
Vietnam, 2009). In reality, from 2005 to 2010, the government had started to
accelerate the establishment of SEGs in key economic areas including: Vietnam Post
and Telecommunications, Vietnam National Coal-Mineral Industries, and Vietnam
National Textile and Garment (in 2005); PetroVietnam, Vietnam Electricity, Vietnam
Shipbuilding Industry, Vietnam Rubber (in 2006); and Baoviet (in 2007); Vietnam
National Chemical Group, Industrial Construction (in 2009); and Vietnam Housing
and Urban Development (in 2010).
The establishment of SEGs was to realize the call for restructuring the SOEs
guided by the previous Party’s Resolution in 2001 (Communist Party of Vietnam,
2001). However, in the language of the CPV and its government, the word
“restructuring” – “Tái cơ cấu” – does not mean that the Party will diminish the role of
SOEs. Instead, it is to merge SOEs into the giant corporations and economic groups
while abolishing or equitizing small and inefficient enterprises. This policy image was
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clearly explained by an elite policy maker, Minister of Finance, Vuong Dinh Hue at a
conference on “Restructuring the Economy” in December, 2011. In his speech on
“Solutions for Restructuring SOEs, with emphasis on State Economic Groups and

General Corporation”, Mr. Hue asserted: “restructuring is not to curtail the role of
SOEs but to consolidate their functions and missions as the cornerstone of the
Socialist-oriented economy” (Vuong, 2011). Accordingly, he said that restructuring
should focus on five activities: (1) classification of economic areas that require
significant state’s ownership; (2) reassessment of the resource distribution within and
among state enterprises; (3) renovation in the institutional governance of SOEs; (4)
identification of an appropriate relationship between government and SOEs; and (5)
establishment of a relevant legal framework.
In the middle of 2010, the giant Shipbuilder Economic Group (Vinashin) was
officially going bankruptcy after it announced its incapacity to pay the debt
amounting to 86,000 billion VND (around 4.3 billion USD). Nonetheless, a number of
important documents of the CPV afterward continued to confirm the Party and
government’s policy image that SOEs needed to be preserved. Indeed, the Special

Conclusion No. 78 - KL/TW of the Politburo on SOEs in July 2010, while admitting
problems with state owned enterprises, concluded that “the Party’s principles on the
key role of SOEs in the national economy are proved to be correct” (Communist Party
of Vietnam, 2010). The conclusion continued to attribute the constraints and problems
of SOEs to the poor performance of the enterprises’ leaders and the limitations of
internal management capacity rather than blaming the ownership nature of SOEs. It
also encouraged the development of the State Capital and Investment Corporations to
facilitate restructuring SOEs and consolidate the role of the state in key economic
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areas. In 2011, the Socio-economic Development Plan 2011-2020, promulgated by
the CPV as the guidelines for the development of the whole country in the long run,
continued to affirm the need for the state economic sector to “play a central role as the
important material force for the state to direct and monitor the economy, contributing
the macroeconomic stability” (Communist Party of Vietnam, 2011).
At the government level, in 2011, the Prime Minister has taken several steps to
respond to the fierce pressures from the public and international community to
improve the performance of state owned enterprises. Following the Decision on

Standards to Classify the SOEs, in March 13, 2011, the Government Decree No.
59/2011/Nð-CP was issued to direct the transformation of certain 100% state-owned
enterprises into joint stock ones. The documents guide the process and procedures to
transform some SOEs into joint-stock companies with multiple types of ownership in
order to increase efficiency and performance. However, these documents did not
provide radical changes in the assumed view that state owned enterprises are essential
to the well being of the economy and the state. Instead, they only aim at consolidating
the role of the state in key economic areas and to strengthen their performance. The
government only wants to equitize SOEs whose business activities are key economic
areas based on the state’s definition.
In the same direction of change, most recently, on July, 17, 2012, the Prime
Minister issued the Resolution No. 929/QD-TTg on “Program on Restructuring State-

owned Enterprises with emphasis on State Economic Groups and General
Corporations in the period 2011-2015”. The resolution identifies areas in which the
government retains 100%, over 75%, from 60-75%, from 50-65% of the total
enterprise’s charter capital. The other types of SOEs will be equitized. Table 12
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describes ideas of government in restructuring the state economic sector. Following
guidelines of the Party produced at the 6th Plenum of the XI Party National Congress
in October 2012, the government promulgated Decree No. 99/ND-CP on Dividing
and Delegating State Ownership Rights and Responsibilities in SOEs and State
Investments in November 2012. The decree is to clarify the roles and responsibilities
of different public authorities in the state management over the SOE sector and to
delegate some power from the central government of the line ministries and provincial
authorities. The decree continues to confirm the will of the state to invest in key
business areas of the economy in order for the state economic sector to maintain the
leading role and for the state to monitor the economy.
Table 12: Categorization of state-owned enterprises based on Prime Minister’s
Resolution No. 929
Type of
enterprises
1

Percentage of charter
capital charter retained by
the state
100%

2

75 to 100%

3

65-75%

4

50-65%

Business areas or activities

National defense, security, publishing; irrigation,
transportation security, lottery, electricity production at
a large scale and important to national security and
defense, infrastructure development and management in
the railroad sector and urban development sectors,
airport, sea ports, and currency printing.
Natural resource exploitation and process;
telecommunication service provision
Chemical and fertilizer productions, agriculture product
trading, pharmacy trading, financing and banking,
insurance, water process and delivery, urban
development in big cities, agriculture seeding
production, vaccine production, road system
management and repair, see port management and
exploitation, electricity production at large scale,
railway and airway development
Based on the circumstance and market place

In addition to the reviewed official documents, the policy beliefs and images
of the Vietnamese Party and government regarding the role and function of SOEs
have also been expressed in the policy statements and interviews of the policy elites.
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On May 21, 2012, the Minister of Planning and Investment presented at a National
Assembly meeting a Master Plan on Restructuring the Entire Economy. Among the
targets of economic restructuring was the state economic sector. The declared goal of
restructuring was to change the administrative and resource distribution mechanism,
to improve the efficiency and competitiveness of SOEs, especially the general
corporations and economic groups, in order for them play a better role and to perform
more efficiently and effectively within the national economy. In order to restructure
the state economic sector, the Master Plan focused on (1) reassessing the roles and
functions of SOEs in order to classify and categorize different types of SOEs; (2)
renovating administrative governance within the individual enterprises; (3) imposing
market and state rules on the operation of SOEs and (4) introducing more competition
into the state economic sectors (Bui V. Q., 2012).
In addition to the beliefs in the central role of SOEs, the policy elites have not
seen the nature of state ownership as the key reason for the low performance of the
state economic sector. For example, in a hearing focusing on the poor performance of
SOEs in front of the National Assembly on June 15, 2012, Deputy Prime Minister,
Nguyễn Xuân Phúc, cited a report produced by the State Bank of Vietnam which
concluded that the debt and loss rate of the state general corporations and economic
groups are not high and not the reason for the existing high percentage of bad loans of
the banking system. The Deputy Prime Minister referred to the lack of administrative
regulations and oversights over the SOEs, along with incompetent leadership of some
SOEs, as the main reasons for the low performance. Instead of looking at the
ownership nature of the SOEs, he argued for more transparency and oversight as the
way to improve the performance of the SOEs (Nguyen X. P., 2012). Another example
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is Nguyễn ðức Kiên, Deputy Chair of National Assembly’s Economic Committee. At
a press conference organized by the General Accounting Office on July 19, 2012, in
his report on the performance of SOEs, Mr. Kien while recognizing the low
performance of some SOEs highlighted the achievements and efforts of the SOEs in
the past few years in the midst of the world financial crisis. He attributed the ongoing
worldwide financial crisis as the main reason for the difficulties of the SOEs
including Vinalines Group as a victim of the crisis.
To summarize, over the past two decades, the regime of Vietnam repeatedly
emphasizes the need for restructuring the state economic sector to make the SOEs
more efficient and effective. In fact, the Party and government of Vietnam have
accepted a number of incremental changes over the past few years, including the
issuance of the legal framework for equitization including Decree No. 59, Decision
No. 929, and Decree No 99. However, similar to the case of higher education, the
state-owned enterprises policy case has not seen any significant change in the policy
image of the Party and government regarding the role and function of the SOEs. The
Party and government stand firm on their perception on the central roles of the state
economic sector especially the SEGs and SGCs as the leading forces of the national
economy. The state continues to consider SOEs as effective and necessary
macroeconomic instruments for the state to monitor the economy and to ensure the
social welfare system.
Even after the recent scandals related to the SEGs and SGCs, the regime does
not see any conflict between the existence of a large state economic sector and the
development of a market-oriented economy and deeper international economic
integration to the world economy. According to this view, all economic sectors can
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develop together and contribute the socio-economic development of the country.
Also, the regime has not perceived the nature problem of the state-owned enterprises
operating in a market economy. Instead, leaders have continued to attribute the
weaknesses and problems of enterprise governance and of internal management as the
key reasons for low performance. As the result, the main solution to the state
economic sector is not to resize this sector or to focus on the areas where the market
fails. Instead, policy changes have focused on providing a stricter state oversight over
the enterprises and improvement in enterprise operation and management. Due to the
lack of significant change in the policy image of the Party and government in this
policy area, no innovative policy change initiative has been advanced and discussed
within the regime. Therefore, we do not need to examine the forth policy factor of the
proposed policy change model as the case of international trade reform in Chapter VI.

3. Conclusion on the relevance of the proposed Policy Model to the case
Vietnam has traditionally chosen a step-by-step or gradualist approach to
reform rather than initiating “big bang” solutions to address its socio-economic
problems. This approach is unlikely to change when it comes to reforming the SOEs,
especially given the superior status granted to the state economic sector under the
Socialist legacy of the regime. The CPV defined the “Socialism-oriented” economy as
a multi-sectorial economy, operating under the market rules and led by the state
(Communist Party of Vietnam, 2001). By employing the policy factors and causal
flow of the proposed major policy change model for Vietnam, we can understand why
reaching a comprehensive reform in the state economic sector will be difficult and
take considerable time.
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Over the process of ðổi Mới, the Communist Party of Vietnam and its
government have been aware of the need to improve the performance of the state
economic sector. However, the lack of significant change in the policy image on this
sector is the impediment for a radical and innovative policy change. Concretely, the
Party and government of Vietnam have not changed their policy images on the roles
and functions of the state economic sector in several aspects. First, the Party and
government have continued to consider SOEs the cornerstone of national economic
development, providing the state with effective macroeconomic instrument. The
ruling regime still believes that without a large scale and strong state economic sector,
the state cannot retain control over the industrialization process of the country to
ensure that the market serves the Socialist-oriented goals. Second, the policy elites
continue to attribute the origin of the problems of SOEs to the weaknesses of internal
administration and leadership within individual enterprises instead of the problematic
nature of state ownership. Thus, incremental internal governance policy changes such
as a more transparent and stricter legal framework can help deal with immoral and
corrupt enterprise executives and promote the health of SOEs. Third, the Vietnamese
Party and government still have not recognized any fundamental conflict between a
large scale and strong state enterprise sector and a market economy. The regime
believes that on the one hand the state can consolidate the state economic sector while
at the same time promoting the development of the private sectors. Fourth, the
government continues to reaffirm that the critical roles of the SOEs are to maintain
the legacy of a socialist government by providing essential state welfare services. By
controlling essential consumer products and public services, the state can ensure
social equality and support to the poor and disadvantaged people.
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Similar to the case of higher education policy, the legacy of the Socialist state
prohibited the formulation of innovative policy change initiative in state-owned
enterprise reform even when Vietnam has adopted many radical changes in other
policy areas during ðổi Mới. The CPV continues to consider SOEs, especially state
general corporations and economic groups as the instruments and resources for the
Party to direct the Socialist market-oriented economy. This view is congruent with
Marxist and Leninist ideology that the social class, which controls the means of
production will be able to control politics and to lead the society. All of the above
policy beliefs and political judgments have dominated the fact that SOEs have been
much less efficient and effective compared to other sectors. Thus, the evidence in this
case study proves proposition 4 of the policy model that political judgments can
override efficient concerns in the policy-making process in Vietnam. In order to pave
the way for a radical policy change in state management of the state economic sector
in the future, the Party and government of Vietnam must first change their policy
images and beliefs about the effectiveness and the roles of the state economic sector.
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Chapter VIII: A Radical Legal Change in Foreign Investment in
Response to the Stressors from WTO Accession

In 2005, the Vietnamese government accepted a great deal of legal reforms
with the goal of establishing a favorable business environment for all types of
enterprises doing business in Vietnam. An important question posed by these reforms
is why they occurred so quickly and easily compared to the slow and relative absence
of major policy change with respect to state-owned enterprise policy discussed in the
previous chapter. At the surface, some may see a divergence between these swift
radical reforms and the tradition of “gradualism” in policy reform in Vietnam. In this
case study, I hope to provide the evidence to answers to this question which in turn
can help shed light to the policy process of Vietnam as well as to validate the major
policy change model proposed in Chapter III.
Since the main goal of the case studies in this dissertation is to validate the
explanatory capacities of the proposal policy model, I am selecting the legal reform in
the areas of foreign investment represented by the integrative Investment Law
adopted in 2005 as subject of analysis. In addition, I will narrow down the analysis to
the process in which the Vietnamese government step by step created an equal
playing field for enterprises of all economic sectors including the foreign-owned
enterprises. By examining the changing process in creating a favorable environment
and equal legal status for the foreign invested enterprise sector, I hope to shed light on
the role of policy factors to the policy process and its outcomes in this policy domain
since ðổi Mới in 1986.
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The Investment Law was promulgated in 2005 to replace the Domestic
Investment Promotion Law of 1998, the Foreign Direct Investment Law of 2000 and
the investment provisions of the Enterprise Law of 1999 and of the Law on Stateowned Enterprises of 2003. Generally, the new Law created an integrative legal
framework for all kinds of investment activities in Vietnam. The expressed purpose of
the law was to remove all forms of legal discrimination between public, private and
foreign-owned enterprises and to recognize equal rights and obligations of all types of
enterprises, regardless ownership. The law provided for greater autonomy and
incentives for foreign-owned enterprises doing business within the territory of
Vietnam.
I will organize my analysis in this case into three parts. In the first part, I will
review the macroeconomic performance of Vietnam during the years prior to the
adoption of the integrative Investment Law of 2005. This section will provide the
reader with an understanding of the background for my analysis of the policy change
process in the second section of this chapter. In the second section, I will employ the
key policy factors embedded in the major policy change model for Vietnam to explain
why the Vietnamese government decided to adopt the Investment Law of 2005 in a
quick and decisive way after a decade and half of incremental changes. My main
argument is that due to the pressures to meet the requirements for WTO accession, the
government finally promulgated the Investment Law along with other legal reforms
such as the integrative Enterprise Law. In the last section, some conclusions on the
applicability of the proposed major policy change model for Vietnam will be drawn.
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1. Vietnam economic performance prior to 2005 and key legal changes in the
area of foreign investment in Vietnam
The two years of 2004 and 2005 witnessed strong recovery and very positive
indicators of the Vietnamese economy after a period of downturn and recession since
the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. Continuing the trend toward deeper integration
into the global economy gradually helped Vietnam to regain the growth momentum of
the first half of the last decade. Real GDP growth in 2005 rose to 8.4 percent per year,
the highest rate since 1997, making the GDP per capita of US$630, more than four
times the US$146 GDP rate in 1990 (Chu & Dickie, 2006; Luong, 2006). The total
value of exports of goods and services increased by 23 percent a year, reaching the
level of US$36.5 billion in 2005, compared to US$0.9 billion in 1986. Foreign direct
investment (FDI) grew continuously with increases in both commitments and
disbursements. Investments totaled almost $6 billion of registered capital in 2005,
reaching its highest level since 1997 (Luong, 2006).
Private sector investment continued to expand rapidly in response to an
increasingly favorable business environment in the aftermath of the Enterprise Law of
1999. About 40,000 new enterprises were registered in 2005, representing a year-onyear increase of 9 percent in number and 45 percent in registered capital (Chu &
Dickie, 2006). The real GDP originating from the industrial sector increased by 10.7
percent among which the manufacturing subsector rose more rapidly at 13.0 percent.
Services sector growth increased to a record of 8.5 percent in 2005, which was the
first time the sector had grown higher than the overall GDP growth (Chu & Dickie,
2006). Although the agriculture sector in 2005 was adversely impacted by drought, a
typhoon and the resurgence of avian flu, resulting in a loss of about 0.7 percent of
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GDP, spurred by rising international prices of agricultural products, the sector
managed to overcome these difficulties to register a four percent growth in value (Chu
& Dickie, 2006).
The strong economic growth rate had fiscal consequences for Vietnam in the
years preceding the passage of the 2005 Investment Law. Driven by rising food and
fuel prices and facilitated by an accommodative monetary policy, the inflation rate
increased to 9.6% in 2004 and 8.4% in 2005 (Luong, 2006). However, the inflation
rate was under the control of the government. The government’s policy of stimulating
the economy through increased governmental spending accounted for an annual
budget deficit of between 4% and 5% of gross domestic product (GDP) since 2001
(Luong, 2006). But this rate was still acceptable. By 2004, total external debt only
amounted to US$15.5 billion, just over 34 percent of GDP and 52 percent of the total
exports of goods and services (Chu & Dickie, 2006). A large proportion of the debt
remained on concessional terms (just under US$3 billion had been contracted by the
private sector).
The rapid economic growth of the economy was accompanied by a sharp
reduction in poverty. According to the poverty standards of the Vietnamese
government, the poverty rate declined substantially from 58 percent in 1993 to 19.5
percent in 2004 (Chu & Dickie, 2006). As a consequence, the World Bank, IMF,
Asian Development Bank and other international institutions praised Vietnam for its
successes in poverty reduction and alleviation (cited in Meyer, Tran, & Nguyen,
2005). Key human development indicators for education and health, such as life
expectancy, also improved significantly during this period.
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The economic performance prior to the passage of the 2005 Investment Law
was positive and Vietnam seemed to enjoy a strong recovery from the Asian Financial
Crisis in the period from 2002-2005. Under these circumstances, some may think that
the Vietnamese government would not be pressed for further economic reforms.
However, when we look at the governance agenda of Vietnam in 2005, a great deal of
legal reforms were discussed and hastily adopted. Many kinds of law, which had been
only incrementally revised in previous years were quickly and dramatically changed
by the government in a short period of time. The following section will review in
detail the changing legal environment, especially in the policies that established the
equal status for different types of enterprises operating in the various sectors of the
economy.

2. Policy process in setting the equal legal status for all types of enterprises
One cannot fully understand the legal changes made in 2005 without putting it
in the larger context of policy changes initiated by ðổi Mới in 1986. The first phase of

ðổi Mới was characterized by the recognition of a market-oriented and multi-sectorial
economy. The CPV and government recognized private ownership as an integrative
component of the economy, accepted trade liberalization and encouraged foreign
investment. A major goal of ðổi Mới was to loosen the restrictions on private firms
and attract significant external resources from other countries to foster
industrialization. The results of economic development since ðổi Mới have raised the
people’s living standards and modernize the country, which in turn was thought
important for ensuring the political stability and leadership by the CPV.
The changes in the mindset initiated by ðổi Mới spawned a great deal of
progressive changes in Vietnam’s legal framework. For example, during the period
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1987-1996, a new constitution was adopted (in 1992) and over 100 laws, including a
Civil Code, were enacted (Ministry of Industry and Trade of Vietnam, 2003). The first
cornerstone of the legal framework for the new market economy was the Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) Law promulgated in December 1987. The FDI was
welcomed in all economic sectors and for the first time the law permitted 100 percent
foreign ownership companies operating in Vietnam; generous tax and duty
exemptions were provided, and unrestricted repatriation of capital was guaranteed
(Chu & Dickie, 2006). This FDI legislation was very progressive for its time. It
served over the years to attract new investments, provide international market access
for export-led development and stimulate infrastructure development in Vietnam by
the infusion of significant investments of foreign capital. In 1992, the Law was
amended, granting foreign investors more incentives and benefits such as allowing
more forms of investment, longer land use terms, and tax reductions (Vu H. T., 2010).
The second significant legal reform was the introduction of the Private
Enterprises Law and the Law on Companies in 1990. Through these laws, the
Vietnamese Party and government officially recognized the importance of the private
economic sector and set the regulatory framework for the establishment and operation
of businesses in this sector. Regarding international trade, according to the 1990 laws,
private enterprises which satisfied a number of conditions and obtained an import
license from the respective authority were allowed to engage in import–export
activities. However, due to the complication of the licensing procedure, only a small
number of private enterprises were licensed to engage in direct import–export
activities.
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In the years following the passage of the 1990 laws, the government continued
to revise the initial legal frameworks to create a freer business environment and to
integrate deeper into the world economy. The Foreign Direct Investment Law of 1987
was revised two times in 1990 and 1992 and then replaced by the new Foreign Direct
Investment Law in 1996. Vietnam joined the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in
1995 and started negotiation with the United States for the Bilateral Trade Agreement
in the same year. Also, in 1995, Vietnam initiated WTO accession and planned to join
this organization in 2005. In order to legalize the establishment and management of
state-owned enterprises, which were previously regulated only by decrees and
directives of the government, in 1995, Vietnam promulgated the Law on State
Enterprises. According to this law, state-owned enterprises were to be organized and
managed by different models compared to companies operating in the private sector.
In response to fierce competition from the countries in the region after the
Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the Vietnamese government leaders were pushed to
accept the second phase of legal reforms by creating more favorable conditions for
FDI by the revision of the 1996 Foreign Direct Investment in 2000. The import-export
license was abolished by Decree No. 57/1998/ND-CP in 1998 and the 1999
Enterprises Law, which stipulated that all registered enterprises were allowed to
engage in international trade. The integrative Enterprise Law replaced the 1990
Private Enterprise Law and the Law on Companies. In 2003, the government also
revised the Law on State-Owned Enterprises, first promulgated in 1995.
Despite significant legal changes in the 1990s, the various economic legal
frameworks in Vietnam were still suffered serious limitations and inequities,
especially between the state-owned enterprises and their non-public counterparts as
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well as between domestic and foreign firms. For instance, foreign investment
activities were viewed with suspicion by the Vietnamese government, which was
reflected in onerous licensing requirements, restrictions on hiring local attorneys and
legal advice to international law, and, occasionally, interfering with such basic aspects
as renting office space and obtaining telephone lines (Ministry of Industry and Trade
of Vietnam, 2003). Mergers and acquisitions involving foreign companies were still
very limited. For example, a foreign investor was prohibited from buying more than
30% of shares of equitized SOEs even in SOEs of the same industries where foreign
investors could fully own an enterprise. Joint ventures with domestic private
companies required a special licensing procedure that was much more time
consuming and more difficult than the licensing procedures for a wholly owned
domestic company. Distribution rights were restricted and a required percentage of
locally produced parts was imposed on manufacturing firms despite the limited
development of domestic suppliers. A number of industries and markets were not yet
open to foreign investors. While the 1987 Foreign Investment Law was considered
progressive for its time, by the beginning of the new millennium the law was no
longer competitive compared to other regional investment laws (Le D. D., 2002).
In addition to a constraining legal framework, the high costs of doing business
in Vietnam served as an additional barrier to foreign investors. For example, the high
cost of international telephone calls, Internet fees, and seaports compared to other
regional countries was a disincentive to foreign investors ( (Le D. D., 2002). Notably,
Vietnam still had a dual price system for foreign investors in place into the 21st
century and applied separate laws to foreign investors from those it applied to
domestic investors. For example, corporate tax rates and personal income tax rates
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(50% of the gross income) for foreign-owned enterprises were well above the regional
average (Le D. D., 2002).
At the beginning of the new 21st century, competitive pressure on the global
front, coupled with domestic pressure to attract more foreign investment, forced the
Vietnamese government to consider abolishing its discriminatory treatment of
domestic and foreign enterprises and of the rules governing the operation of
businesses in the different sectors of the economy. The pressure was reinforced by the
commitments that Vietnam made under international agreements, in particular the
Vietnam-US Bilateral Trade Agreement coming into effect in 2002, the ASEAN Free
Trade Area (AFTA) agreement by 2006 and the WTO agreement in 2005. Together,
these agreements required Vietnam to demonstrate a strong commitment to alter its
domestic legal framework in order to operate within the global economic community.
As a result of both internal and external pressure, in November 2005, the new
integrative Law on Enterprises and Investment Law were adopted to harmonize
investment/registration procedures for foreign and domestic enterprises. The
Investment Law replaced the Foreign Investment Law of 1996 and 2000 and the
Domestic Investment Promotion Law of 1998, and parts of the Enterprise Law of
1999 and the Law on State-Owned Enterprise of 2003. Under the new law, foreign
and domestic enterprises are treated equally according to the rule of nondiscrimination under WTO (Muller, 2002). The law removed the constraints on
foreign-owned enterprises in importing goods related to their business lines or
specified in their investment certificate, and removed restrictions on importing goods
of the same kind as those produced under the investment license (Pham H. T., 2011).
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The following Table 13 summarizes all of the legal reforms in investment that
were put in place after ðổi Mới in 1987 up until the passage of the 2005 Investment
Law. The consistent pattern of incremental change occurring over this nearly 20 year
period raises the question of why a new comprehensive law was needed and
decisively adopted in 2005.
Table 13: Summary of legal changes in Vietnam’s foreign investment from 1987-2005
No

Name and Date

Major contents of Laws

Policy implication

1

December, 1987:
Foreign Direct
Investment Law
(FDI)

This FDI legislation officially
opened the door for international
economic integration by attracting
foreign investments and accessing
international markets for Vietnam's
export-led development.

2

December, 1990:
Company Law
and Law on
Private
Enterprises

3

April, 1995: Law
on State
Enterprises

4

November, 1996:
New Foreign
Investment Law

These laws are considered as the
first legal documents to recognize
private ownership and guide the
establishment of private companies
including limited, joint-stock and
private models.
This law legalized the establishment
and management of state-owned
enterprises, which were previously
regulated only by decrees and
directives of the government.
Replaced series of laws governing
foreign investment with a new
comprehensive and organic law that
outlined rights and incentives to
foreign investors and companies,
including: the right to assign the
contributed capital to other parties
or to engage in new forms of
investment including BOT (BuildOperate-Transfer), BTO (BuildTransfer-Operate), and BuildTransfer (BT) contracts.

Continuously revised. In 1990 &
1992 more rights and incentives
given to foreign companies. In 1992
a number of articles were added and
amended, allowing FDI to
participate in the construction of
infrastructure facilities, giving the
same tax treatment between jointventures and wholly foreign-owned
enterprises, and longer term of land
use
These laws implemented a paradigm
shift away from a state controlled
economy to a mixed economy of
private and public ownership of the
means of production.

5

June, 1998: Law
on Domestic
Investment

Set a framework to encourage the
domestic investment from the
Vietnamese citizens who inside or
outside Vietnam and foreign people
who live inside Vietnam.
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The law established different
models for establishing and
managing state-owned enterprises.

This law notably retained a number
of restrictions that limited the
control of foreign investors such as
the principle of unanimity in the
board of management and the
requirement to purchase local
products and services.
In 2000 the Law was amended and
modified again to acknowledge the
right of foreign investors to merge
and acquire companies and
branches, and the right to transfer
the form of investment.
The law indicates the existence of
separate legal frameworks for
different economic sectors at the
end of 1999s

6

June 1999:
Enterprise Law

No
7

Name and Date
November, 2003:
Revised Law on
State Enterprise

8

December, 2005:
New Enterprise
Law and New
Investment Law

This law replaced several previous
laws regulating different kinds of
economic enterprises and broadened
the rights and powers of profitoriented companies, both domestic
and foreign-owned.
Major contents of Laws
This law replaced the 1995 Law on
State Enterprise and provided three
models of state-owned enterprises:
state-owned enterprise, state-limited
enterprise, and state joint-stock
enterprise. The two later models
were close to the models of private
companies regulated in the
Enterprise Law of 1999.
The Enterprise Law of 2005 unified
the procedures of establishing and
managing enterprises regardless
ownership. This Law replaced the
Enterprise Law of 1999, the Law on
State-owned Enterprises of 2003,
and parts of the Foreign Investment
Laws of 2000.
The Investment Law of 2005
replaced the Foreign Investment
Law of 2000; the Law on Domestic
Investment Promotion of 1998, and
parts of the Enterprise Law of 1999
and the Law on State-owned
Enterprises of 2003

This law was a critical step in the
process of integrating the legal
framework for business activities in
Vietnam.

Policy implication
This law blurred the boundaries
between state-owned enterprises and
the domestic private ones in terms
the rules governing their
establishment and operation.

These two laws introduced
significant changes to the rules
governing private, state-owned, and
foreign-owned enterprises. It
removed preferential treatment of
state-owned enterprises and put in
place the conditions required for
accession to the WTO.

3. Analysis of the policy change process in establishing equal playing field for
foreign-owned enterprises in Vietnam
This section will look deeper into the policy process to explain why Vietnam
enacted changes to accept an integrative Investment Law in 2005. As mentioned in
my introduction to this chapter, I will only focus on the policy efforts to establish
level playing field for foreign-owned enterprises to be established and operated in
Vietnam. To examine the policy change process, I am going to employ to key
concepts of the proposed major policy change model in Chapter III. As with my
discussion of the policy change process in the case studies presented in previous
chapters, my goal is not to evaluate the policy outcomes. Instead, the goal is to
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understand the role the various policy factors accounting for the initiation,
formulation and adoption of major policy change in the area of foreign investment. I
am interested in understanding why major change occurs in 2005, not earlier or later.

The role of stressors in initiating foreign investment legal reform
As reviewed in section one of this chapter, the macroeconomic situation of
Vietnam in the years preceding the adoption of the 2005 Investment Law was very
positive. The economy had recovered from the downturn caused by the Asian
Financial Crisis. On the surface, there appeared to be a lack of economic stressors that
trigger the major legal reforms adopted in 2005. However, while there may not have
been strong internal economic pressures, there were strong external stressors from the
international economic commitments especially from the application to the WTO.
Indeed, the high economic growth after ðổi Mới was attributed to the strong
growth of export and foreign investment which in turn depended on the level and
depth of Vietnam integration into the world economy. The international integration
process required Vietnam to establish a set of favorable business conditions for
foreign investors and enterprises. Vietnam realized this requirement, which accounts
for the gradual and consistent series of changes that occurred during the 1987-2005
period summarized in table 13. But the changes that occurred over nearly a 20-year
period were not sufficient to meet the criteria for Vietnam’s entry into the WTO. As
the summary makes clear, the incremental changes still left state-owned enterprises
and non-foreign investors with preferential treatment that was inconsistent with
membership in the WTO.
Becoming a member of the WTO, as discussed in Chapter VI, was a high
priority for the Vietnamese Party and government. But this goal could not be achieved
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without making significant additional reforms to harmonize the legal system with the
fundamental principles of international laws. The pressure for legal reforms increased
especially after Vietnam signed the important Bilateral Trade Agreements (BTA) with
the USA, which came into effect from December 2001.
In accordance with this BTA, Vietnam had to commit itself to the following
reforms: (i) to reduce tariffs and eliminate trade barriers to U.S. exports, (ii) to
provide protection and enforcement for U.S. intellectual property rights, (iii) to open
Vietnam’s services market to US companies, and (iv) to create fair and transparent
rules and regulations for U.S. investors (Pham H. T., 2011). The implementation of
the BTA with the U.S. was important itself because it would help attract U.S.
investors and open a largest export market for Vietnam’s products. But more
important, the BTA was a good opportunity for outside observers to test the
willingness of the Vietnamese government to make the reforms needed for admission
into the WTO. As pointed out in my discussion of the BTA with the U.S. in Chapter
VI, after a period of internal intensive debates and deliberation, Vietnam accepted the
Agreement. The BTA marked a period when Vietnam stood firm on deeper economic
reforms, especially when FDI from the U.S. to Vietnam rapidly increased starting in
2002, attracting 209 projects, with the U.S. having the 11th largest foreign investment
in Vietnam in 2004. (Meyer, Tran, & Nguyen, 2005).
To become a member of WTO, economic and legal reforms made by the
candidate nation would become irreversible (Ministry of Industry and Trade of
Vietnam, 2003). From March 1998, WTO members sought clarification on Vietnam’s
policies and institutions not only about its trade policies and practices but also about
the institutional and legal structure of the economy, the degree of privatization and the
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ability of the government to live up to the commitments it makes to the WTO
(Nguyen & Haughton, 2002). Guaranteed by the BTA with the U.S., the WTO started
the final phase of negotiation with Vietnam in April 2002. Earlier, Mike Moore,
President of WTO, on a visit to Vietnam in November 2001, demonstrated support for
helping Vietnam become a member of WTO but emphasized that approval depended
mainly on the effort Vietnam put into making the necessary changes to its policies and
procedures (Nguyen & Haughton, 2002). Thus, undertaking reforms was a
prerequisite for Vietnam WTO membership. Vietnam needed to show its continued
commitment to institutional reform even when it had furthered reforms in response to
the Asian Financial Crisis in the period from 1998 to 2001.
Despite the continuing bilateral and working party negotiations, by 2004 the
focus of implementation had changed from the BTAs that Vietnam had signed with
member countries of WTO to what Vietnam was doing domestically with regard to
enacting national laws, ordinances, and regulations (Ministry of Industry and Trade of
Vietnam, 2003). Accordingly, the Working Party, which was a committee assigned by
the WTO to work with the Vietnamese Negotiation Delegation, insisted that Vietnam
needed to enact essentially all the legislation that the Working Party deemed
necessary for implementing Vietnam's accession obligations before accession was
granted for review, in English translation, by the Working Party (Ministry of Industry
and Trade of Vietnam, 2003). Presumably, this reflected some dissatisfaction with
Vietnam regarding the speed with which it was proceeding to meet WTO expectations
compared to the progress of legal reform made by China before it was admitted to
WTO in November 2001.
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Other domestic pressures reinforced the pressures for legal reforms from the
WTO. According to Le Dang Doanh (2002), despite tangible improvement over the
years after ðổi Mới, especially the Enterprise Law in 1999 and the liberalization of
trade through the BTA with US and other countries, legal regulations in Vietnam were
fast changing and becoming less predictable and less consistent, especially in tax,
foreign exchange, labor regulation, land and jurisdiction. For example, customs
officers in different seaports could apply different tax rates to the same products. As a
result, red tape, bureaucracy, inconsistency and low transparency were contributing to
great uncertainty in the business environment in Vietnam. Law enforcement was not
consistent and uniform in the country and law interpretation and enforcement
depended too much on local agencies or lower ranking state officials.
The external and internal stressors were reflected in the most important Party’s
documents in the early years of the new century. According to the Social-Economic

Development Plan - adopted by the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party
of Vietnam (April 2001), Vietnam wanted to invest US$ 60 billion over the period
from 2000 to 2005 in order to sustain an average growth rate of GDP by 7.5% per
annum (Communist Party of Vietnam, 2001). FDI was expected to contribute US$ 12
billion to the implemented investment. With an implemented rate of 40%, this meant
Vietnam had to attract US$ 30-35 billion of registered FDI during the period 20002005 (Le D. D., 2002). This goal would only be achieved if Vietnam could deepen the
reforms, improve its investment climate, build trust of foreign investors and thus
compete with other regional economies. In addition, foreign direct investment while
better than during the years after the Asian Financial Crisis (from 1997-2001)
remained below levels found in the mid-1990s (Nguyen H. T., 2007).
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The Party’s Special Resolution No 7 on International Economic Integration
issued on November 27, 2001 was another critical guiding document. The resolution
revealed the pressures on Vietnam to push for continuous and deeper economic
integration into the world economy. It asserted that “our business environment has
been significantly improved, however still is being exposed to various weaknesses:
disjointed and unsystematic legal framework, and lack of transparency” (Communist
Party of Vietnam, 2001). The Party seemed to recognize that high economic growth
could be maintained only by continued legal reforms and the existing institutions and
policies in place were not enough. Without improvement in the policy framework,
investments and capital formation would likely slow down (Dollar, 2002).
To summarize, this section has revealed the stressors on the government to
take comprehensive legal reforms to establish an equal playing field for enterprises
regardless their types of ownership. Although there were internal pressures to reform,
the primary pressures were external and driven by Vietnam’s desire to join the WTO.
While stressors were at work, according to the policy change model proposed in
Chapter III, the stressors by themselves do not guarantee an immediate radical policy
change. Other policy factors need to be in place to ensure the final adoption of
innovative policy. One of these factors proposed in the model is the predisposition of
the CPV and its government to pursue reform. The role of this factor will be explored
in the following section.

Leadership predisposition to create an equal legal status for foreign
enterprises
The Vietnamese Party and government had demonstrated its commitments to
create a favorable environment for the foreign investors since the inception of ðổi
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Mới. In 1987, one year after the CPV decided to shift to the market-oriented economy
at the VI National Party Congress, the Law on Foreign Direct Investment was
promulgated. At that time, the Law was considered to be a very progressive document
that would open a door for foreign investments and for international integration of the
domestic economy. This law was then amended two times in 1990 and 1992 and then
replaced by a new Law in 1996, responding to the perceived needs of investors (Le D.
D., 2002). In 1996, the Five -year Socio-economic Development Plan 1996-2000
directly pointed to the intention to access the WTO and other international economic
institutions as a strategy to achieve the goals of the plan. The momentum of reform
had been slowed down from 1996 when there was a lack of consensus within the
Party leadership on the pace of reform.
In the wake of increasing competition for foreign investment among the Asian
countries after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the Vietnamese government pushed
for further reform to provide more incentives for foreign investors. The leadership
predisposition to trade liberalization reform was intensified by the Resolution of the

Fourth Plenum under the VIII National Party Congress 1997 in which the Party urged
for a “proactive and positive attitude to penetrate and expand international market”
and the need to “conduct quick and solid negotiation of the BTA with the U.S, and
participate in APEC and WTO”. One year later, when Vietnam strongly felt the
adverse impacts of the regional crisis, Resolution No.5-NQ/TW on the Socio-economic

Missions of 1999 produced at the 6th Plenum (first round) pointed to the need for
developing integrative policy, institution, and procedure related to the investment
environment and business conditions regarding enterprise establishment, land use,
capital, technology, commodity flow, and tax (Communist Party of Vietnam, 1998).
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Following these resolution, in 1999, the Decision 53 (1999/QD-TTg) of the Prime

Minister reduced some service charges in order to limit the differences between
domestic and foreign investors, which demonstrated the desire to advance towards a
system with one common price for all (Tran G. X., 2000). In 2000, the Foreign
Investment Law of 1996 was revised to give more rights of foreign investors, for
example the rights to merge with and acquire companies and branches, and to transfer
the form of investment.
In August 2001, the government of Vietnam adopted a Resolution on

Indicative Measures to Promote Foreign Direct Investment in the period 2001-2005.
The first priority of the government was a general overhauling of the legal system
according to the international commitments that Vietnam had made in the framework
of the Bilateral Vietnam-US Trade Agreement and AFTA (Le D. D., 2002). Also,
Vietnam publicly expressed its desire to join the WTO by 2005, which required
Vietnam to amend a large number of laws or legal regulations. Among these
important changes was the development of the unified laws governing all types of
enterprises and ownership forms (private, state-owned and foreign-invested
enterprises).
In the same year of 2001, the special Resolution of the Politburo No. 07-

NQ/TW on International Economic Integration asserted that:
“The strategy of international economic integration has been confirmed clearly in various
resolutions of the Party and in reality has been step by step implemented; however, the policy
image in terms of the contents, phases, and pathways for international economic integration
has not been supported by strong consensus. A segment of public officials had not recognized
the opportunities as well as the challenges offered by proactive integration of the economy;
the economic structure was changing slowly which was insufficient to exploit the relative
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advantages of the country. Many policies and mechanisms were slow to change in accordance
with the requirement of international economic integration” (Communist Party of Vietnam,
2001).

Based on this acknowledgement, the resolution called for the creation of “an
integrated economic management mechanism for a Socialist-oriented market
economy, and the creation of a favorable and equal business environment for all
economic sectors”.
In keeping with the commitments of the CPV, the government released a
number of incentives for foreign companies. For example, the corporate income tax
was lowered in comparison with other countries in the region. Beginning in January
2004, the standard rate was 28% and the preferential rates for foreign investment in
some areas ranged from 10% to 20% (Meyer, Tran, & Nguyen, 2005). Foreign
investors could be exempted from import duties on fixed assets, such as machinery,
means of transport, and construction materials that were not produced locally. Further
exemptions were made available for raw materials, spare parts, parts and materials
imported for production of goods for export. Moreover, foreign investors were
permitted to carry their losses forward for up to five years.
In summary, economic liberalization required major reforms in Vietnam's still
highly restrictive regulatory framework, which hindered foreign investment prior to
the passage of the Investment Law of 2005. The Vietnamese Party and government
had shown the predisposition to initiate comprehensive legal reforms, especially after
Vietnam decided to sign the Bilateral Trade Agreement with the U.S. The previous
significant legal changes made in response to the Asian Financial Crisis, including the
Enterprise Law (1999), the Law on Domestic Investment Promotion, the revised Law
on Foreign Direct Investment (2000), and the Law on State-owned Enterprises (2003)
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was not innovative enough to create an equal legal status for enterprises among all
economic sectors. Moreover, the existence of different kinds of laws regulating
different types of enterprises and investments (public, private and foreign) revealed
that there was still legal discrimination among enterprises operating in different
economic sectors. In order to bring about the adoption of an integrative legal
framework that would level the playing field for all kinds of enterprises regardless
ownership, the Party and government had to change their policy image on the role of
foreign-owned sector in the economic development of Vietnam. The following
section examines the changes in policy image of the Vietnamese regime in relation to
the foreign-owned sector.

The significant change in policy image in foreign investment sector
Even though ðổi Mới initiated a series of economic reforms, it was not the
case from the beginning of ðổi Mới that the Vietnamese Party and government
favored a free market that was non-discriminatory to foreign investment. For the
beginning of the reform process initiated by ðổi Mới, the Party and government were
afraid that the uncompetitive state-owned enterprises and new private enterprises
would not be able to compete against foreign enterprises, especially multi-national
corporations. In political terms, the legacy that the leadership carried from the Cold
War was a fear of foreign interference, which in turn influenced the Vietnamese
government's foreign policy. Many senior party members instinctively questioned the
policy of engaging in too much interaction with the outside world (Pierre, 2000).
They felt threatened by the emerging transnational forces and "soft power" of the
twenty-first-century global system. Even after Vietnam decided to sign the BTA with
U.S., the progressive Party’s Resolution No. 07 in 2001 cautioned that “the
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integration plan and phase should be appropriate in relevance to the developmental
level of the domestic economy while meeting the requirement of the international
organizations” and “international economic integration needs to be aligned with the
demand for security and national defense, … [and] be alert for the plot of peaceful
evolution” (Communist Party of Vietnam, 2001).
The fear of losing the control over the economy was the main reason for
continuing with discriminatory policies and practices among various types of
enterprises in the market economy. This fear is reflected in the three different kinds
of laws that separately regulated the investment procedures of state-owned, private
and foreign-owned enterprises (the Law on State-owned Enterprises of 2003, the Law
on Domestic Investment Promotion of 1998, and the Law on Foreign Direct
Investment of 2000, respectively). These laws had been gradually and incrementally
revised to provide more specific legal frameworks for the investment of each type of
enterprise. They narrowed the legal the differences between the economic sectors and
created more favorable environments for private and foreign-invested firms, but they
stopped short of putting all companies and sectors on an equal footing. For this to
occur, the government would need to change its policy image strongly influenced the
legacies of the state-led economy under the Soviet economic model. In the Soviet
model, the state takes full control over the economy and considers private ownership a
deviation from the proper economic management and political values. Under this
model, international economic relationships with foreign countries risked the adverse
impacts of global capitalism on less developed countries that could not compete
successfully in the global capitalist economy (Nguyen D. L., 2010).
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However, with the deeper integration into the world economy and practical
experiences of the process, the Vietnamese Party and government realized the
significant roles of the non-state economic sectors and did not see a necessary conflict
between the existence of both private and public economic systems in the economy.
The increasingly important contribution of the private and FDI sectors to the
economic growth and rising income gradually convinced the government to create an
equal legal status for all types of enterprises. More important, a level playing field
was considered a prerequisite for admission to the WTO, an important status goal of
the Party that stood as a critical incentive to the economic arguments for membership.
The change in policy image was a gradual process that began in earnest with
the signing of the BTA with the U.S. in 2000. In an interview of the same year, Trần
Xuân Giá, Minister of Planning and Investment, publicly admitted the important role
of foreign direct investment to the economic development of Vietnam. By that time,
FDI was providing 28 percent of all investment in Vietnam, which constituted 10
percent of GDP, 32 percent of industrial production and 22 percent of exports (Tran
G. X., 2000). In addition, FDI contributed U.S. $300 million annually to the
government budget and directly created employment for some 300,000 workers. As
Mr. Giá stated, foreign investment in Vietnam had contributed to the development of
new industries, for example, automobile manufacturing, oil and gas exploration,
telecommunications, hotels, and tourism. It also produced some goods that can
replace imported products, for example, steel and cement. In short, foreign investment
had brought new modern technology and advanced management skills into Vietnam,
thus demonstrating that foreign investment not only had financial benefits, but more
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importantly contributed to the long-term social and economic development of the
Vietnam.
The decision to sign the U.S.-Vietnam trade agreement after a year of
hesitation consolidated the predisposition of Vietnam to engage more fully in the
global economy (Pierre, 2000). However, it took about five more years before the
Vietnamese leaders changed their policy images and accepted the radical policy
decision to remove all forms of legal discrimination among the foreign-owned
enterprises and their domestic counterparts. While the change was significantly aided
by the BTA agreement with the U.S., the actual experience of implementing this
agreement provided additional incentive to the Party and government leaders. FDI and
industrial growth resulting from the BTA continued to increase at a high growth rate.
Garments exports experienced a particularly high rate of growth, contributing over
50% of Vietnam’s exports to the USA in value, with further growth expected with
Vietnam’s anticipated membership in the WTO (Ministry of Trade of Vietnam, 2004).
In addition to the importance that FDI played in changing the policy image of
the Party and government leaders, the changing perspective on the role of the private
sector in Vietnam’s economy also contributed to the change in the policy image.
There was significant growth of the private sector in Vietnam, especially after the
Enterprise Law in 1999 was promulgated. This law was a significant step to create an
equal business environment for all types of domestic enterprises by streamlining and
providing a uniform process for domestic business registration. Especially, in 2002, a
special Resolution No. 14 at the Fifth Plenum of the Party Central Committee on

Private Economic Sector strongly called for changes that would create a more
favorable environment and set of conditions for private economic development. This
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resolution recognized that the private economic sector was an important component of
the national economy. Private economic development was viewed by the Party as part
of a “long-term strategy under the development of a multi-sectorial Socialist-oriented
economy, contributing to the success of the key missions of the industrialization and
modernization cause and increasing domestic strengths during the international
integration process” (Communist Party of Vietnam, 2002). Acknowledging the role of
private the sector, the resolution called for the “revision and supplementation of the
Enterprise Law and other existing legal frameworks in order to eliminate
discrimination among economic sectors ensured by an integrative policy on private
economic development of the Party and government”.
To summarize, in order to sustain a high rate of economic growth and to meet
the requirements of the international economic integration, the Party and government
leaders gradually reached consensus that the legal framework of Vietnam needed to
be fundamentally altered. However, the decision to streamline the regulatory
framework by creating a level playing field for both foreign and domestic companies
in all sectors of the economy took place only after there were changes in the policy
image of the Vietnamese Party and government. The change in policy image was
encouraged by the initial positive economic performance in the wake of the BTA with
U.S. And it was then reinforced by the considerations that would come from
becoming a full-fledged member of the global economy by acceptance into the WTO.
In addition, even though the CPV and government still considered state-owned
enterprises as the cornerstone of the economy, they came to believe that private
companies and non-state owned foreign companies were important to the success of
Vietnam’s economic, social and political development.
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While a change in policy image is treated by the policy change model in
Chapter III as a necessary precursor to major policy change, a change in policy image
does not make such change inevitable. This is because the model also considers the
importance of a final factor in the policy change process of Vietnam, namely the
Party’s consensus on political priority at given point of time. This is an issue I will
explore in the next part of this section.

Political priority of CPV in the first years of the 21st century
Vietnam entered the new millenium at a time that was adversely impacted by
the Asian Finanical Crisis in 1997. A decade after ðổi Mới in 1986, Vietnam
experienced remarkable socio-economic achievements. However, the Asian Financial
Crisis and Vietnam’s slow pace of change in its legal framework risked the initial
achievements of ðổi Mới. The Political Report of the Party National Congress in
April 2001 (IX Congress) focused on a variety of major challenges to the country.
These included distraction from the socialist pathway, corruption, bureaucratic
inefficiency, and the risk of being left behind economically among other developing
countries (Communist Party of Vietnam, 2001). Being left behind economicaly was
listed by the Party report as the greatest of all challenges. The report called for the
acceleration of industrialization and modernization, building an independent economy
to make Vietnam an industrialized country, and giving priority to the development of
the force of production. It asserted that “every economic sector is an important
component of the Socialist-oriented market economy, which cooperate and compete
with each other in the long run” (Communist Party of Vietnam, 2001) .
The Political Report, along with the subsequent Socio-economic Strategies of

the period 2001-2010, emphasized the goal of “taking the country out of the less255

developed situation, increasing people’s spiritual and material lives, creating the
foundation for the country to become an industrialized country by 2020” (Communist
Party of Vietnam, 2001). The report called for a GDP growth rate by 2010 that was
twice the level of 2000 with an economic structure which would rapidly reduce the
share of labor in agriculture below 50%. In five years from 2001 to 2005, the GDP
growth rate was expected to be 7.5% annually on average. In order to reach these
goals, the report recognized the need to build a multi-sectoral economy in which each
sector is an integrative component of the entire economy. The special Resolution No.

7 in 2001 of the CPV on International Economic Integration is a further step to
specify the demand for international economic integration into the world ecomomy,
urging “proactive integration in order to stimulate domestic strengths and
effectiveness of international cooperation”.
To summarize, the first priority of the CPV and goverment in the period from
2001-2005 was economic development and international economic integration. The
regime was pressed to succeed in achieving the industrialization and mordernization
goals which had been damaged by the Asian Financial Crisis at the end of 1990s.
Accordingly, the Party and government leaders realized that these goals could not be
achieved without comprehensive reforms in Vietnam’s economic legal framework.
These reforms would necessitate removing legal barriers between private and state
owned enterprises and between domestic and foreign owned enterprises.
Accomplishing these changes became the top political priority of both CPV and
government leaders. As the result, many innovative legal changes were adopted by the
Vietnamese government on the threshold of the accession to the WTO.
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4. Conclusion on the relevance of the policy change model to the case
The proposed major policy change model presented in Chapter III is useful in
explaining the policy change process in the economic legal framework regulating
foreign direct investment in Vietnam. It helps to elucidate why in the midst of positive
economic performance in the years of 2004-2005, the Vietnamese government
accepted various radical changes, especially the issuance of the Investment Law,
which set the level playing field for various kinds of enterprises, regardless of
ownership. Even though the government still considered state-owned enterprise sector
as the backbone of the regime economic power, the will to fully integrate into the
world market dominated the fear of adverse consequences to the state sector. Through
the passage of the integrative Investment Law, Vietnam demonstrated the significant
change in the mindset of the regime that recognizes the equal status of private and
foreign-owned with the status of the state-owned counterparts.
By employing the stressor concept, we can see that the application to the WTO
and the obligations under various international agreements, particularly the BTA with
the U.S., were the main sources of pressures on Vietnam for comprehensive reforms.
In this case, the stressors did not come from negative economic performances. Rather,
they arose from the pressure created by the changes in international trade
liberalization, a different policy arena than the arena of domestic legal reform. At the
threshold of the official admission to the WTO, the National Assembly was rushing
for completing all of the legal changes to successfully guarantee its admission to the
WTO.
The concept of leadership predisposition to reform is also helpful in
examining the actual intention and acceptance of the CPV and government to put in
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place a new integrative legal framework governing various kinds of enterprises
operating in the different economic sectors. By looking at Party resolutions and
socio-economic plans, we can see that by the time Vietnam signed the BTA with U.S,
the Vietnamese regime had strongly and clearly shown its willingness to pursue
further and more comprehensive legal reforms to set equal and favorable conditions
for foreign-owned enterprises. Guided by the leadership predisposition of the Party,
the Vietnamese government and National Assembly had advanced the issues of
comprehensive legal reforms in providing equal legal status for enterprises of all
economic sectors in the their agendas. The special Resolution of the Politburo on

Private Economic Sector in 2002 was a critical guiding document that demonstrated
the Party’s recognition of the significant role of the private sector in the economic
development of the country and the need to create a non-discrimination investment
environment for the non-public sectors. Even though the resolutions focused on the
domestic private sector, it had important implications for the foreign-directed sector.
Despite the clear path that had been established since 2001, it took another
four years for Party leaders and government officials to gradually change their policy
images with respect to the equal roles of public and private enterprise sectors
operating in the economy. Creating a level playing field means less privileges or
priorities to domestic and especially state-owned enterprises. It also means that there
will be more risks for domestic firms when they have to compete directly on an equal
footing with their foreign rivals. From a political perspective, removal of all barriers
for foreign investment in the domestic economy means that the state does not have as
much control over the political and economic development of the country. Extreme
openness of the economy might cause the collapses of domestic institutions such as
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the public universities, which in turn could risk social stability and party control.
Here, it should be noted that, due the lack of information and data, this case is not able
to shed light on these kinds of considerations. Access to this information would
provide a more complete understanding of the process of changing policy images that
occurred in the years preceding the adoption of the Investment Law in 2005.
The concept of political priority of the CPV is helpful in explaining why
Vietnam committed itself to the most comprehensive reform agenda since ðổi Mới.
Indeed, from 2000-2005, the resolutions, strategies and agendas of the CPV and
government demonstrated that economic and trade reforms were the main focus of
their attention. The regime had gradually felt the serious impacts of the Asian
Financial Crisis on the flow of FDI and on exports. Party and government leaders
were well aware of the wave of legal reforms that were taking place in most of the
countries in the region. In the wake of the regional crisis in 1997, the Party risked
serious long-term declines in growth if it failed to follow its neighbors in undertaking
widespread legal reforms. Thus, even though the legacy of Socialism still remained,
the highest priority of the CPV in the first years of the new century was economic
development. Party and government leaders believed that high economic growth
might help Vietnam increase its GDP per capital rapidly which in turn would ensure
higher living standards for the people. Moreover, the priority for economic growth
was supported by the positive results of the BTA with the U.S and sound economic
performance starting from 2002. At that time, the regime did not see a strong conflict
between economic openness, social stability and party leadership. Thus the significant
changes in the policy image on foreign investment along with Party’s first priority
given to economic reform helped produce a large number of new laws in various
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sectors that make many to consider the series of legal reforms and policy changes in
2005 as the second phase of ðổi Mới.
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Chapter IX: Conclusion
This last chapter will summarize the overall conclusions of my case study
analysis and outline some directions for future research. The chapter is divided into
three sections. The first section discusses the relevance and explanatory capacity of
the major policy change model that I have proposed in Chapter III. The second section
discusses the contributions of my study to the policy process literature and policy
reform studies in Vietnam. The final section of this chapter discusses the limitations of
this research study and implications for future lines of inquiry.

1. The relevance and explanatory capacity of the proposed major policy
change model
This chapter will not repeat the summary contributions of each case to the
validation of the four policy change factors that are part of my policy change model
proposed in Chapter III. Instead, I will discuss cross-case comparisons and examine
the cases as a whole to tell us about the relevance of the four policy change factors
and the logical flow of the proposed policy model. In the first part of my discussion, I
will focus on the way in which the role of a policy change factors might vary across
policy domains. In the second part of this section I will explore the causal flow among
the four policy factors in the policy model. In the final section, I will examine the
overall implications of this study for the understanding of the key elements of the
policy-making process in Vietnam.

The role of four policy factors in the policy change process in Vietnam
In this section, I will draw from the four case studies to provide a summary
discussion of the importance of each of the four policy change factors that are part of
my proposed major policy change model for Vietnam.
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Stressor
As explained in the proposed policy change model, stressors are considered
independent variables at the first stage of the policy process. Stressors to a policy
subsystem may include: natural and human disasters, economic crises, structural
changes in socio-economic conditions, critical changes in other policy areas, national
mood, or international pressures. Adverse consequences may occur if the stressor is
not addressed. Stressors serve as the catalysts that make major policy change more
likely to happen by disclosing new knowledge, new risks and new challenges. Thus,
by underscoring anomalies in the prevailing policy paradigm, or raising the visibility
of new problems, stressors can provide opportunities for policy learning within the
policy subsystem which in turn can trigger changes in the policy maker’s perception
of the problems, how they rank values or priorities, and how decisive they are in
pushing for major policy change. As a result, stressors trigger a new policy cycle in
which policy change initiatives are considered by public agencies and policy elites.
In all four cases there existed strong stressors that pushed for new policy
change initiatives to be undertaken by the regime of Vietnam. While stressors were
present in each of the four cases, the stressors in each case were different in the form
and level of visibility. For instance, in the higher education case, the Vietnamese
Communist Party and government were pressured by both internal and external critics
to undertake major educational reform in order to create a workforce that could
successfully compete in a globalized economy and provide a higher standard of living
for the citizens. Reports produced by the Consultative Group Meeting in Vietnam,
McKinsey Global Institute, and the Economic Committee of the National Assembly
revealed a low productivity level of the Vietnamese workforce. Two well-known
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reports by Harvard Kennedy School of Government on the Vietnamese higher
education system in 2008 and 2010 even used the word “crisis” to describe the status
of the system. Starting in 2005, the CPV, National Assembly, Prime Minister and
Ministry of Education and Training repeatedly recognized that low quality of
education was challenging the quality of economic growth in Vietnam and the
attractiveness of the business environment. There were numerous reports, directives,
decisions, and other legal responses that recognized the need to make change,
particularly in providing higher education institutions with greater autonomy. As late
as 2012, the Party and government recognized the need to change, which was
reflected in passage of the Higher Education Law of 2012 and the agenda of the 6th
Plenum of the Party Central Committee just finished on October 15, 2012.
However, in contrast to pressures to make changes on the economic front,
there has been little tangible pressure to change in higher education policy. There are
several factors that explain this result. Unlike the pressure for economic change, the
stressors in the higher education sector are much less quantifiable and visible. The
quality of the labor market in Vietnam and in most of other countries does not show
up directly low quality of higher education as the primary cause for a poor economic
growth and development. The weak connections between the business sector and
higher education institutions in Vietnam make the stressors less viable. In addition to
the issue of whether stressors are felt and seen, as elaborated in my proposed policy
change model, there may be a variety of reasons why the stressors are not acted upon,
such as the predisposition of the party leaders to reform; significant change in the
policy image, and the consensus of Party on political priorities which favor the policy
change initiative.
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In contrast to the case of higher education, in the case of international trade
liberalization, the stressors were much clearer and more measurable. Stressors are
represented by quantifiable economic performance and indicators caused by the Asian
Financial Crisis in 1997. For example, Vietnam’s GDP growth sharply declined from
9.54 % in 1995 and 9.43 % in 1996 to 5.76 % in 1998 and 4.77% in 1999 (Nguyen H.
T., 2007). The registered foreign direct investment fell dramatically from 8.7 billion
USD in 1996 to 1.6 billion USD in 1999. In addition to internal economic situation,
external factors also placed pressures on the Vietnamese Party and government to
make radical policy changes. For instance, after the Asian Financial crisis, many
countries in the region depreciated their currencies in order to make their products
cheaper (which also means more competitive) than the same kind of products
produced in Vietnam. They also implemented various reforms in the banking system
and legal framework that made their business environments more attractive than
Vietnam. These pressures were especially strong from Vietnam’s giant neighbor
country - China. China signed the BTA with the U.S. in November 1999 and
expressed their desire to become a member of the WTO by 2001. These actions made
the products from China much more competitive than those produced in Vietnam
because of the lower import tax applied in by the U.S. and other countries. All of
these internal and external factors put strong pressures on Vietnam’s existing policy
on international trade. As a result of the policy changes being made by other
countries, Vietnam was under strong pressure to reach the consensus on most of the
technical issues of the BTA with the U.S. by the end of 1999.
While significant stressors with respect to trade liberalization resulted in major
policy changes, this has not been the case with state owned enterprises. From the very
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beginning of the Do Moi Program in 1986; the Vietnamese Communist Party and
government have felt the pressure to reform the state economic sector. The pressure
increased when Vietnam signed the BTA with the U.S. in 2001, joined WTO since
2006 and especially after the bankruptcy of the Vinashin Group in 2010. At each point
in time, the stressors pressed the Party and government to produce guiding documents
for improving the efficiency of state-owned and operated enterprises. Indeed, in
1995, only several years after Vietnam allowed the establishment and operation of
private and foreign-invested enterprises, these two non-state economic sectors had
growth rapidly to contribute to 28% and 30% of the total investment respectively and
to 25% each of the total industrial outputs (General Statistic Office of Vietnam, cited
in Muller, 2005). The rapid growth of non-public sector enterprises put pressure on
the government to restructure state economic enterprises so that they could compete
more successfully with the other sectors. As a result, the Law on State-owned
Enterprises was passed in 1995 to replace the previous rule-by-decree practice with
the hope of increasing the efficiency and performance of the state owned and operated
sector.
The pressure on the state economic sector had grown after the Asian Financial
Crisis in 1997; especially after Vietnam signed the BTA with the U.S. State-owned
enterprises became exposed to fierce direct competition from multinational companies
in the U.S. and other developed countries. The more Vietnam liberalized international
trade and foreign investment, the more the state-owned enterprises experienced
competitive pressure. In 2003, when Vietnam accelerated the negotiations with the
WTO, the Law on State-owned Enterprises was revised to establish a more marketbased and disciplined legal framework for the state economic sector. The Vietnamese
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government anticipated the demand for renovation in the state economic sector in
order to better cope with international rivals when Vietnam was expected to joined the
WTO in 2006.
From 2008 to the present, the stressors to SOEs have changed in nature.
Indeed, before 2007 when Vietnam joined the WTO, the stressors came from the
competition that domestic private and foreign economic enterprises gave to the SOE
sector within the national economy. As a socialist state, the CPV and its Government
wanted to retain a strong state economic sector to provide the state with the economic
resources and the political power that the regime needed to achieve non-economic
goals. For example, the Party and government were committed to principles of
equality among the various social classes; they were committed to affordable price of
basic commodities. The prices of basic commodities are in turn depending on how the
government monitors the key state economic groups who control the capacity of
setting the prices. These noneconomic goals meant that the Party and government
needed to place higher priority on political control and centralized party leadership.
However, the bankruptcy of the Vinashin Group, the disclosure of huge debts
and economic loses by SEGs and SGCs pushed the CPV and government to rethink
its views on the role of SOEs within the economy and what was needed as a strategy
to build a strong and large state economic sector. A combination of factors, including
scandals and poor performance of SOEs, economic recession, growing inflation rates
and huge loses of state budgets, caused the regime to reconsider the issue of stateownership and the meaning of being a Socialist regime. In the midst of these
increased pressure, a number of leaders of SEGs and senior public officials were
singled out for investigation for corruption, which ultimately resulted in the arrest of
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some SOE leaders. The management failures of SOE continued to be the focuses of
the Party, and were one of the three main focuses of the recent 6th Plenum of the
Central Party Committee in October 2012.
In the case of legal reform to establish a level playing field for enterprises of
all economic sectors in 2005, the government had to adopt a number of radical legal
changes in response to stressors from the desire to integrate deeper into the world
market especially from the WTO accession. Unlike the other cases, the stressors in
this case were more external in nature. As has been discussed in Chapter VII, most of
the socio-economic indicators of Vietnam in 2004 and especially in 2005 were very
positive. GDP growth peaked at the rate of 8.4%, which was near the level prior to the
Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 (9.34% in 1996). The GDP per capita increased more
than four times, from US$146 in 1990 to US$630 in 2005; the total value of exports
has increased to US$36.5 billion in 2005, reaching an annual compound growth rate
of 21.6 percent; and the poverty rate had declined substantially from 58 percent in
1993 to 19.5 percent in 2004. Despite the fact that Vietnam was enjoying strong
recovery in the period 2002-2005, Vietnam was pressed to take radical legal reforms
as a condition of being admitted to the WTO. The stressors were intensified by
different events, starting from the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, then the BTA with
the U.S in 2001 and finally the admission to WTO in 2006. At the threshold of WTO
accession, the pressures to accept the various abiding rules and comprehensive legal
reforms forced the Vietnamese government to hastily adopt a number of legal reforms
in 2005. Thus, in this case, the stressors for innovative policy changes arose from the
radical change in other policy area, namely international trade.
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To summarize, in all of the cases under study in this dissertation, the empirical
evidence proved the presence of stressors to the policy subsystems. However, the
level of visibility and intensity was different. Stressors might come from internal
forces or from the external environment contexts or might arise from an economic
crisis or from radical changes in the socio-economic conditions, or from the radical
changes in other policy subsystems. While there is variability in the source of the
stressors and their interface with other factors, the four cases support the broad
conceptualization of the key role of “stressors” in the proposed policy model in
Chapter III. The case studies together negate a narrow assumption of some theories
dealing with policy reforms and politics in Vietnam that radical change can only be
caused by internal pressures because the Vietnamese government has been able to
control external conditions and has been insulated from international pressures (see
views of Painter, 2003). In fact, once Vietnam expressed the desire to integrate more
completely into the world community, gradually external stressors became much more
important than in the past.

Leadership predisposition to reform
In the policy model proposed in this dissertation, the concept of leadership
predisposition was defined as a psychological readiness of the policy elites to consider
policy change initiative. This readiness is achieved only after the policy elites take
into account the existing stressors along with the ideological commitments and
political risks. Thus, the predisposition demonstrates the intention to reform a given
policy area in response to stressors. It reflects how the policy elites perceive and
articulate particular policy issues, how they assess the proposed change initiatives,
and how they weigh political and technical factors in dealing with policy problems.
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The policy change model argues that once there is a predisposition to reform within
the leadership of the CPV, the given policy problems and issues will be officially
advanced into the agenda of the National Assembly or government for further
deliberation and study. This increases the possibility, but does not guarantee that a
policy reform will be adopted.
Leadership predisposition is an abstract concept. However, in the case of a
single-party and centralized political system like Vietnam, it is possible to identify this
predisposition through the policy arguments of policy elites or policy statements in
the Party’s documents. As a Party-led system, when the Party affirms the need to act
on a policy problem, it will be documented in the Party’s guiding documents and be
implemented by public agencies under the National Assembly or Central Government.
Normally, policy stressors are initially documented at the ministerial level or by a
committee of the National Assembly. A certain number of urgent issues will then be
selected by the Government/Prime Minister or National Assembly to submit to the
Party Central Committee led by the Politburo for guidelines – “chủ trương”. If the
policy issues are considered by the Party to require new policy response, it will be
affirmed by the Party and then passed on to the National Assembly or government for
further actions. If not, the initiative will be delayed or ignored. It should be noted that
even when the Party has agreed to consider changes in a given policy arena, it is a
common practice to refer the issue for further deliberation and studies. In doing so,
this approval for further study does not mean that the Party will automatically approve
the final policy alternatives or proposals produced by the National Assembly or
government afterward. Thus, the predisposition to reform is only the preliminary
perception on the need to undertake policy reform. It does not mean that reform will
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actually be agreed upon. This is because the Party follows a process that involves
different type of public organizations, including National Assembly’s committees,
Central Government’s Office, ministerial agencies, and research institutions, even
international advisors or consultative groups. After the policy change alternatives
have been formulated, deliberated and selected by the state apparatus, the Party will
be in the position to accept, delay or reject the policy change proposal.
In the four case studies, the CPV and government of Vietnam did show a
predisposition to reform in each of the four cases. However, the leadership
predisposition differed among the cases in terms of the level of intensity and clarity.
In addition, the lag time between the time when the Party’s expressed desire to
undertake reform and the time the policy issues were advanced to the agenda of the
National Assembly or government varied widely from once case to another. For
example, in the case of trade reform, the BTA with the U.S was advanced into the
government’s agenda right away after the Party produced a guiding resolution in
1997. Whereas, in the case of higher education, although the Prime Minister

Resolution No 14 on Comprehensive Renovation in Higher Education indicated a
strong intention by the government to make radical change in this area for quality
improvement, it took five years before the issue of higher education management
policy was advanced to the legal agenda of the Ministry of Education and Training
and then to the National Assembly in 2010. It then took two more years for the Higher
Education Law to be ratified in June 2012.
In the case of higher education, the Party Central Committee of Vietnam
issued a special resolution on education in 2009 that expressed the need for
educational policy change, including higher education change. As late as October
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2012 the issue of education reform was listed as one of the top three priorities by the
6th Plenum under the XI Party National Congress. Notably, there has been a National
Assembly’s resolution in 2009 and a Prime Minister’s directive in 2010 that directly
targeted the need for higher education reforms, but there has been no specific
resolution on higher education at the Party level. Moreover, even when the guiding
documents in education produced by the Party, the government and the National
Assembly pointed to the need for reform in the state management of higher education,
the focus has been broadly expressed to include financial mechanism, curriculum
renovation, teacher quality improvement, educational network, institutional autonomy,
etc. Among the solutions to improve state management in higher education, increased
institutional autonomy has not been considered as a high priority. To conclude, higher
education is the case that witnessed the least predisposition by the Party leaders to
undertake policy reforms that would give more autonomy to universities and colleges
despite the fact that this issue has been repeatedly cited as important in many recent
state documents. This explains why higher education reforms have been mostly
limited compared to the policy changes in other cases (see the analysis of the Higher
Education Law of 2012 in the Appendix for more details).
In the case of trade liberalization reform, the leadership predisposition to
change was the most strongly present factor among the four cases presented in this
study. Since 1995, Vietnam’s political leaders had expressed a desire to undertake
comprehensive trade liberalization through their decision to join AFTA, initiating
negotiations to join the WTO and starting the BTA negotiation with the U.S. In 1996,
the Five-year Socio-economic Development Plan 1996-2000 directly pointed to the
Party leaders’ intention to become members of the WTO and other international
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economic institutions, although the document did not mention specifically a BTA with
the U.S. Only after the occurrence of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 did the
predisposition to advance trade liberalization reform intensify, especially with the

Resolution No 7 of the Fourth Plenum under the VIII National Party Congress. In the
solution section of this resolution, the CPV called for a “proactive and positive
attitude to penetrate and expand international market” and the need to “conduct quick
and solid negotiation for BTA with the U.S., and participate in APEC and WTO”.
Nonetheless, the BTA with the U.S was a sensitive and controversial issue that was
the source of contentious deliberation within the highest organs of Party and
government about the pace and scope of international economic integration.
Eventually, in 2000 the BTA was signed but it took one more year for the regime to
wholeheartedly accept agreement after the CPV released the Resolution No 7 on

International Economic Integration in November 2001.
In the case of state-owned enterprise management policy, from the inception
of ðổi Mới the CPV has demonstrated the intention to improve the efficiency and
competitiveness of the state economic sector. As I have presented in Chapter VII, in
all of the Party’s resolutions and five-year socio-economic development plans since
the early of 1990s, restructuring and reshuffling SOEs has been the primary concern
and focus of the political leaders. Especially, the Resolution of the Third Plenum of the

Party Central Committee of the IX National Party Congress regarding reorganization,
reform, and development of the SOEs (2001) and the Resolutions No 28-NQ/TW of the
Politburo on Reshuffling, Reforming and Developing State Farms and Forestry Firms
(2003) pointed directly to the issues related to state management in SOE sector. These
documents provided guidelines for reforms in this sector as means of achieving a
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deeper integration of Vietnam’s economy into the international global market. In 2010
after the breakout of Vinashin’s bankruptcy and negative performance of SEGs and
SGCs, the Politburo produced a special Conclusion No 78 - KL/TW, which
reemphasized the intent of the Party to reform this sector. This intention had been
already articulated in a resolution of the Party nine years before (the Resolution of the

Third Plenum at the IX Party Congress). Most recently, in the face of tremendous
criticism from the public and international organizations for the failures of the SEG
and SGC model and very serious debts and large economic losses by the SOEs over
the past few years, the Party once again identified state economic sector reform as one
of the three urgent issues of the 6th Plenum under the XI Party Congress in October,
2012.
In short, the leadership predisposition to reform the SOE sector has been well
articulated in the Party’s guiding documents. As a result, a large number of laws,
decrees, and directives have been produced in response to the Party’s call. Notably,
the predisposition to reform SOEs before 2008 focused more on increasing the
competitiveness of the state economic sector when Vietnam integrated deeper into the
world market. After 2008, in the face of SOEs large-scale failures, the predisposition
to reform changed dramatically with an increased focus on the question of the right
ownership model, the nature of the relationships between the state and SOEs and the
role of SOEs in the market-oriented economy. However, the lack of a significant
change in the policy image resulted in no real serious and innovative change being
made during the period of this study.
The last case of legal change in foreign investment shows the greatest
leadership predisposition to reform. After the BTA with U.S. was signed in July 2000
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and then ratified in 2001, the CPV was able to reach consensus and stood firm on its
intention to fully integrate into the international economic institutions. The special

Party Resolution No. 7 on International Economic Integration in 2001 marked a point
in time when the Party considered further and comprehensive domestic legal reforms
as an irreversible necessity in order to be accepted into the WTO. With this strong
predisposition to legal reform, the National Assembly, government and various
ministerial agencies accelerated the law-making process in every sector to revise,
integrate and replace laws and regulations in the period 2002-2005. The main goal
was to meet the preconditions for the accession to the WTO and to create a more
favorable business environment for investment and trade. Here, it should be noted that
the leadership predisposition was intensified by additional stressors as time went by.
For example, the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 consolidated the will of the CPV to
reform the legal framework in order to attract more foreign investment and to meet
the requirements of bilateral and multi-lateral trade agreements. Then predisposition
to reform were intensified at the threshold of WTO accession which forced the
government to accept broad-based and comprehensive reforms to establish a level
playing field for enterprises in all economic sectors in 2005.
To summarize, while stressors are a precondition for major policy change in
Vietnam, these stressors do not result in the advancement of policy change initiatives
without another precondition: the predisposition of leaders to initiate policy change.
However, this precondition can be present and still not result in any major policy
change. For example, stressors and a predisposition to change were present in all four
cases in this study. However, in only two cases did any major change actually occur.
Studies of these cases where major change did occur indicate that other important
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factors were present, including a change in the policy image of party leaders and a
high consensus on the political priority of making the given changes compared to
other potentially competing political priorities of the CPV at given points of time.

Policy image
In the proposed major policy model for Vietnam, the concept of “policy
image” was defined as the belief through which the policy actors: (1) interpret a given
set of policy issues, (2) identify the causal relationships between these issues and the
existing policy or the absence of relevant policy, and (3) rationalize their solutions
resolving the issues. Policy image also reflects the assumptions on the best way to
realize the core values and political priorities of the Vietnamese regime. In Vietnam,
to maintain these values and priorities, the regime needs to achieve intermediate goals
such as high economic growth, improvement in the people’s living standards; social
equality, and social welfare system for the mass, etc.,. In the proposed policy model,
significant change in the policy image of the CPV and government is critical for the
formulation of innovative policy change alternatives to address the core problems in
the transitional process of development. After formulated, the policy change
alternatives will be selected if it is perceived as the instruments to contribute to the
intermediate goals while not directly risks the core values of principles of the CPV.
This in turn will determines if such alternatives are considered “technically feasible”
and then to be advanced to the final stage of adoption.
In the four case studies of this dissertation, the policy image was significantly
changed in the two cases that witnessed the most radical changes while the policy
image remained unchanged in the two cases that did not experience any significant
policy change. In the case of trade reform, a change in policy image was clearly and
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dramatically documented. During the negotiation process of the VNUSBTA, the two
sides gradually built trust in one another by breaking down pre-existing stereotypes
and obsessions with the past war. The current national interests came into increasing
play for the Vietnamese delegation, replacing their preoccupation with the past. By
looking to the future and the positive feedback from the trade agreements between
China and other countries with the U.S, Vietnam anticipated the positive outcomes of
the BTA to its economy rather than the adverse impacts of further trade liberalization.
Vietnam came to understand that the BTA would bring in mutual benefits for both
sides and without the BTA with the U.S, Vietnam could not integrate deeper into the
world economy in general and join the WTO in particular. The change in the policy
image on the BTA with U.S resulted from a prolonged process of negotiation and
exchanges with the U.S. delegation, from internal debates and deliberation within the
leadership groups of the Party and government, and also from self-education with new
information, feedback and evidence made available by technical analytic policy
actors.
What is most interesting about Vietnam’s policy changes in the area of
international trade is that arguments based on technical assessment and feasibility
were necessary, but they were not sufficient to bring about major policy change. By
1999, all the technical issues had been resolved by the two negotiation delegations;
however, the BTA was postponed for one more year due to lack of consensus within
the highest organ of the CPV. As I have presented in Chapter VI, the General
Secretary of the Party at that time was not able to reach a compromise among the
conservatives and reformers in the Politburo. In addition, he was a leading figure of
the conservative groups within the Party leadership organ who did not favor rapid and
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comprehensive economic reforms. As a result, only in 2000 when the reformers took
over control of the Politburo and the General Secretary lost his leadership legitimacy
that the final agreement was reached within the leadership of the Party to accept the
BTA with U.S.
In the case of legal reform (Investment Law), radical change in the legal
framework did not occur until there was a change in the policy image by Party leaders
on the role of non-public economic enterprises in the economic development of
Vietnam. Up until the end of the 1990s, there was still a fear that the forces of
capitalism in the private economic sector would dominate the domestic economy of
Vietnam and risk social coherence and the leadership of the CPV. Even the
breakthrough Resolution No. 14 on International Economic Integration issued in
November 11, 2001 pointed out that “the integration plan and phase should be
appropriate in relevance to the developmental level of the domestic economy while
meeting the requirement of the international organizations” and “international
economic integration needs to be aligned with the demand for security and national
defense, … [and] be alert for the plot of peaceful evolution” (Communist Party of
Vietnam, 2002).
However, this fear gradually diminished with the increasing contribution of
enterprises in the non-state economic sectors. Private and foreign-invested enterprises
significantly contributed to Vietnam’s positive economic performance in the period
after the Asian Financial Crisis, especially from 2001-2005. In addition, deeper and
freer international economic integration, especially the BTA with the U.S., started to
produce positive outcomes in terms of FDI and growing exports. As a result, the
regime became much less fearful that a dynamic and strong private and FDI economic
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sectors would threaten political stability and Party leadership. Still, to maintain
political control, the Party and government emphasized the need to develop the stateowned economic sector in key economic areas.
The change in the policy image on the role of the private sector, including the
FDI enterprises, was reaffirmed by the special Resolution No. 14 of the Fifth Plenum

of the Central Party Committee on Private Economic Sector in 2002. This document
strongly urged the creation of a policy framework and incentives that would create a
favorable environment for private economic development. The resolution pointed out
that the “private economic sector is an important component of the national economy.
Private economic development is a long-term strategy for the development of a multisectorial Socialist-oriented economy, contributing to the success of the key missions
of the industrialization and modernization process and increase internal strengths in
the international integration process” (Communist Party of Vietnam, 2002). The
change in policy image on non-public sector enterprises, along with the increasing
pressures from WTO on the requirements for comprehensive legal reform, pushed the
National Assembly and government to accelerate the policy-making process of a large
number of laws in 2005.
Unlike the two above cases, the two cases without radical policy are also the
cases that did not see significant changes in the policy image of the Party and
government. In the case of higher education policy, during the past two decades,
Vietnam has come to attribute the weak and backward state management to the origin
of the low quality of education in general and of higher education in particular.
However, due to lack of policy image change with regard to the institutional
autonomy of higher education institutions, the CPV and government have not
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produced an innovative legal framework to provide comprehensive institutional
autonomy for universities and colleges. The lack of change in the policy image on the
institutional autonomy in higher education has prohibited the formulation of
innovative policy solutions dealing with the problems and stressors in this policy
domain. As the result, the most updated Higher Education Law of 2012 which was
expected to set a legal framework for innovative state management provides only
abstract and conditional terms regarding the institutional autonomy for universities
and colleges.
There are three main factors that have prohibited a significant change in the
view of the regime with respect to higher education state management. First,
according to the legacy of a Socialist state, higher education is an important area
which helps maintain the core political ideology and values of the Party within the
younger generations. In the economic area, higher education is supposed to provide
the human resources for the industrialization and modernization process led by the
state. Even though the top leaders of the government and MOET have repeatedly
referred to the concept of “market-driven” higher education system in recent years, it
does not mean that the regime want to release the system to the market rules. Instead,
the state needs to direct the development process of this sector in consistent to the
predetermined goals and demand set by the state for national development.
Second, the regime has been concerned about the adverse social consequences
of granting comprehensive autonomy without having in place full-fledge
accountability mechanism and enhanced administrative capacity on the part of higher
education institutions. With the rapid growth in the newly-established universities and
colleges, the political leaders have become more concerned about the quality of
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education and social responsibility of the institutions, especially in a market economy.
The lack of trust in the administrative capacity of individual institutions has played a
key role in stalling major policy change. The low quality of some private-owned or
even public universities and mismanagement by leaders has diminished the effort of
the Vietnamese government to release its ties on the higher education institutions.
Third, until now, the government has not perceived a strong positive correlation
between higher autonomy and better education quality. Unlike other western
countries, administrative autonomy and academic freedom are not considered the
backbone of the higher education system. The Party and government have repeatedly
argued for state management reforms in higher education. However, the phase “state
management – quản lý nhà nước” has been used with broad meaning to include
financial management, teacher education, recruitment and compensation, university
network, curriculum development and institutional autonomy. Until now renovation in
the relationship between the state and higher education institution has not been
considered as the first priority of state management reform and best solution for
quality improvement in this sector.
Similar to higher education, the state-owned enterprises policy has not
experienced any significant change, even though the need for change has been
mentioned often in the Party and government documents. The existence of stressors to
change and a recognition by the leaders of the need to change has not resulted in any
policy reforms because there has been no change in the policy image in the role and
function of SOEs held by Party and government of Vietnam. The Socialist legacy
continues to view SOEs as the macroeconomic instruments and resources for the
Party to control domestic and foreign economic forces. This view is congruent with
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Party doctrine that the social class that controls the means of production will be able
to control politics and to lead the society. Given this view, SOEs are expected as
important and effective macroeconomic instruments for state economic management
as well as for the administration of the state welfare system. In addition, the regime
has not seen a conflict between a strong state economic sector supported by the state
and the development of the private and FDI sectors. The recent political and economic
scandals related to SEGs have challenged the view that the state economic sector is an
effective channel for the state to direct the industrialization process and to sustain
Party’s control over the economic forces. Nonetheless, the Vietnamese Party and
government continue to stand firm on the will to develop a strong state economic
sector by restructuring and reshuffling.
The word “restructuring-tái cơ cấu” has been repeatedly used by the policy
elites in the way that does not include the release of state control on the economy or to
transform the role of state to the marketplace. Instead, it is used to refer to the need to
consolidate the state economic sector by making improvement in the ability of SOE’S
to play a central role in the economy. Even though the Party and government have
recognized the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the SOEs, the lack of change in
policy image have obstructed the formulation of innovative policy change alternatives
in this sector over the past decades. As the result, the Party and government have
fallen short of making any innovative policy change in this policy area and the major
consensus within the Party and government until now is for incremental changes in
the organization and management of the SOEs, instead of the change in the policy
paradigm in this sector.
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To summarize, the concept of “policy image” is very helpful in explaining the
divergent outcomes in the policy areas under review in this dissertation. Specifically,
it helps explain why in the cases of higher education and state-owned enterprises,
there has been no innovative policy changes over the past decades even though the
CPV and its Government continuously emphasized the demand for reforms in these
areas. The socialist policy legacy has impeded the significant change in the policy
image in these two policy domains. As a result of the lack of significant change in the
policy image, only incremental and modest changes have been adopted instead of
radical and innovative policy change in state-owned enterprise and higher education
sectors.

Consensus on the political priorities
In Vietnam, any major policy change alternative is ultimately assessed against
two main principles: political stability and the absolute leadership role of the CPV
over the state apparatus and the society. Because these principles are abstract, and can
be interpreted in a broad sense, the Party’s leaders have to refer to some intermediate
or subsidiary political goals. For example, when examining the consequences of a
particular policy change alternative, the Party can refer to social equality, economic
development to achieve a higher living standard, social welfare for the masses,
democratic-centralism, or the importance of state-led approach to development. At a
given of time, the Party will consider the priorities among these goals and identify the
most important to be achieved. If a policy change alternative is congruent with the
dominant political priorities at the time, it will be adopted. The change in policy
image is a critical to influence how the Party orders or prioritizes these goals and
anticipates the impacts of the tentative policy change on the core values or principles.
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Thus, the differentiation between the political core values/principles and the
intermediate political goals is very helpful in explaining the “pragmatism” approach
of the CPV during the ðổi Mới.
Among the four case studies, the case of trade liberalization reform with the
signing of the BTA with the U.S. is where the role of consensus on political core
values and priorities is illuminated most clearly. The political judgment as the result
of the lack of consensus within the Politburo did dominate the technical feasibility of
the BTA. Indeed, by the middle of 1999, most of the critical technical issues under the
BTA were resolved by the two sides. However, Vietnam decided not to sign the
agreement at the last minute and the BTA was postponed for nearly one year. At that
time, the Politburo was sharply divided between the conservatives and reformers who
disagreed about the pace of reform and the potential consequences of the BTA. The
conservatives placed priority on democratic-centralism and social equality which
argued for a slow and controllable integration process to avoid the risk of economic
collapse and social chaos. By contrast, the reformers placed priority on economic
development and higher living standards which argued for further policy reforms and
deeper international integration. The lack of strong and decisive party leadership by
the Party Secretary General resulted in a stalemate among the differing points of view
of the members of the Politburo. The lack of party leadership consensus on what
should be the chief political priority at that time delayed further economic reforms by
each of the three plenums in 1999 despite serious economic recession. This explains
why the Party delayed agreement on the BTA with the U.S even when all the technical
issues of the BTA were resolved by the two negotiation delegations.
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In the case of legal reform in investment law, due to the change in the policy
image of the Party regarding the role and contribution of the non-public sectors, the
Party gradually overlooked the risks of legal reforms to economic development and
social coherence. The Party became less cautious about creating unhealthy conflict
between strong private and FDI sectors and a large state economic sector. Instead, the
leaders recognized the important role of non-state enterprises in the economic
development and prosperity of the country. In 2005, the change in the policy image
was coupled with strong consensus within the Party on the priority of economic
development in the period from 2000-2005, and the strong pressures from the WTO
accession pushed the regime to adopt a bunch of legal reforms in many areas, some of
which only constituted incremental changes in the past.

The relevance of the causal flow of the policy change model in the cases
Table 14 below summarizes the policy outcomes and the presence of the four
policy factors that I have identified in the proposed major policy change model for
Vietnam. In this section, I am going to discuss the extent to which the causal flow of
change in the cases occurred in the causal sequence proposed by my policy change
model.
Table 14: The relationships between policy factors and major policy outcomes in four cases
Cases/causal
factors

1. Stressors

2. Predisposition
to reform

3. Change in
policy image

4. Consensus
of Party

Major
policy
change

Trade reform

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Legal reform

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Higher
education
State-owned
enterprise

Yes

Yes

No

N/A

No

Yes

Yes

No

N/A

No
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The major policy change model for Vietnam presented in Chapter III proposes
a sequence of change that is depicted in the order listed in the first row of Table 14.
First, the stressors arise due to the change in the internal or external circumstances.
Stressors are documented by the state agencies and then reported to the government
for review. At a given point in time, the Prime Minister can choose only a small
number of stressors that are considered to be sufficiently important to justify
considering major changes in policy. The government will report to the Party Central
Committee (PCC) for leadership and guidance on how to respond to the stressors. At
this level, the Party leaders will deliberate and determine whether they want to
consider a policy change to address the stressors. If the Party perceives that there
needs to be a significant change in a given policy area in order to respond to the
existing problems, it will produce a resolution, conclusion or other kind of guiding
document to direct the state agencies to further the discussion and study of the policy
problems. As depicted in Figure 1, the predisposition to reform by the Party’s leaders
is the precondition for major policy change initiatives to be advanced to the official
agenda of the National Assembly or the Central Government. After receiving the
guideline from the PCC, the state agencies will lead the discussion, studies, and
hearings in order to formulate and then to select the final policy change alternative.
At this stage, there must be a significant change in the policy image of the
policy elites in order for them to be able to create an innovative policy change
alternative. If the innovative policy change alternative is considered technically
feasible, it will then be submitted again to the PCC of the CPV for final review. At
this stage, the leaders of NA and government, who are also member of the PCC, will
work with other members of the PCC and especially with members of the Politburo to
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discuss the political acceptability of the policy change alternative. The Party will take
into account the political core values, especially the intermediate political goals when
it examines the policy alternatives. If the Party can reach consensus on the priorities
among the intermediate political goals, which favor the innovative policy change
alternatives, then a radical policy will be adopted. Notably, the PCC convenes at least
two times a year, each time for a week or two, to review the innovative policy change
alternatives submitted by the National Assembly and the Central Government. The
following section, I will review the policy change process in the cases to determine
whether they confirm the sequential order proposed by the policy change model.
In general, all of the cases under review in this dissertation conform to the
logical flow depicted in Table 12. However, there are important variations and
subtleties in each of the cases that add the richness to the simple causal model. For
example, in the first place, the trade reform case with the adoption of the BTA with
U.S is the case that has proved the overall logics of the model to the largest extent.
Similar to the case of legal reform in foreign investment, all the policy change factors
identified in my proposed policy model were present and interacted with each other in
consistent to the causal flow of the model to produce radical change. However, it
differs from the case of legal reform in confirming the proposition No. 4 that the lack
of consensus on political priority can impede the adoption of radical change. That is,
the delay of the BTA with the U.S in the U.S demonstrates that political judgment can
dominate technical feasibility.
The case of legal reform to set the equal play field for foreign-invested
enterprises with the integrative Investment Law in 2005 followed the similar logical
flow of the case on the BTA with the U.S with some divergences. First, both cases
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witnessed strong pressures from both internal and external stressors. However, in this
case the pressures came from external stressors, namely the accession to WTO,
instead the internal stressors of bad economic performance (affected by an economic
crisis) in the case of trade reform. Also, the stressors in this case were not one time
but were intensified to the end of the changing process. Second, the process of the
policy image change in this case was not clearly isolated as the case of trade reform
due to the lack of information about the internal debates within the state agencies on
the Investment Law. Third, as presented in the previous paragraph, the Party
consensus on political priority was not fully documented and explained clearly as in
the case of trade reform.
In the two cases without radical policy change, the logical flow of the model
was also affirmed. Overall, the lack of significant changes in the policy image of the
Party and government in respective policy domains prohibited the adoption of
innovative policy even though both cases witnessed strong pressures and
predispositions for reforms. Indeed, over the past two decades, the Party and
government of Vietnam have felt the stressors to reform higher education and stateowned enterprise sector in response to the problems and challenges. Notably, the
stressors in the case of state economic sector have been more quantifiable and
measurable while the stressors to higher education sector have been more abstracts
and qualitative. In the face of stressors, the Party has shown leadership predisposition
to reforms in both areas through many resolutions and conclusions of the PCC and
Politburo. Interestingly, higher education and state-owned enterprise reforms were
two of three urgent issues under the agenda of the 6th Plenum of the PCC in October,
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2012. However, again, the results of this Plenum did not show any new policy image
of the CPV in relation to state management in these two areas.
In both case, the lack of policy image change has prohibited the formulation
and proposal of innovative policy change initiatives over the years. The lack of policy
image change in both cases in turn is caused by the dominance of the legacy of the
Socialist state with the Soviet model. In fact, Vietnam has been discussing and
adopting a number of policy changes on these two policy areas. However, no
innovative alternative has been advanced into the agenda of the state or revealed in a
number of guiding documents. As a result, no innovative policy change has been
adopted even the Higher Education Law was promulgated in June 2012 and the Plan
on Restructuring the State-Owned Enterprises was approved in July 2012. It is very
important to know that the regime has continued to consider higher education and
state economic sectors as the key instruments for the state to maintain the core
political principles. There has been a continuous fear that by losing these sectors, the
regime will be put at risk in achieving industrialization and social development
oriented by the Socialist characteristics.

Policy implications to the policy process in Vietnam
The major policy change model proposed in this dissertation, along with the
evidence drawn from the four case studies, shed light on the policy process and policy
outcomes during ðổi Mới in Vietnam. They help to explain why innovative and
radical policy changes have been adopted in some areas while others only witnessed
incremental and limited changes. Especially, the model and the cases studies elucidate
some of the concepts like “gradualism”, “pragmatism”, “dual party-state system” that
scholars have employed to describe the policy phenomenon and outcomes in Vietnam.
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In the following paragraph I am going to explain these concepts by referring to the
proposed policy change model.

Gradualism
“Gradualism” has been used to describe a slow and controlled policy change
process. The number and sequential order of the policy change factors listed in Table
12 explain why reform in Vietnam conforms to this gradualism model. In order for an
innovative policy change initiative to be adopted by the Party and government of
Vietnam, it must be able to get through different stages with different gatekeepers.
This ensures that any innovative policy initiative that can bring in radical change is
usually examined carefully through a variety of both technical and political filters.
First, the existing political leaders must feel the real stressors and perceive the
imperative for reforms in response to stressors. Then, there must be a predisposition to
reform that goes beyond simply talk to the production of Party and government
documents that provide a guiding framework for continuing the deliberative process
of change. These documents legitimize the policy change initiative without
guaranteeing that the initiative will be adopted later. It may take some time, even
years or decades, for internal discussion and deliberation among the affected or
concerned public agencies to change the inculcated policy image that has governed
traditional thinking about a given policy issue. Education, additional information,
intensified stressors may be required for the policy image change. After the consensus
on the technical feasibility of the innovative policy initiative is reached, a second
round of review is conducted in order to reach a common understanding and
consensus on the political priority and its relation to the proposed major change. This
stage involves a collective decision-making mechanism to achieve an accommodation
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of preferences and interests among the key members of the Party and government. At
this stage of deliberation, participants bring in consideration on the risks of change to
the Party’s core political values and political priorities. As a result, the reform process
in Vietnam is characterized by gradualism.

Pragmatism
“Pragmatism” refers to practical behaviors of the Vietnamese officials that are
not always predictable based on abstract principles or ideology. As Shivakumar
(1996) argued: “assertion that communism has been strongly biased against a market
economy, with privileged policies, limited access to information, and so on, cannot
therefore be seen as a characterization of the most powerful strategies at work in
Vietnam, on socio-economic change”. By employing the policy model and the
analysis of the case studies, we can explain the pragmatic approach of Vietnam.
Indeed, the ruling regime embraces two political core values serving as the guiding
principles for the whole system: political stability and absolute Party’s leadership over
the state and society. To realize these core values, several intermediate political goals
are advanced in practice. These goals can be social equality, social coherence,
economic growth, higher living standards of the people, democratic-centralism, good
governance, and party unity and strength. At different points of time, depending on
the existing internal and external conditions, the CPV and its Government will
deliberate to reach the consensus on the political priority among the above political
goals. For example, in the case of trade reform presented in Chapter VI, at the time
that the BTA with the U.S was ready to be sign, the consensus of the Party on social
coherence and Party unity took priority over economic growth and governance
reform. By contrast, during the period from 2000-2005, the Party reached consensus
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on giving top priority to economic growth and increased income and an improved
standard of living. As a result of different priorities at different times, the BTA was
not adopted in 1999 but it was adopted in 2000.

Dual party-state governance system
The third concept that can be elucidated by the model and the case studies in
this dissertation is the “dual party-state” political and policy system of Vietnam. In
Vietnam, as well as in China, at all of levels of public authority, there exist parallel
Party and government agencies that work together to shape the policy outcomes. The
Party organs take the leadership role in providing the guidelines and direction to the
state agencies. These guidelines set the direction without specifying all of the detail.
Every year the Party Central Committee convenes at least twice to examine and
deliberate on different policy alternatives and proposals submitted by state agencies.
The PCC and its organs can request the state agencies to provide information and to
organize hearings and deliberation. Notably, the Party is more concerned about the
political acceptability of reform and its congruence with core regime values while the
state agencies are responsible for technical feasibility. State agencies composed of
various ministerial organizations and research institutes produce consultative reports
and data. Even though, the boundary between Party’s and State’s functions is blurred,
the democratic-centralism mechanism requires the state agencies to seek the
guidelines from the party organs.

2. Contribution of the proposed policy model to the policy process literature
This dissertation aims at creating and validating a major policy change model
for Vietnam in an effort to provide a better understanding of the politics of the policy
process in Vietnam during its the transitional period. The author hopes that the
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proposed policy model along with the evidence from the four policy case studies can
contribute to two bodies of literature. The first literature is related to the policy
process theories and models that have been developed to explain policy change in the
U.S and other countries. As I pointed in my literature review in Chapter III, most of
these policy models have developed out of the American political process. Pioneering
U.S. scholars have developed such theories as Punctuated-equilibrium (Frank
Baumgartner and Bryan Jones), Advocacy Coalition (Paul Sabatier and JenkinsSmith), Multiple-stream (John Kingdon), Institutional Analysis and Development
(Elinor Ostrom). An increasing number of scholars have applied the policy process
theories and or developed different policy models in order to explain policy process in
different policy contexts and political systems (Regime-policy model, Wilson, 2000;
Focusing-event model, Birkland, 2006; Technical Infeasibility, Zhu, 2008; etc.). The
question posed by these studies is the extent to which the explanatory capacities of the
theories and models in policy analysis in different policy context including the context
in centralized, transitional, and single-party countries.
The second body of literature is composed of research and studies on politics
and policy reforms in Vietnam during its transitional period. Within this body of
literature, there are two main sources of research. The first source focuses on
descriptive inferences in different policy areas. For example, following are some of
the important research conducted in each of four policy areas under this study:

 In higher education policy on institutional autonomy: Hayden & Lam
(2007), Tran (2009), Pham (2010), Luu (2010), Ho & Berg (2010),
Harvard Kennedy School of Government (2008, 2010)
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 State-owned enterprise: Painter (2003, 2005), Melanie Beresford
(2008), Vu (2009), The Vietnam Consultative Group Meeting (2011)

 Trade liberalization: Athukarola (2006), Nguyen & Haughton (2002),
Pham (2011), Vo & Nguyen (2009)

 Economic reforms: Kokko (1998), Dixon (2000, 2003), Le (2002),
Abrami, (2003), Muller (2005), Meyer et al (2005), Chu & Dickie
(2006), National Assembly of Vietnam (2012).
The second source has used the language and theories of political science to
study policy reforms in Vietnam including the research of McCormick, (1998), Dinh
(2000), Nguyen (2000), Pierre (2000), Abuza, (2001), Painter (2003), Fritzen, (2000,
2002), Luong (2006), London (2009), Vu (2010). In addition to these sources of
research, increasing number of studies on Vietnam politics and policy reforms has
been developed from the works of international organizations such as WB, IMF, ADP,
DFID, UN agencies, Harvard University, etc. Vietnam has increasingly been open and
sought for technical and financial assistances from international donors and partners
that allow for a larger number of independent reports produced or supported by
various international organizations. Normally the studies sponsored by international
organizations are able to provide in-depth and comprehensive research in specific
policy areas or overall pictures of the socio-economic situation of Vietnam
(Macroeconomic Report 2012: From instability to the path of restructuring conducted
by the Economic Subcommittee of the National Assembly, in 2012; the White Paper

on the Future of Higher Education in Vietnam conducted by the Harvard Kennedy
School, and the Fulbright Economics Teaching Program (FETP) in Ho Chi Minh City
and sponsored by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 2010;
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Vietnam development report 2012: Market Economy for a middle-income Vietnam
conducted by the Vietnam Consultative Group Meeting in 2011, etc.,. This body of
literature, along with research on China politics and policies, has provided us with a
much better understanding of the policy reform outcomes as well as constraints and
insights of the politics of the communist and single-party countries represented by
China and Vietnam.
Despite a remarkable development of these two bodies of research, to the
knowledge of the author, no scholar or research has focused on developing a
theoretical policy models to explain policy process and politics of reforms in Vietnam.
Most researchers have concentrated on descriptive analysis to examine the policy
problems, outcomes and solutions in a transitional Vietnam. Thus, this dissertation is
expected to contribute to a better understanding of policy reforms and politics of
Vietnam as following:

Contribution to the literature body of policy process theory and model
First, the dissertation confirms the popular views of the policy process theories
and models that stressors are a precondition for an innovative policy change initiative
to be advanced to the official agenda of the government. Stressors challenge the
existing status quo of a policy subsystem and pave the way for different policy
paradigm to be articulated. Pressures from stressors play a catalyst role in accelerating
the process of change. In the cases of trade and legal reforms in this dissertation,
radical policy change would likely not have occurred if there had not been the Asian
Financial Crisis in 1997, which spawned an increased incentive on the part of
Vietnam to liberalize international trade and adopt radical legal changes. The stressors
identified in my four case studies illustrate that stressors can be both internal and
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external and can include a combination of economic, social, political factors that are
triggered by policy changes in other areas. However, this dissertation along with other
policy process theories and models reviewed in Chapter II argues that stressors do not
automatically lead to radical changes. There must be other policy factors in place to
push for the adoption of radical change. For example, in the case of state-owned
management policy, despite increasing stressors, even scandals or the risks of
economic collapse, the CPV and its government still stood firm on their will to
maintain a large and strong state economic sector.
It should be noted that the concept of stressor is very broad and as argued by
Thomas Birkland in his Focusing-event model, it is not easy to quantify and measure
the magnitude of stressor influences on the policy process and outcomes. It seems
easier to quantify the stressors in economic areas than in social areas. Among the four
cases studies in this dissertation, the stressors in the higher education sector seem less
visible and more abstract because there is a lack of a strong linkage between
economic development and high education quality. In Vietnam, there is also an
absence of a direct connection between higher education quality and more
institutional autonomy. As a result, the predisposition to reform in this policy area
seems weakest among the cases. The Vietnamese government acknowledges strong
pressures but cannot realize exactly what they are.
Second, the concept of “leadership predisposition” is new in the literature even
though the scholars have made reference to the importance of such a concept. For
example, in the policy-elite policy choice model created by Thomas and Grindle
(1991), the two authors used the concepts “ideological predisposition” to explain the
ideological commitments of policy elites in the policy change process. Bruce Gilley
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(2010) used the phrase “subjective perceptions” to identify the difference in the
political transformation between China and Taiwan. These concepts, together with the
concept of “leadership disposition” to reform, help describe the policy change process
in developing countries, especially in single-party and state-led political system. In
this system, due to a weak civil society, more power and legitimacy is vested in the
hand of policy elites and public officials compared to their counterparts in developed
and democratic countries. Therefore, the role of the state and public agencies and its
leaders in advancing policy change initiatives into the government agenda is clearer
compared to pluralist systems. The concept of leadership predisposition helps to
explain why international donors and agencies working with Vietnam sometimes feel
disappointed in what they perceive to be arbitrary decision and the lack of democratic
participation in the policy process and decision making practice in Vietnam even
though the Vietnamese government has been very open hearing external ideas and
different views. Being open to new and different ideas may not result in any
predisposition to change. Leaders may think that a change is a good idea and will
endorse it in general but not adopt it in particular because the timing is wrong or that
it will undermine other values that have higher priority.
Third, the model and the empirical evidence of the policy case studies affirm
the importance of policy image in the process of radical policy change. Without
significant change in the policy image regarding the assessment of the problems and
the solutions to resolve such problems, no innovative policy change alternative is like
to occur. The policy image can be changed by the influences of stressors, by policy
learning from feedback or additional information and studies. However, a powerful
central ideology like socialism, communism, democracy, theocracy may prevent any
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change from occurring. This was certainly the case in Vietnam where the issue of
state-owned enterprise management was seen as central to the prevailing socialist
ideology and was too powerful to bring about many changes in the operation of
SOG’s and SEG’s. While political leaders recognized the problems of low efficiency
and corruption arising from state-ownership, they have opted to make marginal
improvements rather than fundamentally restructure the relationship between state
and the economy.
Fourth, this Model and evidence from the four case studies in this dissertation
introduce the concept of “political value or principle” which serves as the filter for
political acceptability in the case of Vietnam. As I have presented in Chapter III, this
concept is similar to the concept of “deep core belief” introduced by Paul Sabatier
(1988) in his Advocacy-coalition framework. Sabatier argued that deep core belief
such as individual freedom, liberty or democracy are the embedded values in the U.S.
society and cannot be changed. Since these values are inculcated in the society and
public governance, the Sabatier’s policy framework does not focus on “deep core
beliefs” as an independent policy change factor. When this notion is applied to
Vietnam, it means that the country’s commitment to its deep core belief in socialism
shapes defines and narrows the meaning of policy change factors like stressor, policy
image, leadership predisposition to change, etc. This understanding of how “core
political” beliefs interacts with other policy change factors helps us understand
Vietnam’s emphasis on preserving its core values in the face of strong internal and
external pressures to reform. As a Socialist and transitional country, Vietnam has been
exposed to the core beliefs from the outside world, especially from western
democracies. Therefore, the regime has been challenged by these divergent values
297

when its people have more communication and connection with other cultures and
societies from the internet, press media, travel and global economic interdependence.
As a result, the political leaders feel compelled to protect its Socialist legacies and
characteristics of a single-party and party-led political system. These core political
values play a gatekeeping role over the policy reform process and the role of the
factors affecting major policy change.

Contribution to the literature body of policy process and politics of reform in
Vietnam
This dissertation contributes to a better understanding of the policy change and
politics of reforms in Vietnam during ðổi Mới in different aspects. First, the process
of initiating, deliberating, formulating and adopting a radical policy change in
Vietnam is state-led. This does not necessarily mean that the state is closed to the
outside world or ignores the policy inputs and ideas from the society. Instead, the state
apparatus is composed of consultative agencies, research institutes and taskforces that
help the state to communicate with the people and comprehend their aspirations.
However, until present the state has been able to isolate the pressures and critics by
international organizations and the people. The government’s ability to rely on partycontrolled mediating institutions to collect and communicate information in the policy
development process has been gradually undermined through economic reforms and
technology, which have opened the country to more information from nongovernmental sources, both internally and from abroad. The regime has recognized
these challenges but has been slow to make changes. It has opted for “experimental”
and “pilot” governance practices with the hope that “as we go, we find our way”.
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The second important point regarding the policy reforms during ðổi Mới is
the increasing influence of external factors on Vietnam’s development. The case of
adopting many radical legal changes and policies in 2005 at the threshold of the WTO
accession demonstrated a truth: as Vietnam integrated deeper into the world
community, it would increasingly be affected by the outside world. Vietnam has
responded to these pressures by creating a level playing field for economic
enterprises, but it has done so in a proactive manner. Vietnam accepts reforms and
changes but by its own pace and pathway. Powerful international organizations like
the World Bank and the IMF have not succeeded in imposing their will on the pace
and kind of policy reform undertaken by the government. Shivakumar (1996) in the
article “Political parties, development policies and pragmatism in a changing world:

Lessons from Vietnam” posited that “while one could question the role of institutions
like the World Bank or IMF in formulating the economic reforms that began in 1989,
it is obvious that they could not play a leading role in shaping the process of change
undertaken by Vietnam”. The Vietnamese government demonstrates recognition to
address the concerns of its outside critics but do so in ways that harmonizing the
desires of the donors with the interests of the regime.
The third lesson from these case studies regarding the essence of the policy
process in Vietnam is the absolute leadership of the CPV over the government in
policy reform process during ðổi Mới. Within the party-state system, any radical
policy change initiative must be approved by the Party Central Committee. The Party
takes the leadership role not only in determining the working agenda of the
government and National Assembly but also in deciding the final approval to all
major policy changes. Over the past years the government has tended to diminish this
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role of the Party. However, the recent 6th Plenum of the CPV in October 2012
reaffirmed the decisive role of the CPV in maintaining its leadership over the state
system. The regime wants to maintain a mechanism through which the integration and
coordination between party and state units are effective in providing the necessary
support to ensure that resources are optimally utilized for successful cause of
industrialization and modernization.
The fourth important characteristic of the policy reform process in Vietnam is
the reliance on collective-based decision making system. Even though the reforms are
state-led, there is a democratic and deliberative mechanism within the Party Central
Committee and government. In the small groups of political and policy elites, no
single figure is in the position to impose his will on the policy process and outcome.
This “internal democracy” has helped the CPV to access different points of view and
allowed free debate on its policies and strategies. The outcome of the recent 6th
Plenum in October 2012 demonstrated that even the Politburo was not able to make
final decisions without the consensus of the Party Central Committee. Thus, the
principle of “democratic-centralism” is still a centerpiece of the Party’s Charter that
helps the Party encourage the internal Party democracy while maintaining
centralization and control of the Party Central Committee.

3. Limitations of the research and proposed future research
This section identifies the limitations of this research study and proposes
future research that builds on the findings of this study.
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The limitations of the research
Despite my efforts to develop a research that can provide comprehensive
understanding of the policy process and politics of reform in Vietnam, the research
has both content and methodological limitations

Content limitations
The first limitation in terms of content is related to the constraint of the
proposed policy change model. The model only seeks to explain the policy change
process from the triggering factors though the final state of adoption. The model does
not extend policy change to include the implementation and evaluation stages of a
policy cycle. In the practice of Vietnam, there is always a big gap between policy
design and policy implementation. Therefore, it is important to develop another type
of policy model that would help to explain how the policies in Vietnam are
implemented at the local government level after they are designed and adopted by the
central government.
The second content limitation is that due to the lack of information and data
regarding the internal deliberation and discussion within the Party and government
organs, the researcher was not able to describe in detail the internal policy image
changes within the individual policy elites and within the leadership segments of the
regime. In addition, the author has not been able to identify the actual mechanism to
accommodate different points of views within the Party and government when the
policy change alternatives are discussed and deliberated. This is a common issue for
other researchers and scholars who cannot obtain access to the proceedings and
documents of the secret and closed meetings of the Party and government. Over the
past few years, there is increasing democracy within the National Assembly when
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hearings have been conducted to cabinet members including the Prime Minister and
broadcasted lively on television. However, the questions are submitted in advance and
the cabinet members have prepared the answers prior to the hearings. Also, the
debated issues are oriented and selected by Standing Committee of the National
Assembly after consulting the Party Central Committee. Most importantly, the
Plenums of the CCP and the National Party Congress are not publicized and the press
media agencies are still limited to broadcasting the contents of the outcomes. Party’s
meetings and debates are still considered as the internal affairs of the Party and its
members.
The third limitation of the research is the lack of strong evidence to
differentiate between the policy beliefs of the regime and the rhetorical policy
statements of the policy and political elites. In the proposed policy model, I argued
that to maintain the legacies of the Socialist state and legitimacy of the Party, political
leaders have to advance their beliefs and make them dominant within the state and
society. The principle of “democratic-centralism”, however, does not allow senior
public officials to publicly state their true beliefs, especially when the beliefs might
conflict with the mainstream ideology and political values of the Party. Recently, there
have been increasing critics and independent views challenging the policies and
governance practices of the Party and government. However, these views and critics
are advanced by retired and former senior policy elites only.
Last, there are still some difficulties in isolating political core values and
principles of the CPV. It is also challenging to identify the intermediate political goals
and their relationships to the political core values. For instance, I have identified two
political core values of the CPV: political stability and absolute leadership role over
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the state and society. I have identified through my case studies some of the
intermediate political goals that help the CPV to realize the core values: economic
growth and higher living standards, social equality and coherence, state-led
industrialization and modernization, social welfare for the masses and internal Party
unity and solidarity. I have argued that at given points of time, based on the context,
the Party and government reach consensus on giving the highest priority to specific
intermediate goals. If such priority favors the given innovative policy change
alternative, then radical change can be adopted. If not, there are only incremental
changes or even intact outcomes. However, it is not clear whether and how a change
in policy image inter-relates or affects the assessment of the political priorities at a
given period of time. Also, the question still remains unclear in the case of conflict
among the intermediate policy goals how does the Party resolve such conflicts. This
part of the process has been inaccessible to study.

Methods limitations
Due to limitations on time and resource, this research only relied on document
review data collection to gather the evidence. This included an examination of Party’s
and state’s guiding resolutions, conclusions, legal documents, and policy elite
interviews and statements on the internet, and independent academic research. This
document review method was very helpful in providing empirical evidence related to
the policy factors of stressors, leadership predisposition, policy image and consensus
on political priority of the Party and government. However, it is limited in providing
the access to information on the internal deliberations within the Party and
government organs and on the actual policy beliefs of the elites. The method is also
not able to shed light on the mechanism that the Party uses to accommodate different
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points of view to reach consensus. Among the case studies, the case of trade
liberalization has the best information about the internal beliefs and the changing
process of the policy image and the internal debates within the Party regarding the
balancing of political priorities. For the other cases, even when we have access to
publicized interviews with policy elites, most of their statements are censured and
limited.
To offset the limitations of the research method used for the case studies in
this dissertation, I have relied on a number of personal communications and
interviews with senior officials at both the central and local government levels. Even
though these interviews are not integrated into this dissertation, they have been very
helpful in verifying some of the unclear issues and questions. In addition, my
experience working in a central government agency in Vietnam gave me access to a
practical understanding of the operations of the policy process and structure in
Vietnam.

Proposed future research
Based on the results of this research and its limitations, there are several
productive areas for future research. First, change in policy image is an important
factor in bringing about major reform, but there is much that this study leaves open.
For example, what are the various causal factors that bring about a change in policy
image? Are there some models that can be developed? To what extent are these
models applicable across different types of regimes?
In addition to the questions surrounding changes in policy image, there are
unanswered questions of how changes in policy image interact with one’s assessment
of the importance of various political priorities. For example, the decision to adopt a
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market economy as part of one policy image model is very likely to make
performance of the market economy a higher priority than had been the case in the
past. Further research on issues on changes in policy image and its interplay with the
setting of political priorities can assist international agencies in identifying the kinds
of interventions that are most likely to result in major policy changes in Vietnam.
A second potential area for research is to clarify and differentiate the different
concepts of “political core values”, “intermediate political goals” and “socialist
legacy” of the CPV. For example, I have argued that party control and state direction
of the society have been the core political values of Vietnam with values like social
equity, a harmonious society, social stability, economic prosperity as being
intermediate political goals. But a case could be made that the core political values are
governed by changes in the meaning of a socialist society. In other words, the core
political values may be the source of real change. My study is not able to answer this
question. These kinds of question can be better addressed by interviews with
incumbent and former senior policy elites to get the better insights of the policy
deliberation and internal working mechanism within the Party. The interviews can
also help identify the internal personal policy beliefs of political leaders of the Party
and government of Vietnam.

4. Conclusion
By employing the policy study languages and concepts instead of using
political theories, this dissertation attempted to provide a new approach to explain the
politics of policy reforms in Vietnam during the its transitional period of time. The
major policy change model in the dissertation was developed based on the universal
factors of change embedded in the well-developed policy process theories and models
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in the U.S. while founded on the regime characteristics of Vietnam. The model
emphasized the role of stressor and regime’s leadership predisposition to reform as the
necessary and sufficient conditions for a policy change initiative to be advanced into
the official agendas of the National Assembly and government of Vietnam. However,
in order for a major/innovative policy change to be adopted, there must be a
significant change in the policy image of the regime and its policy elites as well as the
consensus on the temporary political priority within the regime favoring the policy
change proposal.
The proposed policy model was proved to be helpful and relevant to the
examination of the policy processes and outcomes in the policy case studies
conducted in the dissertation. In the two cases with radical policy change
(international trade liberalization and legal reform in foreign investment), the four
policy factors identified in the model (stressors, leadership predisposition to reform,
significant change in the policy image and Party consensus on temporary political
priority) were present at different stages of the policy change process to induce the
final radical change outcomes. In contrast, in the two cases without innovative change
(higher education policy on institutional autonomy and state-owned enterprise
management policy), the lack of significant change in the policy image has prohibited
the formulation and articulation of innovative policy change proposal over the past
decades in Vietnam. The study has found that the legacy of a Socialist state is the key
barrier for the significant change in the policy image of the regime and its leaders in
these two policy areas. The requirements of party/state control, social stability, and
collective mastery still dominate the demand for policy innovation and efficiency in
the policy areas of higher education and state economic management.
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The concepts and causal arguments of policy change in the proposed model
along with the insightful evidence from the case studies in the dissertation contributed
to the understanding of the policy process and reform in the single-party and
transitional countries like Vietnam and China. They help uncover the “black box” of
the politics of policy reforms in Vietnam over the last two decades. By referring to
different policy stages of the policy change process with two kinds of “filer”
(technical feasibility and political acceptability), the proposed policy model is capable
of explaining the characteristics of policy reforms in Vietnam described by other
scholars as gradualist or dual party-state approach. In addition, with the concepts of
political principle and intermediate political goal, we can explain the seemingly
pragmatic behaviors of the regime in Vietnam in policy-making process. When
deliberating and deciding radical policy change, the regime on the one hand needs to
maintain the core values and principles (political stability and Party leadership), on
the other hand opens for various political goals at different points of time.
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Appendix: Key contents of Vietnam Higher Education Law of 2012
related to institutional autonomy of higher education institutions

The Higher Education Law was promulgated by the Vietnamese National
Assembly in June 2012. The following review is to reveal that even in this law, the
Socialist legacy of centralized control still trumps the demand for decentralization as a
strategy to reform the higher education system in Vietnam.

The goals of higher education
There is a difference in terms of the goals of higher education between the
Higher Education Law of 2012 and the Education Law of 2005. Indeed, in the
Education Law of 2005, the first goal of higher education is to “educate learners in
acquiring political and moral competencies and public spirit”. This goal is given
higher priority than the goal of “acquiring knowledge and practical skills relevant to
different educational levels; and acquiring good health, thereby meeting the needs for
national construction and defense” (Article 39, Education Law of 2005). In contrast,
in the Higher Education Law of 2012, the goals of developing human resource,
improving literacy, training talents, conducting scientific and technological research
and producing new knowledge for the sake of economic development, national
security and international integration are prior to the goals of educating learners in
acquiring political and moral competencies and public spirit (Article 5, Higher
Education Law of 2012).
The Education Law of 2005 asserted that the Vietnamese education system is
the socialist education system founded on Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh
Thought. Although this principle has not been repeated in the new Higher Education
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Law of 2012, Article 3 of this law asserts that the organization and administration of
higher education institutions is still subjected to the Education Law of 2005 and other
state legal documents. That means that the Education Law of 2005 still has governing
authority over state management of the higher education institutions.

Party organization and committee within higher education institutions
According to Article No. 13 of the Higher Education Law of 2012, the
Communist Party of Vietnam’s committees are established and operated within every
higher education institution based on the Party’s Charter and under the Constitution
and relevant laws. Higher education institutions are responsible for the creation of
necessary conditions for Party’s organizations and social associations to be
established and operated within the institutions. It means that the Party and
government want to maintain Party leadership within every higher education
institution, including private ones.

University council and president
The roles of university council have been articulated and promoted in various
legal documents since the beginning of 2000 as the way to delegate the administrative
rights from the state agencies to the higher education institutions. This law again
reiterates and concretizes the roles and functions of the university councils. The law
clearly gives university councils the authorities over: (1) Governing strategies,
development plans, and the organizational charter of the institutions; (2) Training,
scientific research, international relations and quality assurance plans and strategies of
the institutions; (3) Organizational structure and investment plans of the institutions;
(4) The division, merge or abolishment of units within the institution; (5) The
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implementation of plans and strategies identified by the councils and the democratic
process within the institutions.
However, the chairs of the university councils are appointed by the relevant
public authorities. Also, the presidents of the higher education institutions are
appointed by the public authorities such as the Ministry of Education and Training,
other line ministries or provincial people’s committees. Notably, the first criterion for
an appointed president is “political competence and good morality” which in
Vietnamese means compliance with and loyalty to the political values and leadership
of the CPV.

Open new academic programs
Under the Higher Education Law of 2012, the Minister of Education and
Training has the right to regulate the criteria, phases and procedures to allow or to
stop the operation of any academic program of every higher education institution at
the undergraduate, master or doctoral levels. The national universities and other
institutions that can meet the national standards and qualifications set by the Ministry
of Education and Training have the autonomous rights and responsibilities in opening
new programs at all levels with two conditions: (1) the program must be in the list of
permitted programs promulgated by the Ministry of Education and Training; and (2)
the program must demonstrate the appropriate training capacity to deliver the
program. National universities are allowed to open new programs not on the permitted
list of MOET as pilot projects but the importance of such program need to be justified
by the Ministry of Education and Training and to obtain formal approval before they
are officially taught as regular programs.
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Content of academic curriculum
Institutions are allowed to design the curriculum for all of their programs.
However, the Ministry of Education and Training regulates the minimum amount of
studying time (credit) for the accomplishment of every program; requirement of skills
and capacities for graduation; the procedures of designing, accrediting, and
promulgating the curriculum; the compulsory courses for the programs managed by
foreign-owned institutions and joint-venture programs; and the procedures to
compose, and select all textbooks. The Ministry of Education and Training composes
the curriculum and textbooks for the political, security and national defense courses
which must be taught at every institution.
For the foreign-owned programs and institutions, they can use their own
curriculum. But they must guarantee that their curriculums have been accredited by
recognized accrediting associations in their home countries and that the learning
contents must not adversely impact social security, national and community interests
and must not violate or distort history, traditions, and the moral rules of Vietnam
(Article 36). The joint-venture programs conducted in any Vietnamese higher
education institutions, except for those offered under the auspice of the national
universities, must meet the conditions for quality assurance set by the government and
must be approved by the Ministry of Education and Training.

Accreditation
Article 51 of the Higher Education Law of 2012 asserted that every institution
is subjected to accreditation whenever required by the public authorities. They also
need to provide necessary information and report on quality assurance requested by
the Ministry of Education and Training. MOET has the right to regulate the national
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standards for every higher education institutions; evaluation and accreditation criteria;
standards for curriculum at all training levels; the minimum requirements of skills and
capacities for graduation of all programs; the accrediting procedures; and the
operational mechanism, and the criteria for the establishment and operation of
accrediting organizations within the system. The accreditation results will be used by
the government agencies to identify the relevant autonomous rights for individual
institutions. The relevant public agencies will also use the accrediting results when
they decide the budget or investment for individual institutions. While the law refers
to the establishment of independent accrediting associations, it has not identified the
specific conditions and procedures to establish and operate such organizations yet.

Student enrolment and admission process
According to recent policy change in student admission, the higher education
institutions are autonomous in identifying the enrollment quota for themselves, but
they are required to publicize student quota and conditions to manage and assure the
quality. Institutions have the right to employ different admission methods such as the
national entrance exams or profile examination. The Ministry of Education and
Training, however, reserves the right to regulate the methods to identify the enrolment
number and admission procedures applied to every institution. For example, the
ministry administrates and organizes the national entrance examination, sets the
minimum (floor) score for admission to any institution, and the timeline for the
admission process annually. Also, even though institutions do not need to get the
approval for their enrollment quota from the MOET, they do need to send a report to
MOET regarding their enrolment quota and the conditions to ensure the quality.
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Institution classification in higher education
One of the new points in this Higher Education Law of 2012 compared to
other previous legal documents is the institutional classification under Article 9.
Accordingly, higher education institutions are classified based on different criteria: (1)
the relative role and position within the higher education system; (2) the scope,
discipline and level of education and training programs; (3) the proportion between
training and research activities; (4) the quality of training and research; (5) the
feedback resulting from accreditation. Based on these criteria, three kinds of
institutions will be identified as one of the following: (1) Research institutions; (2)
Application-oriented institutions; and (3) Profession institutions. The goal of this
classification is for the government to use it as the guide to the investment policy,
especially to deal with the policy question regarding the need to decentralize the
higher education system. The law anticipates that institutions of higher rank and
quality will be given more institutional autonomy and rights compared to the lower
tier ones. The government controls the standards and accrediting criteria for the
classification of institutions. The law provides that the Prime Minister will recognize
the ranking and order of institutions.
According to the law, the two national universities are granted a higher level
of autonomy in education and training activities, scientific research, finance
management, international cooperation and organizational structure compared to the
rest of the institutions. They can work directly with ministry-level agencies, provincial
people’s committees and can report directly to the Prime Minister when necessary.
However, they are under the state management of the Ministry of Education and
Training and their presidents and vice presidents are appointed and removed by the
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Prime Minister. The government continues to regulate concrete functions, missions
and rights of the national universities. Overall, the government is in the chief control
position in designing policies and creating regulations in higher education based on
the development of the accreditation and classification system.

Procedures for the establishment and operation of the higher education
institutions
The Prime Minister reserves the rights to regulate the criteria and procedures
for the establishment and operation of four-year institutions, including foreign-owned
institutions. The Minister of Education and Training has the right to regulate the
criteria and procedures for the establishment and operation of the junior institutions
(two-year colleges). Also, the Prime Minister decides and approves in principle the
establishment of new public, private and foreign-invested four-year institutions while
the Minister of Education and Training has the rights to permit the establishment of
two-year, both public and private, colleges.
In terms of the missions and rights of higher education institutions, the law has
reiterated the general missions and rights in 10 administrative aspects, including:
planning; operational activities such as training, research, quality assurance, and
international relations; developing training program based on the missions, and
ensuring the integration between different level of education; managing organizational
structure, staff recruitment, teacher training, and human resource management;
managing students and ensuring the legalized rights of teachers, staff and students;
self-evaluation and being subjected to accreditation assigned by the government; the
right to use land and receive tax exemption; mobilizing resources for development;
cooperating with domestic and international organizations for mutual benefit; being
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responsible for report to the Ministry of Education and Training and other public
agencies. Even the foreign-owned institutions have to report to the Ministry of
Education and Training and the local governments on a regular basis a variety of
administrative activities.
It should be noted that following other documents, institutional autonomy for
the higher education institutions including personnel management, asset and facility
management, training and scientific research activities, international relations, and
quality assurance are articulated in this law. However, these institutional rights are
limited and conditioned because autonomous rights given to certain institutions
depending on the capacities and the ranks of such institutions revealed by the result of
the accreditation which in turn be recognized by the government agencies.

Setting tuition and fee in higher education
According to the law, the government reserves the right to regulate the method
to identify the tuition and fee levels of public institutions. The private and foreigninvested institutions have the right to identify their tuition and fee rates within the
framework set by the government. Private institutions must use at least 25% of the
added value between expenditure and income (profit) for reinvestment. Notably, the
law avoids using the sensitive word “profit” in education. Also, the withdrawal of
capital of the investors in private institutions must be under the strict regulations of
the government in order to ensure the stability and development of the institutions.
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